Questions on the Posterior Analytics: First Set

By Simon of Faversham.

Translated by John Longeway

Question 21

            We inquire concerning the part, “If, then, demonstrative knowledge” etc., in which the Philosopher shows from what and what sort of necessary propositions a demonstration has being, for it has being from those which are per se and universally and in every case. And wishing to show that it is from such, he first shows what each of these is. First of all he shows what “in every case” is, for he says that is “in every case” which is not in some but not others, and sometimes but not at other times, but in every case and always. Here the Philosopher suggests that where something is in every case it is necessary that the predicate be in the subject for every difference in time. Therefore, since the subject is said of some, it is asked whether a common term is said through a single defining formula (ratio) of its present, past and future supposita.

            And it is argued that it is not said of all those through one formula, for whatever shares in the inferior according to one formula shares in the superior according to the same one formula, for whatever shares in the inferior shares in the superior. Therefore whatever shares in the inferior according to one formula shares in the superior according to one formula. Now being (ens) is superior to human being, and to everything else, therefore whatever shares in human being according to one formula shares in being according to one formula. Therefore those which do not share in being according to one formula do not share in human being according to one formula. But existing supposita of human being and non-existing supposita do not share in being according to one formula, for non-existing supposita are said to be in the soul, but an existing suppositum is a true being outside the soul. Therefore neither do these share in man according to one formula. Therefore man is not said of existing and non-existing supposita through one formula, but past and future supposita are non-existent, and present supposita are existent; therefore etc.

            Again, the Philosopher says in Meteorology IV that each natural thing is determined by some proper operation in which, when it is capable, it is called a singular, and when it is not capable, it is not called a singular except equivocally. So there is a proper operation of human being in which, when it is capable it is called a human being, and when it is not it is not called a human being except equivocally. In the same way, this is apparent of the eye. It is necessary, then, that those which partake of a single natural formula partake in the operation following per se on that formula. But the existing supposita of man and the non-existing do not share in one operation of man, since the existing suppositum feels and reasons, but the non-existing does neither. Therefore the two do not participate in one formula of human being. Therefore etc.

            Again, the Commentator on De Anima II contends that the genus of change is two-fold: one is the genus of change according to which, if something changes, it changes in name and definition, and this sort is substantial change. Coming into being and passing away are of this sort. The other is the genus of change in which, if something is changed it is not changed in name and definition. From this I argue that substantial change is that in which, if something changes, it changes in name and definition. If the non-existing supposita of human being were changed substantially, then they were changed in name and definition. Therefore a non-existing suppositum does not remain the same as it was before in name and definition. But it shared the name and definition of human being, therefore it will no longer share in these. Even though an existing suppositum shares in the formula of human being, the non-existing does not share in this, therefore human being is not said through a single defining formula of both this and that.

            Again, the Commentator on Metaphysics III contends that in that which is, was, and will be, no common formula is found. Now a non-existing suppositum is such that it was or will be, but an existing suppositum is such that it is; therefore, in a suppositum that exists now, and in the past, and in the future, there is not found any common formula. This being agreed, there arises this common proposition, “nothing is common to being and non-being.” Let it be assumed in every case below. But past and future supposita are non-beings and present supposita are beings, therefore one common defining formula is not found in present, past and future, and so it will not be spoken of these through a single formula.

            On the other hand, it is argued that a term is said through one formula of all the supposita that are supposita of that one formula. But present, past, and future supposita are supposita of one formula, for that is the formula of a suppositum because it signifies individually what the common term signifies universally, as is obvious from Metaphysics VII. Now present, past, and future supposita signify the same individually that the common term, for instance, “human being,” signifies universally, since “Antichrist” [a future thing] signifies the same individually that “human being” signifies universally. And in the same way “Caesar” [a past thing] signifies the same individually as “human being” does universally; and the same for Socrates, assuming he is in the present. Therefore Antichrist, Caesar, and Socrates are supposita of one formula, and therefore human being is said of all of these through one formula.

            When it is asked whether a common term is said through one defining formula of present, past, and future supposita, I hold that we can attend to the supposita being present or future as regards either of two things, their sharing in the term, or their act of existing. Attending to their being at present and in the future as regards sharing in the form of the term, in this way a term is not said through one formula of present, past, and future supposita, since the term is not said through one formula of those that share in the form of the term and then no longer shares in it, and of those that will share in it but don’t yet do so, and of those that actually share in it [i.e. in the present]. This is apparent from two considerations—first, in this way the term is not said through one formula (ratio) of those that do not equally share in the form (forma) of the term. Now the supposita that shared in the past and those that will share and those that now share do not equally share in the form of the term. Therefore etc.

            Again, this is explained because the Commentator says on De Anima I that capacity and act are primary differences in being, and are to the greatest extent opposites in each genus. Therefore a term is not said through the same formula of those that divide the form of the term through act and capacity. But supposita that share in the form of the term and then no longer share in it, and those that will share in it in the future and do not yet do so, and those that actually share in the form [in the present], divide the form of the term through act and capacity, for supposita that actually share in the form of the term are brought together under the term, but others according to capacity only; therefore etc.

            Thus it is obvious what is to be said if we attend to being future or past insofar as sharing in the form of the term is concerned. But if we attend to being in the present and in the future as regards the act of existence, in this way I hold that the term is said through one formula of every suppositum that shares in the form of the term, whether it actually exists or not. For the term is said of those that are one in the form of the term through one formula, but all supposita that share in the form of the term, whether existing or not, are one in the form of the term; therefore etc.

            But there is a hidden difficulty here. Is this possible, that a suppositum should not actually exist and yet share in the form of the term? We ask this since you hold that a term is said of those that share in the form of the term through one formula, whether they exist or not. So, for example, is it possible that Caesar should share in the form of human being and be a suppositum of it? It seems that it is not, for what is destroyed as far as its substance is concerned is destroyed in every substantial predicate that inheres in it, but Caesar, who was and now is not, is destroyed as far as his substance is concerned; therefore he is destroyed in every substantial predicate inhering in him. Therefore he is destroyed in being a human being. Caesar therefore is not a human being, and Socrates is a human being, therefore “human being” is not said of them through the same defining formula.

            I hold that it is possible that something should not actually exist and nonetheless actually be a suppositum of the term, and this is apparent. We often say, and it is true, that one abstracts the significatum of a term from every difference in time, so that a term includes neither in what it designates nor in its way of signifying any difference of time. So Aristotle says in De Interpretatione that a name is a word which is significant by convention without tense etc. But one abstracts the significatum of a term from every time, and therefore from every difference in time, therefore a suppositum of one time is no more said to be a suppositum than another of a different time. From this I argue that a term abstracts equally from supposita of every different time, but those from which a term equally abstracts share in the form of the term through one formula; therefore etc. So human being, from this that human being no more determines itself to a human being in the present than in the past or future, since a man in the present is not a man from being in the present, nor a man in the past from being in the past, since it abstracts equally from this and from that, and therefore it is said of them through one formula.

            Again, this is explained thus: of those of which there is one essential understanding there is one essential formula, but of an existing and a non-existing suppositum there is one essential understanding, for just as when I apprehend Socrates, who is in the present, I immediately apprehend a human being, so by apprehending the future Antichrist I immediately apprehend a human being, for it includes man in its significatum, and similarly by apprehending Caesar I apprehend a man. It is said of all of these through the same formula, then. And that both beings and non-beings are understood through one formula is clear, for the Philosopher says against Plato in Of Memory and Reminiscence that they can understand magnitudes that are not; and in understanding magnitude which is and is not, I always understand the same thing, since I understand the essence of magnitude in both. A term, then is said of present, past, and future supposita through one formula, not as they are in the present or as they are past or as they are future, for this is an accident of the form of the term, but as they share in the form of the term.

            Again, of those of which there is one whatness there is one formula; but of supposita that exist and do not exist there is one whatness, for actual existence or not being is an accident of the whatness of a reality, which Avicenna makes clear thus: each reality has something conceptually abstracted by which it is known of it what it is apart from its being understood to be in the soul or in reality outside the soul. And he says later that humanity has only that it is humanity from this that it is humanity, and from this that it is humanity it is neither in the soul nor in reality outside the soul. From this that it is humanity it is neither one nor many nor in singulars nor in the soul; but it has this alone from this, that it is humanity, that it is humanity. But by no means, he says, if animality, from this that it is animality, exists in an effect, then, since animality cannot fail to be animality, animality cannot fail to be in an effect; and if it could not exist in an effect, then its being would necessarily be from itself, and if its being were necessarily from itself then it would depend on no other to be an efficient cause in its being, since animality does not have that it is animality from any other as efficient cause (effective). But then animality as it is animality would exist in an effect, and it would not have this from another as efficient cause, which is impossible, since each thing caused by another as efficient cause depends on the other’s being; therefore animality as such does not exist in an effect. Similarly neither does any other, as a consequence of the same argument. To summarize the argument, then: There is one formula of those which have one whatness. Something, therefore, can be a suppositum of a term actually without determining itself to existence in an effect. For just as a term does not determine itself to existing in an effect, in the same way neither does a suppositum of the term do this through itself. Therefore Caesar, who is actual in the past, is an actual suppositum of the term just as Socrates is, who is now.

