Questions on the Posterior Analytics: First Set

By Simon of Faversham.

Translated by John Longeway

Proemium

            As the Philosopher says in Book X of the Ethics, a life with leisure for contemplation of the truth is the happy and perfect life, and better than a life according to the nature of a human being, for one with leisure for the contemplation of truth does not live in accord with the nature of a human being, but in accord with something divine in him. And I hold that he does not live in accord with the nature of a human being, for since a human being has a twofold nature, namely a sensitive and an intellective nature, the life proper to a human being seems to consist in this, that one should order all one’s functions according to reason, directing them to the best end possible. But to have leisure for the function of the intellect alone seems proper to divine separated substances, in which only the intellective nature is found. A human being, therefore, through continuous function of its reason and intellect, is made deiform, for no other function is proper to God besides speculation, as the Philosopher says in Book X of the Ethics, in which he rules out the opinion of some who say that human beings ought to aim at wisdom in human affairs, and mortal beings at wisdom in mortal affairs. Because of this the opinion of certain men, who say that a man ought to direct his attention to becoming wise in human affairs, and a mortal to wisdom in mortal things, is ruled out. For these are not the only things to be attended to, but from the cognition of material beings one ought to proceed to the cognition of immortal and divine beings, for the human intellect acquires its perfection most of all when, through continuous use of speculative reason, it is both joined to superior things and rises from inferior things, and so in a certain way all things are embraced. Because of this the expositor says, on Book X of the Ethics, that although the intellect lacks the magnitude of a moveable thing, it exceeds everything else in a human being in the quantity of its power. It is absurd, then, for human beings not to pursue their own perfection in accord with the intellect. Noting this elsewhere, the Philosopher said that the other animals certainly experience lust and anger and the rest, but none of them except human beings have reasoning. And he says further that it would be most absurd, then, if we were cheerfully to abandon such a good, and give up these things alone, because of the indifference of mean detractors.

            But it must be noted that, in seeking the perfection of our intellect, this aforementioned order must be followed. For the perfection of the intellect is to know and understand, but it is not possible to know anything except through the cognition of a cause, since, in all sciences of which there are principles or causes or elements, it is necessary to understand and to know starting from the cognition of these causes.

            It is therefore necessary for the intellect to begin from the consideration of causes and principles, considering what is the immediate cause of each effect and what is not, and in what way it is possible to demonstrate the effect through the cause and in what way it is not.

            But the intellect cognizes this from those things which are determined in the Posterior Analytics, which we have before us now, and therefore this science which treats of demonstration is necessary to the perfection of the intellect.

            For this science is among the sciences as are correct rules among things relating to architecture, for through this science everything which is to be demonstrated in the particular sciences is regulated, since unless it is done with attention to this science nothing is properly discovered or taught in the other sciences.

            And therefore philosophers have need of demonstration as a kind of tool (organum) for setting the parts of philosophy aright. Again, Ptolemy makes the utility of this science sufficiently known in the Almagest, where he says that one ought not to fill one’s soul with probable things and matters of opinion alone, since they do not lead to any firm disposition in the soul, but rather with demonstrated things, and certain things, which make the intellect sure and stable.

            The way in which this is done, however, appears from the things set out in this science, so that this among the logical writings is, according to natural desires, to be desired and sought out more than the others.

Question 1

            On this subject, then, we first ask whether a logician can teach the art of demonstrating.

            And it is argued that a logician cannot, since teaching the art of demonstrating does not belong to anyone to whom the consideration of principles of demonstration does not belong. But the consideration of principles of demonstration does not belong to the logician, since the principles of demonstration are true, immediate propositions proper to a science, and such do not belong to the consideration of a logician, since the logician’s craft is common to many sciences; therefore etc.

            Again, that science which teaches the art of demonstrating must be the most certain. But logic is not the most certain, since according to the Philosopher logic, since it concerns inquiry (sit inquisitiva), has the way to the principles of all methods. But a science that inquires (inquisitiva scientia) is not the most certain science, since everyone who inquires is in doubt. Therefore etc.