            In response to the argument, when it is said, “what is destroyed as far as its substance is concerned” etc., this is true. And you say, “Caesar being destroyed” etc.—I hold that if through “Caesar” we understand that which was Caesar before and now is not Caesar, it is clear that he is destroyed as far as his substance is concerned. And “therefore it is destroyed as far” etc.—I contend that that which was Caesar before and is not Caesar now does not share in the form of human being. Nevertheless, Caesar always shares in the form of human being, and therefore he is actually a human being. Now I argue that Caesar is always a man actually, and Caesar is past actually; therefore a certain past thing is a human being, not as it is past, but as it is a human being. I argue in the same way concerning the Antichrist, that he is always actually a human being, and the Antichrist is actually future; therefore a certain future thing is a human being. In the same way I hold that Socrates, who is in the present, is actually always a human being, but actually Socrates is in the present; therefore etc. But a past thing is a human being not as it is a past thing, but as it shares in the form of human being. In the same way a future thing is a human being not as a future thing, but as a human being or as it shares in the form of human being.

            And all the confusion about the problem at hand seems to be because we do not distinguish between act and capacity in a suppositum, for instance, between Caesar in act and Caesar in capacity, or between human being in act and human being in capacity. Now I believe that if we were to distinguish thus, a few arguments would remain unresolved, but the arguments which strengthen this part, as well as those that strengthen the other, can be dissolved. For these are only quasi-logical, therefore we ought not to care much which part is maintained, but this seems to be sufficiently probable.

            And if someone were to say that it is a fallacy of accident to argue “Caesar is always a human being, but Caesar is actually past; therefore etc.,” it is obvious that this cannot be assigned to the fallacy of accident. So human being is not determined of itself to being now and to being then or to being in the present, past, or future, as it is obvious that just as human being can agree actually with Caesar so it can agree with that which is past. And therefore being a human being now is a predicate belonging to the difference between Caesar in actuality and a past thing; and if you should tell me that Caesar in actuality is not in the nature of things, in what way then is Caesar a human being? So this objection amounts to nothing. If it were the case that Caesar in actuality is a human being through the being of actual existence, then Caesar in actuality would not be a human being except when he actually exists, but Caesar in actuality is a human being since this essence is, for one whoever understands Caesar in actuality understands a human being. Hence, if someone were to ask why a human being is a human being, I would say it is because this essence is that, or because the essence of the predicate is the essence of the subject. Thus I will hold that Caesar is a human being in actuality since this essence is that and because of nothing else, just as when no eclipse exists in the realities of nature, an eclipse is still in eclipse.

            And if you reply, “a dead human being is not a human being, but Caesar in actuality is a dead human being; therefore etc.,” I hold, as regards the minor premise, that Caesar in actuality remaining Caesar in actuality is not a dead human being since Caesar in actuality is a human being. Hence, just as you do not say of a human being that it is a dead human being, in the same way neither do you say of Caesar in actuality that he is a dead human being, but when Caesar has been destroyed, whatever was Caesar in actuality before and is not now Caesar in actuality, is the dead human being. And if you say “that which was Caesar in actuality and Caesar in actuality were undivided in essence, and Caesar in actuality was none other than he who is dead, if then Caesar is dead Caesar in actuality is dead, and if Caesar is a dead human being, then Caesar in actuality is a dead human being,” in response to this it must be held that when Caesar is destroyed Caesar in actuality is dead, and he is dead since, when Caesar is destroyed, nothing exists in reality that is Caesar in actuality, so that the substance of Caesar is not found any longer in the being of actual existence.

            And you will argue that the substance of Caesar is not found in the being of actual existence, and it is obvious that the substance of Caesar is not found in the soul since the substance of a reality is not in the soul, but its species is. For the species of a stone is in the soul, and not the stone. This Caesar in actuality, then, is nowhere according to its substance, therefore it is nothing. Therefore, when Caesar has been destroyed, Caesar in actuality is nothing. I reply to this that when Caesar has been destroyed, nothing is found in actual existence that is Caesar. Again, neither is it found in the soul, since the substance of a reality is not in the soul, etc. But Caesar in actuality is in the soul through his species and similitude, so that the intellect through this species and similitude well perceives of Caesar in actuality that he remains no longer in natural reality. Nevertheless it perceives that this substance is not, considered in itself, self-determined to being in the soul or to being in natural reality, and therefore it perceives this substance of Caesar as it is a substance and nature in itself, and perceives that every Caesar in actuality is destroyed, though Caesar in actuality remaining Caesar in actuality is some essence in itself, and since it is not another essence than the essence of human being, therefore it perceives still that Caesar remaining Caesar in actuality is a human being. And since Caesar in actuality remaining Caesar in actuality is past, therefore a certain past thing is a human being, not as it is past, but as it is a certain essence and nature. It is exactly this way with rain—we understand that rain in actuality is what it is in substance, notwithstanding that it is not an external reality—it is similar in the matter at hand. And noting this, Avicenna says that since essence is not determine itself to being actually outside, nor to being in, the soul, let us assume that even though a reality is not in the being of actual existence, nor in the soul, still the intellect can consider this nature according to itself and on this nature the intellect can found some true and unchangeable proposition; and Avicenna says that even though this truth was not in the human intellect from eternity, it was in the divine intellect from eternity.

            And what was said of Caesar is to be understood of Antichrist, for although he is not, still it is true to say that Antichrist is in actuality a human being, even if he never was, just the same as with Caesar. If you answer that what will come to be a human being is not always a human being, but Antichrist will come to be a human being; therefore etc.— I hold that the major premise is true, and as regards the minor premise, I hold that Antichrist in actuality never will come to be a human being, since Antichrist in actuality is eternally a human being, and what is eternally a human being will never come to be a human being. In what way, then, will we say that Antichrist in actuality will come to be? I hold that it is in this way, since he is in actuality Antichrist, a human being will come to be in such a way that at the same time he will be a human being and in actuality Antichrist.

            And if you tell me, “if Antichrist in actuality was a human being from eternity, then the form of Antichrist was in his matter from eternity, and still Antichrist will come to be at some time from scratch, therefore the form of Antichrist would be in his matter before he comes to be, therefore the acquisition of substantial form will not be through generation, therefore the acquisition of substantial form will not be through coming to be, but will be a certain leading out from the hidden into the manifest, so that the form which earlier was latent in matter is led out into the manifest. And this was the position of Anaxagoras, who assumed a latency of forms. And when you say in the major premise, “Antichrist in actuality is always human being, therefore from eternity etc.,” I hold that it does not follow, since this is true from eternity, “Socrates is Socrates,” and still the form of Socrates was not in its matter from eternity. But that this was true from eternity, “Socrates is Socrates,” is obvious since the Philosopher says in Prior Analytics II that whoever believes this proposition, “the good is not good,” believes two contradictories in this proposition, for it says the same thing is good and is not good. Similarly, whoever thinks Socrates is not Socrates thinks that Socrates is Socrates and that Socrates is not Socrates. If you should tell me that Socrates is not Socrates, then Socrates is non-Socrates, since if Socrates were non-Socrates then Socrates would be Socrates, then in this way it is true to say the other of the contradictories of everything—so if it is not true to say of Socrates that he is Socrates, then it is true to say of him that he is non-Socrates, this is converted to give “Non-Socrates is Socrates.” I argue then from these, that non-Socrates is Socrates, and Socrates is non-Socrates, that Socrates is Socrates. And you say earlier that Socrates is not Socrates, therefore you say two opposed things, and so whoever denies this grants it. And it is similar of every similar case—whoever denies it grants it.

            Again, the Philosopher says in De Interpretatione 2 that every true negative presupposes some true affirmative. So this, “good is not bad,” is only true because it is true that “good is good.” So if this is true, that “Socrates is not Socrates,” this presupposes a true affirmative, but nothing can be said of Socrates more truly than himself. Therefore it is necessary that Socrates be verified of Socrates. And you said Socrates is not Socrates, therefore in denying this you have to grant that same thing, and therefore the Philosopher says in Metaphysics IV, where he disputes against those who deny the first principle that of each the denial of another is more true than that of itself, for of a stone it is truer to say “non-runner,” “non-house,” “non-human being,” and whatever else, than “non-stone.” So this, “Socrates is Socrates,” is true from eternity, but his form does not exist in matter from eternity. And therefore it is not necessary, in order that some proposition be true from eternity, that its form exist in matter from eternity. And so this, “Antichrist in actuality is always a human being,” is always true, even though his form is not always in matter.

            And if you should say, “if the actual Antichrist is always an actual human being Antichrist is always one who has his essence, and he only has his essence because he has a form in matter,” I hold that this is not necessary, though this follows nicely, “if the actual Antichrist is always a human being, then whatever actually has the form of Antichrist in matter, while it actually has it, is always a human being.” Similarly, considering Caesar with reference to what he was before his destruction, the actual Caesar is always a human being, that is, while something actually has the form of Caesar in matter it is always a human being, and this would not be if the actual Caesar, considered as he is in whatever time, were not a human being and a suppositum of human being. So if you say there is no such actual Caesar, I hold that I can then grant that no such actual Caesar exists now which is a human being, and still, whoever is the actual Caesar is of necessity a human being, it being assumed as an impossibility that someone is such, for if the antecedent is impossible the consequence is surely necessary. So it is apparent in this way what must be replied to the question from the Commentator on Physics VII, for it was held that a term is said of present, past and future supposita through a single formula, and I hold this of those that share in the form of a term whether they are in the present etc. But I understand what was said in this way: that a common term is said of present past and future supposita through a single formula not as they are present, past and future, for nothing is univocally common to these as they are such, for nothing is univocally common to both being and non-being. But it is said of present, past and future supposita in such a way that I understand by “past supposita” what these take on substantially before their destruction, and by “future supposita” what they will be substantially after coming to be. Hence I do not assume that the term is said through one formula of that which was the actual Caesar and now is not, and similarly of Antichrist. But it is said of the actual Caesar and the actual Antichrist through one formula. And since the actual Antichrist is future, and the actual Caesar is past, it is said of past and future things through a single formula, not as past and future, but understanding by “Caesar” what it was substantially before its corruption, and by “Antichrist” what it will be substantially after its coming to be, so that the actual Antichrist will be of this sort—what will come to be while remaining the actual Antichrist always remains a human being in actuality, and through the same formula by which Socrates in the present remains the actual Socrates.

            And if you hold that nothing is in the nature of realities that is the actual Caesar, this is true. Nevertheless, this is also true, “the actual Caesar while remaining actually Caesar is always a human being,” and similarly of the actual Antichrist, so that when he exists, a human being exists, and when he is understood, human being is understood, and when he is signified, a human being is signified by this, whether it be the same as human being received under the formula of universal, or per se a suppositum of human being. And this opinion seems to be a mean between two that have commonly been held, since I do not assume that a common term is entirely equivocally said of present, past and future supposita, as one position assumes, nor that it is entirely univocally said of present, past and future supposita. For it is not said through one formula of past supposita, understanding by “past supposita” that which they are before their destruction, and similarly for “future supposita.” And it is clear that the response is easy once these things have been seen.

            In response to the arguments: In response to the first, when it is argued that whatever shares in the inferior etc., this is true. And you hold, “therefore whatever shares in the inferior according to one formula” etc., and this is true. And you say “being is superior” etc., “therefore what does not participate in being according to one formula,” I grant this. And when it is said, “an existing suppositum and a non-existing one” etc., I hold that understanding by “non-existing suppositum” that which it is after its destruction, it is obvious that what exists and what does not exist do not share in being according to one formula, for a non-existing suppositum in this way has being only in the soul. But understanding by “past suppositum” that which it was before its corruption, in this way I hold that an existing a non existing suppositum share in being according to a single formula, for each is a true being outside the soul, since a true being outside the soul is an abstract essence that does not determine itself to being in an effect or to being in the soul. Understanding by “non-existing suppositum” what it was before its destruction, in this way it is a true being outside the soul, for it is an abstract essence of itself not determined to being in the soul, but as it is in itself it can be in an external reality if there is some cause giving it being.

            In response to the other argument, when it is argued, “each natural thing,” etc., this is true. And you hold that “an existing suppositum” etc., I hold as before that a non-existing suppositum, understanding by this what it is after its destruction, is neither a human being nor has the operation of a human being, since it is destroyed in its substance. But understanding by “non-existing suppositum” what it was before its destruction, in this way it is a human being and is always a human being, just as a human being in the present is always a human being. For the essence is always the same as this, for if not, what else could be made true of this?

            In response to the other argument, when it is argued, “the genus of change is two-fold” etc., this is true. And from this you accept that “it is changed in substance,” etc. This is true. And you hold, “a non-existing suppositum was changed in its substance” etc. But I reply that a non-existing suppositum was changed in its substance because it is not the same in substance as it was before, and insofar as it is non-existing, it is neither a human being nor shares any more in the formula of human being. But if we attend to what it was before, thus it is a human being and has the formula of human being, and therefore, attending to that, it is always a human being.

            In response to a certain argument that can be advanced concerning Antichrist in particular, which goes as follows: Nothing shares in any nature until it has its form and species, but Antichrist does not have the form and species of human being, since he will come to be a human being, therefore Antichrist is not a human being. In reply to this, I grant the minor premise, and in response to the major premise I hold that we can understand by Antichrist what he was before coming to be, and in this way he does not have the form of human being, and is not a human being, or we can understand what he will be after he comes to be, and in that way he is a human being, since he is the actual Antichrist, and the actual Antichrist as long as it remains actual Antichrist is always a human being.

            In response to the other, when it is said “in what is, was, or will be” etc., from which it was accepted that “in being and non-being” etc., if you understand that to a being actually in existence and to a non-being actually in existence there is nothing univocally common, in this way it is false. If you understand that to what has some essence and nature and to what does not have some essence and nature nothing is univocally common, in this way it is true. And you hold that “a suppositum in the present” etc., which is true, “but a past suppositum is not some essence and nature,” and I hold, just as before, that a past suppositum, considering it as regards what it is before its destruction, in this way I hold that something is univocally common to present and past supposita, since in this way the past suppositum is some essence and nature. But to a being and a non-being, that is, to what is some essence and nature and to what is not some essence and nature, nothing is univocally common. And this is what the Commentator understood by them if his words have any truth.

            At this point some are used to arguing thus: a universal is abstracted from each singular according to the intellect, but according to being it is joined to each individual, but what is signified by the name of a human being is a true being outside the soul; therefore it is necessary that every suppositum of it be a true being outside the soul. It was seen in what way this argument is to be resolved, since it must be solved as the first was, for it was seen in what way a non-existing suppositum is a true being outside the soul and in what way it is not.

            Again, let it be argued thus: form gives being, therefore those which differ as far as being is concerned differ as far as form is concerned, but an existing suppositum and a non-existing suppositum differ as far as being is concerned; therefore etc. It is clear that form gives being of essence, and so those that differ as far as being of essence is concerned differ in form. And you hold that “an existing suppositum” etc., which is true in the being of actual existence that now is, but in the being of essence, understanding by non-existing suppositum what it was before its destruction, it is false.

            It was also customarily argued thus: the Commentator on Metaphysics VIII against Alexander, who supposed heat and cold etc. to be the substantial forms of the elements, says that Alexander argued thus: that heat is the substantial form of fire because when heat is destroyed, fire is destroyed, therefore it is the substantial form of fire. And the Commentator responds to this that “something being destroyed upon the destruction of another” can be understood in two ways, either causally or concomitantly, causally as the destruction of the proper passion follows upon the destruction of the subject, concomitantly as the reverse, so that the destruction of fire follows upon the destruction of heat. Given this, the Commentator accepts that the subject is destroyed concomitantly upon the destruction of its proper passion. Now although being in an effect is not of the essence of a reality, still it is a passion immediately following upon its essence, therefore those that differ in the being of essence differ as far as the being of existence is concerned, and those that are destroyed are destroyed in that way, but an existing suppositum and a non-existing one differ in being of existence etc.; therefore etc. It is true that being of existence is not of the essence of a thing and let that be supposed here. And you claim “being” etc., I hold that being immediately follows upon essence, but no being-then, but being that indifferently abstracts from being-now and being-then, and this is reasonable, for from this that being is a passion per se following upon the essence of a reality, one abstracts essence from each, and abstracts being from the same. And you suppose that existing is a passion immediately following upon essence, just as the essence of a reality, then, abstracts from here and now, so being from being-now or being-then, and so a name signifies universally without tense. Being is also said to be everywhere and always, not positively, but through the privation of any definite place and time. Therefore it is reasonable that existing following upon essence abstracts from existing now and then, so that something existing then, considered as it was substantially then, is the same thing as a human being.

            It was held that a term is said of present, past, and future supposita through one formula, understanding by a past suppositum what it was before its destruction, and by a future suppositum what it will be after it comes to be, and I maintain that logically speaking, although perhaps a philosopher really would not say this. For with a logician there can be one common formula of all those of which there is one common concept. Now of present, past and future supposita, understanding present, past and future as has been said, there can be one common concept, and this is because if I understand by Caesar what he was before his destruction and by Antichrist what he will be after he comes to be, there is one common concept of these as such and of a human being in the present, since they do not differ in human nature abstractly considered. And therefore a rational philosopher, that is, a logician, says that a common term is said univocally of present, past and future, understanding by present, past and future what has been said, but a real philosopher would not say this since being-in of a nature is not a past suppositum as far as that which it was is concerned, or a future suppositum as far as that which will be is concerned. Because of this everyone who holds that opinion that a term is said univocally of present etc., holds it concerning the formula of understanding, but everyone who holds the opposite view congratulates himself on this, that past essence does not remain, while a present essence remains. Hence, just as the logician says that genus is predicated univocally of its species etc., so the natural philosophy says that the genus is predicated equivocally of its species, and so the natural philosopher says “equivocally” where the logician says “univocally.” In the same way the logician says a term is predicated univocally and a natural philosopher equivocally. Therefore proceeding in this manner of inquiry we have gotten this far, that a common term is not said according to one formula of present, past and future supposita, understanding by “past” what it is after its destruction and by future what it is before it comes to be. But understanding by “past” what they were before their destruction, and by “future” what they will be after they come to be, the term is said univocally of these, and speaking as a logician, but equivocally if we speak as a natural philosopher—it is just the same of genus, for the natural philosopher says genus is equivocally predicated and this because of the diversity of essence, but the logician univocally because of the unity of the formula of understanding.

Question 22

            We inquire concerning of-every-case, and here it is asked whether a term in a universal affirmative proposition is only distributed for those that agree in the form of the term.

            And it is argued that it is not, since a term in a universal affirmative proposition is distributed for all those that signify the form of the term, but many signify the form of the term that do not share in the form of the term; therefore etc. The minor premise is obvious, since Caesar and Antichrist signify human being, and still do not share in the form of human being, therefore many signify the form of the term that do not participate in its form, therefore etc.

            Again, in a universal affirmative proposition a term is distributed when the significatum of the term is taken universally, but the form of the term is not taken universally unless it is taken for those that share in the form of the term and can share in it; therefore the term is taken for those that can share in the form of the term, but those that can share in the form of the term don’t yet share in it; therefore etc.

            On the other hand, the term is only distributed for those for which there is supposition under in the minor term in the first figure, but in the minor term there is not supposition under unless it is for that with which the form of the term agrees, as is obvious in saying “Socrates is a human being,” “Plato is a human being”; therefore etc.

            It must be held that in a universal affirmative proposition a term is only distributed for those with which the form signified by the term agrees, for when something acts on another as on its per se and proper object, it is clear that it acts on nothing else except insofar as that other shares in the formula of that primary object. For example, heat acts on the heatable as on its per se object, and therefore it acts on nothing else except what shares in the formula of the hot. Now in the distribution of the term the soul, mediated by a sign, touches the form of the term as the per se object of distribution. I say, “the soul mediated by a sign” since the soul is the principal agent in distribution and the sign is the instrumental agent. Therefore everything for which a term is distributed shares in the form of the term.