            On the other hand: it is argued that knowing does not occur except through demonstration, so teaching the way to demonstrate and the art of demonstrating belongs to whomever teaching the way of coming to know (modum sciendi) belongs. But teaching the way of coming to know belongs to the logician, for the logician teaches the way of coming to know in each of the sciences. Therefore etc.

            It must be understood here that although a science and the way of coming to know that science differ in the other sciences, they are nevertheless one in logic, so that logic, although it is a science, is the way of coming to know with regard to the other sciences as well as itself. And it is clear that of necessity one arrives at some science in which the science and the way of coming to know do not differ. For let there be some science: I ask whether this science and the way of coming to know this science are the same or differ. If they are the same I have what was proposed. If the science and the way of coming to know it differ, it is necessary that there be a science of this way of coming to know; for there is no way of coming to know which is not in a knower, but a knower is not a knower except through some scientific knowledge, so that there will be a science of the way of coming to know. And then I will ask about the science of that way of coming to know, whether the science and its way of coming to know are the same. If they are the same I have what was proposed, namely, that one arrives at some science in which the science does not differ from it way of coming to know. If the science and its way of coming to know differ, there will be a science of this way of coming to know, and then I shall ask about that science and its way of coming to know as before, and so it will either proceed without limit or one will arrive some science in which the science and the way of coming to know do not differ.

            But to proceed thus without limit in sciences, because there is a way of coming to know anterior to each science, is absurd, since then no one would have scientific knowledge except by chance, which is clear since no one would have anything sufficient to direct him how to come to any science. But this is false, for logic is sufficient to direct one, and therefore it is necessary that we arrive at some science in which the science and its way of coming to know are the same, and we call this science logic. Logic, then, is a science in itself and a way of coming to know as regards the other sciences, and also a way of coming to know as regards itself. For we see that the intellect understands itself in understanding other things, so that it reflects upon itself and its act, and because of this, since logic is the correctness (rectitudo) of an act of reason, it sets other sciences right as well as itself.

            So this is a way of coming to know as regards other sciences, and is also a way of coming to know as regards itself. So logic, in treating of the way of demonstrating according to which other sciences proceed, also proceeds itself in the demonstrative mode, so that the other sciences take from logic the way of demonstrating in accord with which they proceed, but logic does not take its way of demonstrating from another science, but from the way of experience, since, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics I, “Science and art come to men through experience, for, as Polus rightly says, ‘Experience made art, but inexperience luck’,” from which it is clear that the science and its way of coming to know do not differ in logic.

            Then, in response to the question, when it is asked whether logic can teach the art of demonstrating, I maintain that it can. For the correctness of each science consists in its proving properties (proprietates) of its subject demonstratively. Teaching the art of demonstrating in all of the sciences, then, belongs to him to whom setting all other sciences right as regards the way of knowing and demonstrating belongs, but setting all other sciences right as regards the way of coming to know and demonstrating belongs to the logician; therefore etc.

            Again, this is explained by an argument that Albert touches on: Every science which passes on a perfect cognition of something has to consider the ultimate and the best end of that which it considers, but logic passes on a perfect cognition of the art of syllogizing, as is obvious from the plan of the Philosopher’s work (processu Philosophi) in the Prior Analytics; therefore it is the business of the logician to consider the ultimate and best end in the art of syllogizing. But the art of demonstrating is the last and best in the art of syllogizing, for the science of the syllogism is ordered to the science of demonstration. Noting this a certain Greek expositor of the Posterior Analytics says that demonstration is the end of the logician’s business, for Aristotle passes down the other logical texts to us for the sake of demonstration. And Albert says, further on in the same place, that this science which teaches the art of demonstrating is the last and best power of all of logic, therefore it belongs to the logician to consider demonstration or the art of demonstrating.