            Again, this is explained in this way: the term in a universal proposition is only distributed for its supposita. Supposita, however, are of two sorts, namely accidental and per se supposita. Accidental supposita do not fall under distribution except because of per se supposita, for that this human being falls under distribution, and this human being is white, therefore this white thing falls accidentally under the distribution. Therefore per se supposita fall under the distribution of the term, but per se supposita share in the form of the term; therefore etc. The minor premise is obvious, for the Philosopher says in Metaphysics V, when distinguishing senses of “whole,” that “whole” is two-fold, namely integral whole and universal whole. An integral whole is that of which no part is itself a whole, but a universal whole is that of which every part is itself a whole. Now if a universal whole is one of which every part is itself a whole, and a part of universal whole is a per se suppositum, then a suppositum of a universal is itself a whole. Therefore, by whatever predication a universal is predicated of a per se suppositum, saying “this is this,” this would not be so unless each one of them shared in a the form of the term, and therefore a per se suppositum hares in the form of the term. The term, therefore, is distributed per se through those which share in the form of the term.

            In response to the arguments opposed to this view, as for the first, when it is argued, “a term is distributed” etc., I reply that this expression is improper. A term is not distributed for what signifies the form of the term, since the utterance is what signifies the form of the term, but a term is not distributed for an utterance, but for those which share in the form of the term. But let it be granted, and as for the minor premise, when it is said “there are many that signify” etc., it is remarkable that Caesar should signify the form of a human being and yet does not share in the form of human being. For if Caesar signified the form of human being, then a human being is what is signified by the name of Caesar, therefore if a human being is what is signified by the name of Caesar, then what is signified by the name of Caesar is a human being, by conversion. If, then, Caesar is signified by the name of Caesar, Caesar is a human being. And therefore whoever assumes that “Caesar” includes human being in what it signifies assumes that Caesar while he remains Caesar is a human being. I do not say whoever was Caesar before, and therefore Caesar while he remains Caesar is a human being and shares in the form of human being. For although Caesar is past, still, when he is Caesar he is always a human being, and this is shown since that which, whenever it is assumed a human being is assumed, and whenever it is understood a human being is understood, and whenever it is signified a human being is signified, that is either the same as human being or a per se suppositum of human being. But understanding by Caesar what he was before his destruction, in this Caesar is always a human being while he remains Caesar, not because Caesar is, but because in whatever Caesar is made true human being is made true in it, just as a theologian says that every human being is always alive, for in whatever is a human being, in the same life is found. So since Caesar being assumed, a human being is assumed, and Caesar being understood, a human being is understood, and Caesar being signified, a human being is signified, therefore Caesar is either the same as human being, or a per se suppositum of human being.

            In response to the other, when it is argued, “a term is distributed” etc, I grant it. And when it is argued, “but the form of the term would not be taken universally” etc., I hold that the form of the term is taken universally when it is taken actually for all those with respect to which it is a universal. Now it is not a universal except with respect to those that actually share in the form of the term, for it is only a universal with respect to those from which one abstracts, for one abstracts the form of the term only from the parts, since one does not abstract from non-beings, and therefore it is only distributed for those.

Question 23

            We inquire concerning the chapter on what is per se, and since the Philosopher sets out four ways in which something is per se, it is asked whether there are only four ways in which something is per se.

            And it is argued that there are more, since, according to the Commentator on Metaphysics V, this proposition “Chilus is alive” is true per se, and yet it does not seem to be per se in any of the four ways set out here; therefore etc.

            Again, every way of being per se is either a manner of being or a manner of inhering. But the fourth way which is set out by the Philosopher is not a manner of being, as is obvious in itself, nor is it a manner of inhering, since wherever there is a manner of inhering it is necessary that one be related to another in such a way that it is predicated of it. But in the fourth way one is not related to the other in such a way, since one is related to the other as cause and effect, and a cause is not predicated of its effect, nor conversely. Therefore the fourth way is neither a manner of inhering nor a manner of being. Therefore it will not be a way in which something is per se. Therefore there will only be three ways.

            The opposite appears from the Philosopher, who says that there are four ways in which something is per se.

            It must be understood here that “per se” sometimes indicates being by one’s self, and sometimes it indicates inherence or the causation of inherence. It indicates being by one’s self, for instance, when we say that Socrates walks per se, that is, by himself; and we also say in this way that Socrates is per se, and in general that every primary substance is—the form (ratio) of which is everything that subsists per se and not through something else outside its form—is per se according the sense in which “per se” indicates being by one’s self. Now every primary substance subsists in the being of its nature, not through something that is outside its nature, but only through the presence of its form (forma) in matter; because of this every primary substance is per se according to the per se that indicates being by one’s self. An accident, however, is not per se in this way, according to the Philosopher in the text. for white and musical do not seem to be per se in this way, for what does not subsist through its nature, but through something else outside its nature, is not per se in this way. But every accident is like this, since it subsists through the nature subject to it, and therefore the Philosopher says in Physics I that white is not unless there is something other than white which is white. Therefore, speaking in this way of the per se, every primary substance is per se, but no accident is per se in this way. This is the third way which the Philosopher sets out, of which Themistius says that the Philosopher does not introduce it as useful for demonstration, but in order to cover every way in which something is per se.

            In another way “per se” indicates causality in relation to inherence, and in this way the per se is found in propositions. In this way we say that the proposition is per se when the predicate is the cause of the subject, or conversely. Now if the predicate is the formal cause of the subject, this is the first way of saying per se. If the subject is the cause of the predicate considered as its matter, this is the second way, in which the subject is related to the predicate as the material to the formal, for it must at least be related to it as matter since what stands under a thing has the nature of matter. In the second way, however, the subject stands under the passion, therefore we say that the subject with respect to the predicate has the nature of matter. But if the subject should be related to the predicate as efficient cause, this is the fourth way. And so in all there are four ways in which something is per se.

            And since the end in a way has the nature of efficient cause, since the end moves the efficient cause, and the efficient cause the matter, therefore that proposition in which the subject is related to the predicate in the form of its final cause reduces to the fourth way of saying per se. And it is in this fourth way that this proposition, “the happy is human per se,” is per se. For here the subject is related to the predicate as final cause, and for this reason the Commentator, on the authority of Alexander, states that the end of a human being is to be perfected through the speculative sciences, in which consists the highest happiness of human beings. Therefore he calls happiness the end of a human being.

            And since in the fourth way the subject is related to the predicate as a cause closest to its effect, and between the proximate cause and its effect there is no intermediate, therefore every proposition that is per se in the fourth way is properly immediate. Because of this all immediate propositions reduce to the fourth way, and therefore, since they are immediate they cannot enter into a demonstration as a conclusion (although some say they can ), but in a demonstration of the highest sort they occur as major premise.

            The solution to the arguments is obvious. In reply to the first, when it is argued that “this is per se” etc., I hold that Chilus can name either something having the form that is the principle of life, or the operation [actual living]. So I say that this proposition, “Chilus is alive,” is per se in the first way, and similarly this proposition, “Caesar is alive,” since, when actual, Caesar is always a human being and a human being includes being alive, speaking logically, therefore, actually being Caesar in this way includes being alive, and so speaking logically and concerning what is actual Caesar in this way includes life. But if “alive” indicates the operation consequent on the form, in this way it reduces either to the first way or the second. And since the logician says that is said to be “in every case” which is not in some things but not in others, nor is it sometimes and sometimes not, but is of everything and always, so the logician claims that the predicate is in the subject and in all of its supposita, and this always. I hold that this is a thing which, if it be supposed once, is always supposed, logically speaking, so that this proposition, “Chilus is alive,” is per se.

            In reply to the other argument, when it is argued “every way in which something is per se” etc., Grosseteste says the fourth way is a way of causing, but let it be granted nonetheless that it is a way of inhering. And the reply to the proof: I hold that cause and effect can be considered in two ways, either abstractly or in the concrete instance. Now the effect is not predicated of the cause abstractly, but is predicated of it in the concrete instance, and therefore the Philosopher offered concrete examples in the fourth way.

Question 24

            We inquire more particularly concerning the ways in which something is per se, and first we inquire about the first way. And two questions arise here: the first will be whether being in an effect is predicated of anything per se in the first way of saying per se, and the second is whether the definition is predicated per se of the defined.

            Concerning the first question, it is argued that it is not, for nothing is the cause of its own being, but if something were a being per se in the first way, then this would be the cause of its own being, since “per se” indicates the cause of a thing. Since this is absurd, it is clear that being in an effect is not predicated of anything per se in the first way.

            Again, whatever exists only when something else exists is not a being per se in the first way, since whatever is a being per se in the first way can be a being whatever other thing limits it, for nothing considered according to its essence depends on another. But there is no being that exists unless it is because a certain other exists, not even the first principle, of which this would seem most likely, for the first principle is the first mover, and if a first mover exists there is also a first moveable, and thus there is more than one thing; therefore etc.

            On the other hand, if there is no being that is a being per se in the first way, then there will be no arriving at a first being, and if there is no first being there are none of those posterior to it, since when the first in some genus is destroyed the others are as well. So if there is no first being there will be nothing. But it is absurd to say that nothing is. Therefore it is necessary that there be some being in the first way, of which being in an effect is predicated per se in the first way of saying “per se.”