            Now the part of logic that is about the art of demonstrating is different from the other parts of logic, for the science which is about the other parts of logic is both a teaching science (docens) and a science in use (utens). It is a teaching science since it teaches from what things and from what sort of things demonstration arises, and how they are related; but it is not a science in use since demonstration as regards its use is from principles proper to the science in which it occurs. Logic, however, is from proper principles in no part of it, but rather from common principles. And therefore the science of demonstration is not a science in use, strictly speaking, but it treats the science of the art of demonstrating, the use of which is provided to the other particular sciences. So just as we see in the art of the smith that there is a certain special art of fabricating a hammer or mallet, the use of which is provided to all those who make things afterwards, so there is an art for discovering the art of demonstrating, the use of which is provided to all the special sciences; therefore the science of the art of demonstrating is strictly speaking a teaching science and not a science in use.

            In response to the arguments opposed to this view: in response to the first, when it is argued “One to whom the consideration does not etc.,” this is true. And when it is said, “but the consideration etc. does not belong to the logician,” I maintain that this is by no means true, since principles of demonstration are propositions that are per se, primary, and true, and the logician knows such propositions, as is clear from the intention of the Philosopher here. And as for the proof of this, I maintain that although the logician does not proceed from principles proper without qualification, he still proceeds from principles proper to the subject genus which he considers. For the proper subject genus which the logician considers in this science is demonstration. Although the logician, then, does not proceed from the proper principles of some special demonstration, he still proceeds from the proper principles of demonstration considered as demonstration, and through these he treats the art of demonstrating.

            In response to the second argument, when it is argued, “That science which teaches the art etc.,” I grant this. And you say that logic is not the most certain science. I maintain that logic as regards this part is the most certain science, and even more. According to Albert this science exceeds all the others both in the admirableness of its subject and the certitude of its demonstration--in the admirableness of its subject because here is treated the cognition of a subject which every other science necessarily uses, and similarly in the certitude of its demonstration because, according to Albert, it is reasonable that where the logician teaches the way to demonstrate and laws of demonstration, there he advances more certain demonstrations. Nor do I speak of demonstrations of the arts, for these are more certain in mathematics, but I speak of demonstration which, as it were, is produced (inducta) in men by nature and perfected by the way of experience. And you say “logic, since it concerns inquiry etc.” I maintain that the logician speaks there of dialectic, and this does concern inquiry, so that I grant that it is not most certain.

Question 2

            It is asked whether anyone can discover or acquire the art of demonstrating from scratch (de novo).

            And it is argued that no one can, since, if anyone could acquire the art of demonstrating from scratch, this could not occur except through demonstration, since every art is possessed through demonstration. But no one can acquire the art of demonstrating through another prior demonstration. Therefore the acquisition of the demonstrative art is not possible. The major premise is obvious. The minor is proved since if anyone could acquire the art of demonstrating through another prior demonstration, that prior demonstration would be either known or unknown. If it is known, then he knew how to demonstrate before he found the art of demonstrating, which seems absurd. If it is unknown to him, then he cannot acquire the art of demonstrating for himself from that demonstration. Therefore it seems that a man cannot acquire the art of demonstrating through a demonstration.

            Again, one does not have knowledge of a conclusion unless he first knows that he has a demonstration directed to (ad) that conclusion; therefore one does not acquire the art of demonstrating for himself unless he first knows he has a demonstration directed to the art of demonstrating. If, then, one acquires the art of demonstrating, he first knew he had the art of demonstrating before he had it. But this is absurd, therefore etc.

            On the other hand, a natural appetite is not directed to something impossible, since it is not in vain. But all men have a natural appetite for the production of knowledge, since all men by nature desire to know; therefore etc. But if a man could not acquire the art of demonstrating for himself, the acquisition of knowledge would be impossible, since according to Albert here, without demonstration nothing can be perfectly found or taught (traditum) in the other sciences. Therefore etc.

            It must be held that one can acquire the art of demonstrating for himself from scratch because the Philosopher did, since the art of demonstration is nothing other than the cognition of demonstration with respect to its causes and principles, and with respect to the properties and passions which are in it.

             Now one can acquire the cognition of demonstration with respect to the properties and passions which are in it through prior demonstration, and so one can also acquire the act of demonstrating through prior demonstration.