            It must be held that being in an effect is predicated of something per se, and this in the first way of saying “per se.” This is argued with an argument similar to that of the Commentator on Metaphysics IV. There is some being that exists in an effect. I ask whether it exists in an effect because of its substance or because of something added to its substance. If because of its substance we have what was proposed, namely that there is something that is a being in an effect because of its substance. If it is because of something added this thing must be a being, since nothing is a being in an effect through a non-being. I ask then about this added thing, whether it is a being in an effect because of its substance or because of something added. If because of its substance we have what was proposed. If because of something added, it is asked about that thing as before, and so either there will be an infinite regress or we will come upon something that is a being in an effect because of its substance.

            This is explained in another way since everything that is such and such through participation can be traced back to something that is such through its essence, for everything that is such through participation is such from another, and everything that is such from another can be traced back to something that is such per se, since everything that is from another is as it were accidental, and everything accidental can be traced back to something per se. Therefore everything that is such through participation can be traced back to something that is such through its essence. Therefore everything that exists through participation can be traced back to something that exists through its essence. But there are many beings that are through participation, since everything caused exists because of participation in the first being. Therefore we will come upon something that exists through its essence, and what is that? I hold that it is the first principle, since in the first being existence is not caused by substance, but is identical with it; for if you say that they are not identical, then there will be a composition of substance and accident there, and consequently some diversity, which is not true. For Proclus proves that every multitude can be traced back to a one that is one and nothing but one. And since a simple form, according to Boëthius, cannot be the subject of accidents, the first principle would not be pure form, but some composite, and consequently it would not be first without qualification, since every composite is posterior to what it is composed of. Since, then, it is absurd for the first principle not to be a being first without qualification, it is obvious that there is no composition of accident and substance in it. And therefore its existing is predicated of it per se in the first way, but of nothing other than this first principle is being in an effect predicated per se in the first way, but if it is predicated per se, it is in the second way. For as I am assuming at present, and as has been proven by Avicenna and will be seen elsewhere regarding this, in everything other than the first being differs from substance, since in everything other than the first that by which a thing is and what the thing is differ.

            Again, some argue in this way: being in an effect is not predicated per se in the first way of anything other than the first principle. For a human being is what it is essentially through no cause other than itself, for though there are many causes of a human being, yet of this that a human being is an animal there is no cause other than itself. And this is what the Philosopher holds in Metaphysics V. But that a human being is an animal is not brought about by another, for this is eternally; therefore a human being is what it is essentially through no cause other than itself. But a human being is an existing thing, or a being in an effect, through a cause other than itself, since every being that is caused is a being through participation in the first being. A human being, therefore, is a thing that exists in an effect through some cause other than itself, and is not what it is essentially through a cause other than itself, as has been shown. Therefore to exist in an effect is not of the substance of a reality. So being in an effect is not predicated per se in the first way, and the same argument apples to every other thing that is caused.

            In response to the first argument, when it is held that a thing is not the cause of its own being, this is true. And you say that “if something were a being per se in the first way” etc. I hold that it is not so. And you prove it, since “per se” indicates a cause. I hold that this is not true in all cases, since “per se” taken positively indicates a cause, but sometimes it is taken privatively, and then it indicates a privation of all external causality. Therefore, when I say the first principle is a being per se, it must be understood that the first principle is a being per se because of the privation of every external cause; from which the first principle is per se a being, not because it is itself the cause of its own being, but since it depends on nothing for its being.

            As for the other argument, when it is held that “what is not unless some other is” etc., I reply that what is not unless a certain other is its cause is not per se in the first way. And when you say, “no being” etc., I hold that if you understand by this that there is not any being which is without something causing it, this understanding is false. And you prove it, since the first principle is not unless there is a certain other; I hold that even though the first principle is not except when there is some other, still, according to the intention of the Philosopher that other is not a cause of the first principle, but only a concomitant of it; so that the first principle is a being per se in the first way of saying “per se.”

Question 25

            It is asked whether a definition is predicated per se of what it defines.

            And it is argued that it is not, for the definition and the thing defined are the same. But one and the same thing is not its own cause. Therefore a definition is not a cause of the thing defined. But if a definition were predicated per se of the thing defined, this would be signified, that it is the cause of the thing defined, for per se indicates a cause. Therefore etc.

            Again, if a definition were predicated per se of what it defines, then the parts of a definition would be predicated per se of what it defines. Then I argue, if the parts of a definition were predicated per se of what it defines, then the parts of a definition would be predicated per se of one another, and so the genus would be predicated per se of the difference, as is apparent in this syllogism, “a human being is an animal per se, a human being is rational per se, therefore the rational is animal per se.” And you hold that the premises are true, therefore the conclusion is true, and so the genus would be predicated per se of the difference, which is absurd; therefore etc.

            On the other hand, all the parts of the definition are predicated of what is define, but the whole definition is nothing other than all its parts; therefore etc.

            It must be said that a definition is predicated of what it defines per se in the first way, since what is included in the substance and formula of something is in it per se in the first way. Whatever is in a formula indicating what it is is in it per se in the way, but what it is, which is signified by the definition, is in the substance of what it defines, indeed it is identical with the substance; therefore etc. Proof that what it is, which is signified by the definition, is the same in nature with what is defined: the definition and what is defined do not differ actually except because what the defined says confusedly and implicitly the definition says explicitly. And the philosopher, noting this in Physics I, says that definition divides into singulars, that is, it takes up the single parts of the thing defined one at a time.

            Again, that what it is, which is signified by the definition, is the same as what is defined is obvious, since as the abstract is related to the abstract, so is the concrete to the concrete. But what a thing is is imposed by whatness, as concrete by the abstract, and similarly being by essence. But essence and whatness are the same in reality, and differ only in their formulae, since the same thing the essence indicates abstractly is indicated by being as regards another. Therefore etc.

            But although a definition is predicated per se in the first way of what it defines, and the parts of it are as well, still the parts of a definition are not predicated of one another per se in the first way. For neither is genus predicated of difference nor difference of genus per se in the first way, since those things are in a thing per se in the first way which are in the formula indicating what it is, therefore only that is in another in the first way which is assumed in its formula, but genus is not assumed in the formula of difference, nor conversely, since in every case, from the immediate addition of things of which one is assumed in the formula of another, or of which the formula of one is the formula of the other, nugatio is always caused. If, therefore, genus were assumed in the formula of difference or conversely, nugatio would be caused from the immediate addition of such things, and so every definition would be nugatoria. And this is obvious, since “rational” is not included in the proper formula of animal considered as animal, nor is animal included in the proper formula of rational considered as rational, for animal considered as animal includes “able to perceive,” but “able to perceive” does not include “rational” in its formula.

            And you hold that genus and difference convey the same nature, therefore one is predicated of the other per se. I grant that they do convey the same nature, but this is not sufficient for being per se, for the logician does not only consider the essences of realities, but considers those essences under determinate formulae of understanding, and therefore he does not consider being per se in the first way except when both reality is included in reality and formula in formula. And since the genus and difference are not related in that way, one is not predicated of the other per se in the first way. Since the genus and the difference are related to one another as potentiality and actuality, like a real composite of matter and form, and since the formula of potentiality is outside the formula of actuality, therefore the formula of the genus is outside the formula of the difference. And as a true natural being is composed of matter and form, thus out of these two understandings a third understanding is formed, which is the understanding of the species, and this understanding is the understanding of something determinate formed out of a determining understanding and a determinable understanding.

            In response to the arguments, the response to the first is obvious from what has been said already.

            As for the second, when it is argued, “if the parts of a definition” etc., I grant this. I hold that it is not necessary because the formula of the genus is not included in the formula of the difference, nor conversely. But the formula of each is included in the formula of the species, so that both are predicated of a species per se in the first way, but neither is predicated of the other per se in the first way. And when you prove that a human being is an animal, etc., I maintain that the fallacy of accident occurs here. When two are partly the same and partly different, and some third thing is taken to belong to the difference between these two, then the fallacy of accident occurs. But this is how per se animal is with respect to human being and rational, and therefore the fallacy of accident occurs there, since being per se an animal is in human being, and not in the rational, and therefore it belongs to the difference between them.

Question 26

            We inquire now, concerning the first way of what is per se, whether this is per se in the first way, “Socrates is a man.”

            And it is argued that it is not, since that proposition is not per se in the first way in which the predicate is not in the subject in every time, but human being is not in Socrates in every time; therefore etc. The major premise is obvious, for the Philosopher contends that whatever is in something per se in the first way is in it of necessity; and what is in something of necessity cannot fail to be in it; therefore whatever is in something per se cannot fail to be in it; therefore it is in it in every time. The minor premise is obvious, for “Socrates” signifies a human being of a determinate time, and therefore human being is in him in a determinate time; therefore etc.

            Again, in a proposition that is per se in the first way, the predicate is in the subject considered as such, but human being is not in Socrates considered as such; therefore etc. The Philosopher asserts the major premise in the text, for he says that in those in which the predicate is in the subject per se the predicate is in the subject considered as such, and demonstrations are made up of such as these. The minor premise is obvious since if Socrates were a human being considered as Socrates, then Socrates would include no more than human being includes. But Socrates includes more. Therefore etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued that as genus is related to species, so species is related to the individual. But the genus is predicated of the species per se in the first way, since in the preceding question it was explained that the parts of a definition are predicated per se of the thing defined; therefore the species is predicated of the individual per se in the first way, but human being is related to Socrates as species to individual; therefore etc.

            It must be replied that this proposition, “Socrates is a human being,” is per se in the first way. The reason is that that proposition is per se in the first in which the predicate belongs to the substance and to the what-it-is of the subject. For whatever things are in the formula saying what it is are in a thing per se in the first way. Now when we say “Socrates is a human being,” the predicate belongs to the essence of the subject, as the Philosopher suggests in Metaphysics VII, when he contends that if Socrates were to have a definition he would not have any other definition than that of human being; therefore etc.