            But how can anyone acquire the art of demonstrating for himself through that demonstration? This is a difficulty, and to clear it up we must consider the fact that the intellect is disposed toward intelligibles as the senses are disposed toward sensibles. Because of this the Philosopher, in Metaphysics II, contends that just as weak vision is not capable of grasping the most visible, so neither is our intellect capable of grasping the most intelligible. But our intellect is related to those things which are most obvious by nature as the eyes of a bat are related to the light of a sun. And because of this the Philosopher compares the intellect to vision in many places. So just as not all are equally disposed to the act of understanding, but—whether it be due to some celestial cause, or because of his body—one happens to have a better soul than another, thus too it is possible that one can acquire through discovery and natural industry something that another cannot know except through teaching.

            But how can anyone arrive at the cognition of a thing from scratch by discovery? It must be considered thus: A man naturally acquires for himself the cognition of incomplex principles, for our intellect is at first like a blank tablet upon which nothing is actually written, though it is possible for many things to be written on it. And therefore at first he acquires for himself the cognition of the ratio of primary terms, as, for instance, of being, of one, and of others which are as it were first lights illuminating the possible intellect, according to what Albert says.

            And noting this, Avicenna says, in the first book of his Metaphysics, that thing and being are of such a sort that they are immediately known (sapientur) in the soul by first impression. But afterwards one acquires the cognition of the prior complex principles, and this at first in a confused way, but afterwards more determinately, since confused cognition precedes determinate cognition in us; for children at first call all men fathers and all women mothers, but afterwards distinguish their own fathers and mothers from the others, and so confused cognition of the principles precedes the determinate cognition of them in us. And that confused knowledge (notitia) of principles is had by way of sense, memory and experience. So a human being first receives from sense, memory and experience the cognition of such principles as “Every whole is greater than its part,” and “regarding each proposition either the affirmation or the negation is true.” For although all human beings at first cognize first principles confusedly, still one who is more disposed to do so by the natural intellect grasps first principles more distinctly than one who is less disposed, and moves (pervenit) with less difficulty from principles to those things of which they are principles.

            But a human being who is disposed in this way by the natural intellect, and moves (discurrit) easily from principles to those things of which they are principles, can easily discover the art of demonstrating. For from a first principle which he acquired earlier by way of sense, memory, and experience, he arrives at certain knowledge of one conclusion, and similarly from another principle that he has acquired earlier, in the same way he arrives at the cognition of another conclusion, and similarly with many other principles. Then, through this sort of induction he will receive a certain universal proposition, which is the source of art and science, namely, that whenever one proceeds from first principles to a conclusion then there will be knowledge of the conclusion, and otherwise there will be none. And working from this principle he can make a demonstration for himself thus: Every making to know occurs from first, true and immediate principles, but the art of demonstrating is of this sort; therefore etc.

            And the Philosopher arrived at the art of demonstrating through this demonstration, which is clear from his own remarks in the text. For first he defines knowing, and it is cognizing through a cause insofar as it is proper and immediate; afterwards he says what demonstration is, that it is a making to know; and joining these together, i.e. that knowing occurs through a proper and immediate cause and that demonstration is a making to know, it follows that demonstration is from what is true and immediate, prior and better known, and from the cause of the conclusion. And so through a demonstration <i.e. the syllogism just presented>, the philosopher first acquired knowledge of the art of demonstrating as regards its properties and passions. So it is possible to acquire the art of demonstrating, and to do so through prior demonstration, though one certainly receives the demonstration by way of sense, memory, and experience.

            And to this end Aristotle grants the remark of his predecessors. For they were accustomed to distinguish demonstration through teaching and demonstration through discovery. Demonstration possessed through teaching is the subject here, and the cognition of this demonstration is possessed through another demonstration that we have through discovery, by way of sense, memory, and experience. And when it was asked by them whether there is knowledge of that demonstration it was said that there is not, since it arises by way of sense, memory, and experience . . . but all this has, in effect, been said already.

            In response to the arguments: In response to the first, when it is argued “If someone can acquire from scratch, etc.,” I grant this. And I deny the minor premise. And when you prove that if someone can acquire knowledge of demonstration for himself through demonstration, that demonstration is either known, etc., I maintain that it is known by him. and you say, “If it is known by him before, etc.,” and I maintain that this does not follow unless we wish to speak strictly of knowing. But it is true that he formed a demonstration for himself before he knew the art of demonstrating, and it does not follow that because of this he knew how to find demonstrations, since he did not know that demonstration through another demonstration, which is knowing in the strict sense, but received it by way of sense, memory and experience. By no means can it be said that someone at one and the same time knew how to demonstrate and acquired the art of demonstrating. So someone at one and the same time knew the principles and conclusions and nevertheless did not know how to demonstrate, since he did not possess that demonstration through demonstration, as has been said.

            In response to the other argument, when it is argued “One does not have knowledge of a conclusion etc.,” I grant it. And you say, “Therefore one does not acquire etc.,” and this is true. Therefore you say, “If someone acquires the art of demonstrating he knew before etc.” I maintain that this is not absurd. For we see how one acquires the art of demonstrating, since it is through demonstration which is not possessed through demonstration, but by way of sense, memory and experience. Now it is not absurd that one should know himself to have a demonstration through discovery before he has one through teaching, so that he who acquired the art of demonstrating first knew himself to have the art of demonstrating through discovery before he had it through teaching. And this is not absurd, although it is absurd that someone should know himself to have the demonstration through teaching before he had the demonstration through discovery, for then he would both know and be ignorant of the same thing at the same time.

Question 3

            We ask about the part “All teaching and all learning etc.,” and since there are two sorts of cognition in us, namely sensitive cognition and intellectual cognition, we ask about the preeminence of one sort of cognition over the other, that is, whether sensitive cognition is more certain than intellective cognition.

            And it is argued that it is, since the Philosopher says in Physics VIII that to abandon the senses and follows reason is a certain sickness of the intellect. Therefore sensitive cognition seems to be more certain than intellectual cognition.

            Again, that cognition that does not depend on another prior cognition and which is the principles of every cognition in us seems to be more certain than every other cognition. But sensitive cognition does not depend on another prior cognition, and it is the principle of every other cognition in us. Therefore, etc.

            On the other hand, that cognition in which error cannot occur is more certain than that in which error can occur. But in intellective cognition error cannot occur, since a concept (intellectus) is only of true things, as the Philosopher says further on in this book. In sensitive cognition, however, error can occur, since the Commentator says, on Physics VIII, that sense judges many things to be moved and to be at rest that in truth do not move and are not at rest. Therefore, etc.

            It must be held that speaking without qualification intellectual cognition is more certain than sensitive cognition, and the reason for this is that the certitude of cognition is caused by the truth of the reality (res) cognized. But the truth of the reality cognized is received from its being (entitas) since the disposition of a thing in being and in truth is the same. And the Commentator on Metaphysics II says that insofar as a reality is more perfect in being it is more perfect in truth. Therefore that cognition is more certain that depends on an object that is more true, and more a being. Now intellectual cognition depends on an object that is more true and more a being than the object on which sensitive cognition depends. For those things that fall under sensitive cognition are singulars, which always fall under motion and change, so that in these nothing as it were permanent or fixed is to be found. Because of this the Philosopher says in this book that there no knowledge of singulars, since when these are absent from sense there is uncertainty whether they are or not. But what falls under intellectual cognition is unchangeable, abstracted from matter and the conditions of matter. Thus, although the intellect cognize some material things, it cognizes them immaterially, for the intellect cognizes immaterial things immaterially and temporal things atemporally, as is proved in the Book of Causes. And since these are thus truer, and more beings, since matter is strictly speaking nothing, as the Commentator says on Physics I. Therefore the more things are abstracted from matter the more they are beings and the more they are true, since matter is a hindrance to cognition, as is said in Physics I, and therefore the more things are abstracted from matter the more intelligible they are. Therefore, etc.

            This can also be explained thus: That power which in cognizing begins from a rule under which error cannot occur cognizes that which it cognizes most certainly. But the intellectual power begins in cognizing from a rule under which error cannot occur, since it starts from the truth of first principles, in which error cannot occur, and therefore the Philosopher says in this book that nothing is more known than first principles in truth, and nothing is more obvious in falsehood than what is opposed to first principles, therefore etc.