            But it must be observed that this proposition, “Socrates is a human being,” is not purely per se in the first way. The reason is that that proposition in which the subject adds something real over and above the predicate is not purely per se in the first way, for when a proposition is per se in the first way the predicate must not be an accident of the subject, nor conversely, at least not as a real thing is an accident of a real thing, although the subject can belong as an accident to the predicate as a formula to a formula. Now, when we say “Socrates is a human being,” Socrates adds something real over and above man, for Socrates includes human nature and individuating principles that belong as accidents to that nature, and this is not purely per se in the first way. So as this proposition, “bronze triangle is a triangle,” is not purely per se, but in one way is per se and in another way accidental, since a bronze triangle is per se a triangle insofar as it is a triangle, but insofar as it is bronze it is a triangle accidentally, in the same way Socrates includes human being and being this, so insofar as he is a human being Socrates is human being per se, but insofar as he is this he is a human being accidentally.

            And if you were to say that if Socrates includes these two, namely human nature and individuating principles accidental to that nature, then Socrates is a being accidentally, and from this there follow two absurdities, the first being that although Socrates comes to be without qualification, his coming to be would be of a being that is accidentally, the second that if Socrates is both a being accidentally and a primary substance, then a primary substance will be a being accidentally. But this is absurd, since the Philosopher says in the Categories that a primary substance is what is called substance properly and principally and in the highest degree.

            Again, if Socrates were to include these two, namely human nature and individuating principles, since individuating principles belong to the genus of quantity, to this extent the proposition, “Socrates is quantitative,” would be per se, just as “Socrates is a human being” is.

            In response to the first of these, it must be held that there are two ways in which a being can be said to be a being accidentally. It can be said to be so in one way because it is an aggregate of two things of which one is not essentially ordered to the other and of which one does not depend on the other in its being in nature, and in this way a pale human being is said to be a human being accidentally, for pale is not essentially ordered to human being, nor conversely. Again, a human being can exist in nature without pale, and conversely, for pale has being in a wall. But Socrates is not such an accidental being, nor can such be the outcome of coming-to-be without qualification. In another way, a being is called accidental because it is aggregated from two things of which one is essentially ordered to the other, and of which one depends on the other in its being in nature, and it is in this way that I claim Socrates is an accidental being. For “Socrates” names a compound from human nature and individuating principles such that human nature cannot exist in nature without the individuating principles, for nothing exists in nature unless it is here and now. And in this way Socrates is an accidental being, for Socrates includes in his defining formula human nature, which is necessarily joined to individuating principles, and coming to be without qualification can very well have this sort of accidental being as its outcome. For it is clear that coming to be has as its outcome a substance that exists, and which is in nature necessarily joined with individuating principles. Calling, then, such a substance as is joined with individuating principles an accidental being, coming to be without qualification has an accidental being as its outcome. So the Philosopher does well to say in Metaphysics VII that what a thing is does not come to be per se, and I understand by per se that per se which is a mark of being by one’s self, so that it does not come to be per se, that is, by itself without individuating principles, since that comes to be which exists as what it is. It does not exist by itself without individuating principles, therefore neither does it come to be per se, that is, by itself. The Philosopher, noting this in the same place, says openly that neither does species—or whatever he calls the form in sensible things—fail to be, nor is there coming to be for it, nor what it is, but what it is is what it becomes in another. So neither matter nor form comes to be, nor even what a thing is, except in another, and so that which a thing is comes to be inasmuch as it is joined to another, that is, to individuating principles.

            And if you reply that for simple change there must be a simple outcome, but coming to be without qualification is a simple change, therefore etc.—I hold that a wholly simple change must have a simple outcome, and in response to the minor premise I hold that coming to be is a simple change with reference to its subject, but with reference to its outcome it is a composite change. And the more the subject is a being potentially, the more it is required that the outcome be composite, for since matter is the subject of coming to be, the outcome is a composite of matter and substantial form, and since such a composite exists, and it does not exist unless joined with individuating principles, therefore etc.

            In response to the other, when it is said that if Socrates is a being etc., I grant that a primary substance is an accidental being, since primary substance is both substance and individuated substance, and so it is necessary that it be made up of substance and a principle individuating the substance, from which it is an individuated substance. When we call what is thus made up of substance and individuating principle an accidental being, then, in this way a primary substance can be an accidental being. And as regards what the Philosopher said, when he says that primary substance is what properly etc., I hold that the Philosopher speaks there of substance with regard to the act of standing under a thing, and since primary substance stands under secondary substances and accidents, and secondary substances do not, primary substances are said to be substances in the highest degree, since they stand under in the highest degree. And this seems to be the intent of the Philosopher when he says in the same place that when we speak of substance as opposed to accident, in this way primary substance is not substance in the highest degree, for substance as it is said to be opposed to accident is a being absolutely considered, but secondary substance is a being more absolutely than primary substance, and therefor in this way secondary substance is more substance than primary substance, for human being is more absolutely what it is than this human being, since this human being depends on individuating principles, and human being, taken absolutely, does not.

            In response to the other, when it is said that “given” etc., then this proposition “Socrates is a man” is no more per se than “Socrates is quantitative,” the Philosopher in Metaphysics VII says that in those things conceived with matter what it is is other than that of which it is, and the expositors explain quite properly that in those things that are conceived with particular designated matter what it is is other than that from which it is. So the Philosopher in the same place sometimes calls matter that which is the immediate subject of form, in the sense in which we say that matter is one of the principles of nature; and sometimes when he says “matter” he names the dispositions following upon the composite because of its matter. Since, then, what Socrates is is something other than Socrates, for Socrates includes human being and individuating principles, but what Socrates is includes only what belongs to the substance of human being, therefore, since being a human being is included what Socrates is and being quantitative is not included what he is, attending to this this proposition, “Socrates is a human being,” is more per se than this one, “Socrates is a quantity,” although taking into account that Socrates includes individuating principles it can be said that this is, in a way, said per se. But it is not per se in the way that this proposition, “Socrates is a human being,” is per se, since being per se principally attends upon what a thing is and nothing more belongs to what Socrates is than what belongs to what a human being is, for the whatness of a species and of all its particulars is the same. Thus it is clear in what way this proposition “Socrates is a human being” is per se and in what way it is not.

            As for the arguments, in response to the first, when it is argued “that proposition is per se” etc., this is so. And as for the minor premise, when it is said “human being is not in Socrates” etc., understanding by “Socrates” what he is substantially, human being is in Socrates for in every time, since this is true in every time, that of whatever Socrates is verified, human being is verified of that as well. And in this way “Socrates is a human being” is sempiternally true, because human being is in Socrates in every time, understanding by Socrates what Socrates is. And you hold that Socrates signifies a human being of a determinate time. When we say that Socrates signifies a human being of a determinate time it must be understood that Socrates signifies a human being, so that it follows that he exists for a determinate time, but still he is not a man for a determinate time.

            As for the other argument, when it is argued that “in a proposition per se in the first way the predicate is in the subject” etc., I hold that per se in the first way is of two sorts, namely per se and primary, and per se but not primary. So when the predicate is in the subject per se and primarily, then it is in the subject considered as such, but when it is in it per se, but not primarily, it is not necessary that it be in it considered as such. So to have three sides is not in isosceles considered as isosceles, because it is not in it per se and primarily, but it is in triangle considered as triangle, because it is in it per se and primarily. In the same way, this proposition, “Socrates is a human being,” is per se but not primary, and this proposition leads back to this, “A human being is a human being,” which is per se and primary. And in general every per se proposition, affirmative or negative, leads back to some proposition in which the same is predicated of itself, and there it stands.

Question 27

            It is asked whether the proposition “a human being is an animal” is true per se when no human being exists.

            And it is argued that it is, since the proposition “a human being is a human being” is true per se when no a human being exists. For no proposition is truer than one in which something is predicated of itself. But if a human being is a human being, a human being is an animal, therefore when no a human being exists, this proposition “a human being is an animal” is true per se.

            Again, in every case that may occur a part of a definition is predicated per se of the thing defined. But animal is part of the definition of human being. Therefore in every case that may occur a human being is animal. Therefore when no human being exists this will be true, “a human being is an animal.”

            On the other hand, the propositions that answer the question what it is and if it is are related to one another in the same way as the questions. But the question what it is presupposes the question if it is. Therefore the proposition that answers the question what it is presupposes the proposition that answers the question if it is. Therefore the proposition “a human being is an animal” presupposes this, “there is a human being.” Therefore when no human being exists this proposition, “a human being is an animal,” will not be true per se.

            It must be held that as far as the logician is concerned this proposition, “a human being is an animal,” is true per se when no man exists. For the logician says that every proposition is true per se in which the predicate belongs to the concept of the subject. Now even when no human being exists, animal is still part of the concept of human being, for being signified follows upon being conceived. But when no human being exists animal belongs to what is signified by “human being,” since “human being” always signifies the same thing. For utterances don’t deviate from what they signify, even if there is no reality corresponding to them. For an utterance always signifies the same whether or not there is a corresponding reality, since it establishes one and the same concept, so that just as always, whenever human being is understood, animal is also understood, so whenever a human being is signified an animal is also signified, for this is what is signified by “human being.” So this proposition, “a human being is an animal,” is always true, and the Philosopher, noting this in Metaphysics IV, says that a human being is a biped animal since it signifies this. Therefore in every such case, when we inquire into the truth of propositions in which such words are used, we must presuppose what is signified by the word, since, if I were to say that “man” no longer signifies animal when no man exists, I would not say that this, “a human being is a human being,” is true. But the Philosopher, in Metaphysics IV, presupposes what is signified when disputing against those who deny first principles. Therefore, since it is always to be supposed that “human being” signifies, with a rational philosopher, the proposition “a human being is an animal” is always true, whether any human being exists or not.

            But perhaps this proposition, “a human being is an animal,” is not true for a philosopher concerned with reality when no human being exists. For realities have two sorts of being, namely being in the soul, and being in an external reality, and according to this two-fold manner of being there ought to be two manners of consideration—one is the consideration of realities according to the being they have in the soul, and the other is their consideration according to the being they have in an external reality. The first sort of consideration belongs to the logician, not to the philosopher concerned with reality, who considers things are they are in nature. Speaking of reality, then, this proposition, “a human being is an animal,” is not true per se when no human being exists, and the reason is that what is destroyed as regards its essence and nature is destroyed as regards everything that is in it substantially, since whoever removes the cause removes the effect. But the substance of each thing is the cause why something is in it substantially, and therefore when something is destroyed as regards its substance and nature, it is destroyed as regards everything which is in it essentially. But given that no human being exists, it is clear that it is destroyed as regards its substance, since coming to be and destruction are changes such that what is changed is changed in both name and defining formula. And therefore, speaking as a philosopher concerned with realities, this proposition, “a human being is an animal,” is false when no human being exists, because everything that is acquired through coming to be is removed through destruction, and the substance of a reality is acquired through coming to be. It is obvious, then, that the substance of a reality is lost through destruction. Therefore a human being considered as it is after its corruption is neither human being nor animal nor any of those things that were substantially predicated of it before.

            But you will reply, “how is this possible, that the same proposition that the logician judges to be true is false in the view of the philosopher concerned with reality?” It must be answered that there is nothing absurd in this, since a philosopher concerned with reality and a logician consider the real with reference to different things.

            The logician consider realities according to the being they have in the soul, and since the same essential concept can remain of a reality whether it exists or not, since to exist and to fail to exist are accidental to the essence of a reality considered in itself. Therefore the logician can say the same thing truly about a reality whether it exists or not. And therefore just as he says this proposition, “a human being is an animal,” is true when no human being exists, not attending to that which is after destruction, since the logician does not attend to coming to be and destruction, but only to the essential concept he has of the reality. But the philosopher concerned with reality considers the thing according to its being in nature, and since when no human being exists there is nothing in nature that is a human being, but human being has been destroyed, therefore a philosopher concerned with reality, considering what human being is after its destruction, hold that this proposition, “a human being is an animal,” is false, since after the destruction of the reality it has no being except conceptual being, and the philosopher concerned with reality does not consider such being, only the logician does. Therefore etc.

            And if you say, “the understanding that understands otherwise than it is in reality is false, but when no human being exists in reality, then no human being is an animal; therefore the understanding, understanding otherwise, is false; therefore when the logician says that this proposition, “a human being is an animal,” is true when no human being exists, he is mistaken,” in answer to this argument I grant the major premise, since from the thing’s being or not being the expression is called true or false, and in the same way the understanding [concept?] is true or false, since the expression is a sign of the understanding [conception?]. And when it is said in the minor premise, “but when no human being exists,” etc., it is true that in reality a human being is not an animal, not, indeed, a human being remaining a human being, but what was a human being is not an animal—since what was destroyed is neither human being nor animal, but was human being and animal before. But the logician who understand human being to be animal does not consider this with respect to what it is after its destruction, but considers the essential concept of the reality, and since animal is included in the essential concept of human being whether or not a human being exists, he therefore says that this proposition, “a human being is an animal,” is true whether or not any human being exists. And then there is no conflict between understanding and reality, since the understanding does not conceive the reality to be or not to be in the effect, but understands it absolutely and thus attributes being animal to it.

            The response to the arguments is obvious, since they proceed each on its separate way.

Question 28

            We ask whether not only the identity of the reality, but the identity of the formula as well, is required for the per-se-ness of a proposition, so that it is required that the reality be included in the reality and also the formula in the formula.

            And it is argued that the identity of the formula is not required. A metaphysician considers the per-se-ness in propositions, as appears from the Philosopher in Metaphysics VII, where he distinguishes the ways in which something is per se. But the metaphysician only considers realities, not the formulas under which they are understood. Therefore a proposition’s per-se-ness etc.

            Again, per-se-ness in propositions must not be understood in a way that depends on some accident, since the per se and the accidental are distinguished as opposites. But the formulae under which something is understood are accidents of the reality signified in propositions. Therefore the per-se-ness in propositions must not be conceived in a way that depends on the formula under which something is understood, but in a way that depends on the identity of the realities.

            On the other hand, it is argued that if the per-se-ness in propositions were conceived in a way that depends only on the identity of things, then every proposition in which the predicate is really the same as the subject would be true per se, but this is false. Therefore the per-se-ness in propositions is not conceived in a way that depends only on the identity of things.

            It must be understood that for a proposition to be true per se in the first way not only is the identity of realities required, but also the identity of formulae, as Grosseteste says on the chapter about the per se. In every proposition that is true per se it is necessary that the subject and predicate be related to one another in such a way that the whatness of one comes out of the principles of the whatness of the other. But what comes out of the principles of the whatness of the other receives that other in its definition, and therefore in every per se proposition it is necessary that the predicate be placed in the definition of the subject, or conversely. If the predicate is placed in the definition of the subject, the proposition is per se in the first way. If the predicate is placed in the definition of the predicate, the proposition is per se in the second way. And noting this the Philosopher said that whatever is in the formula indicating what a reality is is in the reality per se in the first way. Applying this to the question at hand, in a proposition that is per se in the first way the predicate is placed in the definition of the subject, but that which is placed in the definition of another is included in its as regards the reality and as regards the formula under which it is understood, since the definition is a certain intellectual cognition. Since the definition is a formula under which it is understood as regards the essential principles of it, if the predicate is placed in the definition of the subject it is necessary that the predicate be included in the subject both as regards the reality and as regards the formula. Therefore etc.

            Again, this is apparent since according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics III genus is not predicated per se of difference, and yet genus and difference indicate the same reality or nature essentially. Otherwise one would not be predicated of another in a predication saying “this is this,” as Avicenna argues. Nevertheless, although these things are the same as regards the reality, yet they differ as regards the formula. For the formula of the difference is outside the formula of the genus, and conversely. Nothing, therefore, here prevents the predication from being per se except the difference of its formulae. From this I argue that that is required for propositions’ being per se which, being assumed, per-se-ness is placed in propositions, and being removed, per-se-ness is removed from propositions. But the identity of formulae being assumed, being per se is placed in them, and this being removed, it is removed. So genus is not predicated per se of difference, even though they are the same as regards the reality. So for a proposition to be per se in the first way it is necessary that the reality signified by the predicate be the same as the reality signified by the subject, and that the one formula be included in the other.

            Again, per se as it is taken in one way does not indicate causality but privation of causality with respect to every external thing, and therefore this proposition, “a human being is an animal,” will be per se in the first way, for a human being is per se animal, since a human being is an animal through nothing other than being a human being. And if a human being is an animal through nothing other than being a human being, then it is necessary for animal to be included in human being both as regards the reality and as regards the formula.

            If it is asked, what is the formula under which it is understood existing in the predicate, which must be included in the subject, is the formula under which it is understood essential or accidental, to clear this up, it must be considered that speaking thus, “a human being is an animal,” animal is predicated per se and the reality is included in the reality and the formula in the formula. But the “animal” which is in the predicate can be taken in two ways, either absolutely, as it is a certain essence and nature in a determinate genus and species of being, or as it is a nature of the sort on which the intellect founds the intention of a genus. In the same way human being in the subject can be considered either absolutely or as it is a nature of the sort on which the intellect founds the intention of a species. If animal is taken in the first way, an essential formula under which it is understood agrees with it because animal is an ensouled sensitive substance, and this essential formula under which it is understood is included in the formula of human being, and so the formula is included in the formula, speaking of the essential formula under which it is understood, just as the reality is in the reality. If animal is taken in the second way, a certain accidental formula under which it is understood agrees with it, namely a formula not determinate of itself, but determinable by another. And this formula under which it is understood is included in human being as the intellect founds the intention of the species on a human being, since the concept of the species is a concept of a determinate thing, and this concept includes in itself a formula that is of not in itself of a determinate thing, but determinable through another, and a formula that determines it. For just as a composite of nature is from one thing that is act and another that is capacity, so a species that is a composite of reason is made up of the concept of the genus that is, as it were, capacity, and of the concept of the difference, as from that which has the formula of act. And so saying “man is animal” the formula is included in the formula in every way, the essential in the essential and the accidental in the accidental, in this then, the reality is included in the reality and the formula in the formula. But genus is not related to difference in this way, for the formula of the genus is outside the formula of the difference, and vice versa. For although the formula of the species is other than the formula of the genus, still one is included in the other, and therefore one is predicated of the other per se, but the genus is not thus predicated of the difference, nor vice versa.

            And perhaps you might ask further, is this essential formula of the difference outside the essential formula of the genus, so that because of this one cannot be predicated of the other per se? It does not seem so, since the genus and the difference indicate one essence, and of one essence there is one essential concept, and so of genus and difference there will be one essential concept, or one will be included in the other, and so genus will be capable of being predicated per se of difference. It must be understood that genus and difference are not different essences but different concepts founded on the same essence, so that although the same essence is conveyed in the name of the genus and of the difference, still this essence as it is conveyed in the name of genus is different, as regards the formula, from itself as it is conveyed by the name of difference, and therefore we say these are different concepts. So the same essence is conveyed. It is true that that which is genus and that which is difference are one nature, and of these as such there is one essential concept, nevertheless the essential formulae of genus and difference are different. And you will say, “if it were the same essence then the essential formula of the difference would be included in the formula of the genus, and vice versa.” I hold that there are different essential formulae genus and difference, but they are not different essentially in the same way that two individuals of the same species are different, since they do not differ substantially, and since they are different in this way one is not predicated of the other. Similarly, since the formula of the genus and difference are different, although they do not differ essentially, one is not predicated of the other per se.