            Considering the preeminence of the intellect over sense, Avicenna says in his Metaphysics IX that the rational soul grasps more things than senses does, for it grasp both what is external and internal to a reality. It grasps what is external because it grasps the accidents and properties (proprietates) of the reality, and because of this it grasps what is internal, namely the simple whatness (quiditatem) and essence of the reality. So the sense does not grasp anything except what appears on the surface of the reality, but the intellect is not ignorant there, and it also grasps what is interior, namely the whatness of the reality. Because of this we say that whatness is the object of the intellect, and Avicenna says further on that the intellect has a certain nobility above that of senses, from which it is immediately apparent that intellectual cognition is more perfect than sensitive cognition. But as cognition is more powerful and perfect, it is more certain, therefore intellectual cognition is more certain than sensitive cognition.

            And if you hold that the cognition of first principles, which is the most perfect intellectual cognition, is itself received from sense, therefore sensitive cognition is more certain than intellectual cognition—let us see in what way the cognition of first principles arises from the senses. It does not arise from the senses because the senses first grasp the first principles as complexes, so that the intellect cognizes first principles in virtue of senses itself, for then sensitive cognition would be more certain than intellectual cognition. Rather, the cognition of first principles is received from the senses because exterior senses first receive the accidents exterior to the thing, the interior sensitive powers then grasp more intrinsic accidents touching more closely the nature of the thing, and thus proceeding through intermediate sensitive powers to the intellect, the intellect at last abstracts the nature of the reality from material conditions, and forms the first principles as complexes. Thus the senses contribute nothing to the cognition of first principles except in a dispositive way (dispositive). The intellect, indeed, as it were by its own power, forms and composes first principles for itself, and completes and perfects them, but the senses dispose the intellect to do this, as heat and cold dispose something to the entry of a substantial form. In this way, then, sensitive cognition is prior to intellective cognition on the way of generation, and since this is so, every teaching and every intellectual learning takes its rise from preexisting sensitive cognition, and we must needs arrive at that, and there it ends. So this is the order of cognition in us: the cognition of a conclusion is from the cognition of principles, and the cognition of principles is from the cognition of the ratio of the terms, and the cognition of the ratio of the terms is received from the senses. And one cannot proceed further, but this is the end. And the first proposition of the Philosopher, “All teaching and intellectual learning takes its rise from pre-existing sensitive cognition,” must be understood in this way.

            In response to the arguments: As regards the first, when it is argued “to abandon the senses etc.,” this argument is resolved if one attends to the intention of the Philosopher there, for the Philosopher intends that to abandon the senses because of some sophistical argument, and to follow that argument, is stupid. That this was his intention is apparent, since it is in that place that the Philosopher refutes the opinion of Zeno, who, through a certain sophistical argument, proved that everything is at rest. And therefore he acted stupidly when he adhered to that argument and abandoned the senses. But to abandon the senses because of the intellect, when it is not hindered by some error or sophistical argument is not unreasonable, but reasonable, because intellectual cognition is more certain than sensitive cognition.

            In response to the second argument, when it is argued that “cognition that does not depend etc.,” I hold that there is no other cognition more certain than that cognition that does not depend on another prior cognition (I mean prior on the way of perfection), but such a cognition is more certain than the rest. But there can be another more certain than that which does not depend on another cognition prior on the way of generation while it does depend on another prior on the way of perfection. And, as regards the minor premise, I grant that this intellectual cognition depends on something prior on the way of generation, for it certainly is not the first on the way of generation, and from this it follows next that it is something prior according to perfection. For the Philosopher, in Physics VIII, predicating that local motion is prior to other motion according to perfection, argued thus: Those which are posterior according to generation are prior according to perfection, but local motion is posterior to all the rest according to generation, therefore etc. I will argue in the same way here: That cognition that is posterior to the rest on the way of generation is prior according to perfection, and what is prior on the way of generation is posterior according to perfection. But intellectual cognition is posterior to sensitive cognition according to generation, and sensitive cognition is prior. Therefore, intellectual cognition is prior according to perfection, and sensitive cognition is posterior. Similarly, when it is said in the other part of the minor premise, “that which is the principle of everything in us etc.,” I hold that the perfecting and completing principle that is not merely dispositive is the most certain cognition in us. Now sensitive cognition is merely preparatory, but intellectual cognition is completing and perfecting, and therefore intellectual cognition is more certain than sensitive cognition.