            In response to the arguments, as for the first, when it is argued, “the metaphysician” etc., I hold that the metaphysician considers the essential formulae under which something is understood and through those he can judge whether a proposition is per se. So the metaphysician himself, seeing that the essential formula of the difference is outside the essential formula of the genus considered as genus, says that genus is not predicated per se of difference — so that the essential formula of animal considered as animal is outside the formula of rational, and yet is not outside the formula of human being. And this belongs to the metaphysician rather than to the philosopher who considers formulae, since the metaphysician considers realities and their essences. The proper way, however, of finding the essences of things is definition, since, then, the being per se of propositions is considered chiefly with attention to the definition of the subject and predicate, therefore it certainly belongs to the metaphysician to judge whether a proposition is per se. And whoever judges whether a proposition is per se by considering the essential and accidental formulae under which a thing is understood diversely and separately from one another, not as one formula is founded on another, is in part logician and in part metaphysician, unless he considers the formulae under which it is understood insofar as accidental formulae under which it is understood are founded on these, since he is purely a logician in this way. So the metaphysician and logician have a similar way of considering many propositions, and in many propositions the metaphysician proceeds after the manner of the logician, for instance, from the beginning of the fourth book to the end of the eighth in the Metaphysics.

            As regards the second argument, it is obvious what is to be said from the foregoing.

Question 29

            We ask now concerning the second way of saying per se. The Philosopher says that things are predicated per se in the second way when a proper passion is predicated of its subject, and the subject when the subject occurs in the definition of its proper passion. And let it be asked whether a proper accident must be defined through its subject.

            And it is argued that it need not, since definition is an expression of whatness and essence, so whatever does not belong to what a thing is does not occur in its definition; but the subject does not belong to what a passion is; therefore etc.

            Again, whatever has absolute signification is what it is absolutely. Now accidents have an absolute signification, since they signify not as belonging to a subject. But always, accidents in the abstract, if what they are is absolute and their definition indicates what they are, will therefore have absolute definitions, and so will not be defined through their subjects.

            On the other hand, it is argued that what does not have absolute being is not what it is absolutely, and therefore neither what it is, nor its definition, is absolute.

            It must be replied that a proper passion has to be defined through its per se subject if there is to be a complete definition of it. For it is disposed in the same way in being and in truth, and therefore whatever the being of the reality depends upon, its truth depends on that too. But the being of a proper passion depends on the being of its subject, since it is caused from its subject’s essential principles, and therefore its truth or intellectual cognition depends on the being of its subject. But definition is a certain intellectual cognition and therefore the definition of a passion depends on its subject. And the Philosopher notes this in Metaphysics VII, where he says that the definition of an accident is by addition, since it is given through a reality of another sort, namely through its subject.

            This is also explained as follows, and it comes to almost the same thing–whatever comes from the principles of whatness of another receives that other in its definition, since whatever a thing depends on as regards its whatness, it depends on the same thing in its definition. But a proper passion depends on its subject as regards its whatness, therefore etc. And just as one does not have a complete cognition of the effect before the complete cognition of the cause, so neither is there a complete cognition of a proper passion before its subject, which is the immediate cause of the passion, is known. And therefore the complete definition of a passion takes in its subject. And, noting this, the Philosopher in Metaphysics IV says that the definition of the subject, if it is complete, is suited to show the causes of all its accidents. From this one thing is apparent, namely that what an accident is is more absolute than its definition, since something of another sort occurs as subject in the definition of an accident, but the subject is not received nor included in what an accident is. But the absolute what it is of an accident, which a name signifying in the abstract explains, arises from what a substance is. For those things that are formally distinct in themselves are related to one another in such a way that one is not included in what the other is; but subject and proper passion are formally distinct in themselves, as per se cause and per se effect. Therefore etc.

            In response to the arguments opposing this view, as for the first, when it is argued “what does not belong to what something is” etc., we know that a definition is given so that a thing may become cognized, since therefore it is said that “what does not belong” etc., this is true, unless what is defined was such that it cannot be sufficiently cognized from its own principles. Therefore what does not belong to what it is does not occur in its definition. But it is not sufficiently cognized from its own principles, then it is necessary for something else to occur in its definition. And to the minor premise I reply that it is true, for we do have to cognize the property from its proper principles, and cognition of proper principles depends on the cognition of the principles of their subjects. Because of this it receives the subject in its definition.

            As for the other argument, when it is argued that “it has absolute signification” etc., I grant that a proper passion has an absolute what it is, and also has an absolute definition, but there won’t be a complete cognition of the proper passion from this, but it is necessary to resolve the definition of a passion into its principles, and those principles into the principles of the subject. And before such a complete resolution a complete cognition of the a proper passion will not be attained.

Question 30

            Next it is asked about the second way of saying per se, and let two things be asked for now, first, whether one accident can be predicated of another accident in the second way of saying per se, and second, whether any accident is in a subject per se.

            Concerning the first, it is argued that it is, since a proper passion is predicated of its subject per se in the second way, but one accident can be the proper passion of another accident, for instance, having three angles equal to two right angles is the proper passion of triangle; therefore etc.

            Again, the Philosopher says in Physics VII, in the chapter about the comparison of motions, that one and the same accident can be found in different things in species, and he gives the reason. Just as whiteness, which is one accident, can be found in things of different species, and can be of one defining formula (ratio) in them all, since that which is primarily receptive of whiteness, namely a surface, can be of one defining formula in different species. From this I argue that every accident is predicated of what primarily receives it per se in the second way, but one accident can be receptive of another accident primarily, as, for instance, surface is of whiteness; therefore etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued that what is not predicated is not predicated per se. But an accident is not predicated of another accident, since no accident is the subject of another accident. Therefore one accident is not predicated of another accident per se in the second way.

            To this, it must be replied that one accident is not predicated of another accident per se in the second way, if we wish to speak strictly of propositions per se in the second way, since the subject is related to the predicate in two genera of cause, namely in the genus of material cause and in the genus of efficient cause, and more in the genus of material cause, since it is the fourth way more than the second when a subject is related to a predicate in the genus of efficient cause. Now one accident cannot be compared to another accident in the genus of matter and of the subject, and the reason for this is that whatever the ratio of subsisting does not agree with, the ratio of being a subject does not agree with it per se either, for whatever is made subject per se subsists. Now the ratio of subsisting does not agree per se with accident, and because of this the Philosopher says further on in this book, in the chapter on the status of categories, that accident are not anything, since they do not have the ratio of subsisting. Therefore one accident cannot be strictly speaking related to another accident under the ratio of subject. The major premise is obvious of itself, and because of this we say that neither matter nor form is the subject of accidents, but that which subsist per se, of which sort is the aggregate. And there we say that from the union of form with matter there results every accident, but an accident does not subsist per se, and because of this it is not strictly speaking made a subject.

            Again, the absolute ratio of being and the comparative ratio of being seem to be, as it were, a primary difference dividing substance and accident, and because of this the Philosopher, in Metaphysics VII, says that substance is being primarily and maximally. But the being of an accident is being in, and no substance is found with which the ratio of something inhering agrees. And therefore the Philosopher says in Physics I that what truly is is not an accident of anything. No accident is found which strictly speaking has the ratio of subject, but in the second way that which is made a subject has the ratio of subject strictly speaking, there no accident is made subject in respect of another, so that the other is predicated of it per se in the second way.

            Again, a per se proposition must be of the subject taken in itself (secundum se), and because of this the Philosopher says in this book, in the chapter on the status of the categories, that which is made subject is assumed to be made subject in itself, and further on in the text he applies this, but a proposition in which one accident is predicated of another is not of the subject taken in itself, as is said in the text. One accident, therefore, is not related to another strictly speaking in the ratio of matter and subject, because of which it is not predicated of the other strictly speaking in the second way of saying per se, since this is required if it is to be the second way of saying per se strictly speaking, that the subject be related to the predicate in the ratio of matter and subject.

            But even though one accident is not related to another in the ratio of subject, it still can be related to the other in the ratio of efficient cause, so that the substance is the efficient cause of one accident, and that accident is the cause of the other accident, and that of another. For instance, the substance of milk is the cause of heat and moisture proportioned thus, but the proportion of heat and moisture following on the substance is the cause of sweetness in milk. And so one accident is the efficient cause of another accident, even though it is not subject with respect to the other accident. But if every accident is referred to a substance, it is referred it immediately under the ratio of subject, even though it is not referred to its cause immediately under the ratio of cause.

            And you will say, how is this per se, “a triangle has three,” “a line is straight or curved,” since number and line are accidents? I reply that “triangle’ does not only name being made a triangle itself, but along with these measurements (that make it a triangle) it names the nature subject to these measurements. For although mathematicals abstract from sensible substance, they do not abstract from substance absolutely. Hence triangle does not only name measurements, but measurements with the nature subject to them, and that whole is the subject with respect to having three, so that the proper subject is an aggregate which on the one hand is related to the passion as its subject, on the other hand as efficient cause. And I speak in the same way of number in respect of even and odd. For number does not only name numeration, but numeration and the matter subject to numeration, and that whole is the subject when it is said that a number is even or odd.

            It is clear what to say to the arguments. To the first, when it is said “a proper passion” etc., I grant this, and as for the minor premise, it is considered in what way having three is the proper passion of a triangle, since it is not as it names being made a triangle alone, but as it names the whole aggregate from being made a triangle and the subject nature.

            As to the other, it is to be replied concerning the surface as it was replied concerning triangle.