Question 4

            Since the cognition of conclusions, which is called teaching and learning, is from the cognition of first principles, we ask whether the cognition of first principles is innate in us, or acquired.

            And it is argued that it is acquired, since the Philosopher says in the text that we know principles insofar as we know terms, but the cognition of the terms is not innate in us; therefore etc. The minor premise is obvious since the cognition of the whatness signified by the terms is received from sense, therefore it is not innate to us, but acquired.

            Again, that which we have by the way of experience is not innate in us, but acquired, but we have the cognition of principles by the way of experience; therefore etc.

            On the other hand, since, according to the Philosopher at the beginning of the Metaphysics, all men have a natural desire for knowledge, but there is no natural desire unless there is a natural cognition; therefore there is in every man some natural cognition. But that can be nothing other than a cognition of first principles, so the cognition of first principles is in us by nature.

            I maintain that the cognition of first principles is not in us by nature, but is acquired by us. Just as prime matter is related to sensible forms, so the intellect is related, proportionally, to intelligible forms. But prime matter is related to sensible forms in such a way that it is of itself wholly without form, since it is neither a form, nor has a form. Therefore the intellect, similarly, has no intelligible form. And the Philosopher, noting this in On the Soul III, said that our intellect has this only, that the intellective soul itself is none of these in act before it understands in act. But it must be noted that as vision is related to visible things, so the intellect is related, proportionally, to intelligibles, but vision is related to visible things in such a way that if it were to have a species of some visible thing innate in it, it would have no other species of any other visible thing. And so we say that there is no color belonging to vision, in order that it may be, in this way, able to perceive every color. And therefore it is necessary, if vision is to see, that it acquire for itself a visible species from outside. But when it has actually been informed by a visible species in this way, there being no impediment to the visible species on its own part, from the medium, or from the object, of necessity it sees. And it is similar with the intellect, since it has no innate intelligible species for itself. For if it were to have such a species, this would prevent its understanding what is contrary to that species, as is said in On the Soul III. Therefore, if it is actually to understand, it must acquire for itself some species of an intelligible. When it has actually been informed by a species of an intelligible reality, the intellect understands and cannot fail to understand, and then the intellect forms certain concepts for itself from which it makes first principles, which are, in our intellect, the first known in the genus of complex things, and so the intellect as it were acquires the species of first intelligibles for itself naturally, as vision acquires first visibles. And then, when it has once acquired these, it proceeds to the cognition of conclusions following from first principles. So the cognition of first principles is acquired by the intellect in this way through nature.

            In response to the question, therefore, I hold that the cognition of first principles is not innate in such a way that it is in the nature of the intellect, but even so it can be called innate since the cognition of these is not in our soul through some other. And then, having the cognition of these, it proceeds to the cognition of conclusions. Just as we see that nature cannot generate a man immediately from bread, but first alters the bread into blood, and after this the blood into sperm, and it generates a man from sperm, it is similar in our cognition, for our intellect cannot arrive immediately at the cognition of conclusions, but first comes to the cognition of first principles, and then extends it to conclusions.

            In response to the arguments, the response is apparent, since they proceed each in their own way.

Question 5

            We ask about the part “It is necessary to cognize beforehand in two ways...” In that part the Philosopher shows which things and what sort of things it is necessary to cognize before demonstration can occur, and how these cognitions occur, and how many there are beforehand. Therefore we ask whether there are three things cognized beforehand.

            And it is argued that there are, since just as it is necessary to cognize the subject, passion, and axiom (dignitas) before demonstration, so it is necessary to cognize postulates (petitiones), suppositions (suppositiones) and posits (positiones) beforehand. But these do not all reduce to some one thing, therefore it is necessary that more than three be cognized beforehand.

            Again, it seems that there are not three things cognized beforehand, since each thing cognized beforehand has a corresponding cognition beforehand. But there are only two cognitions beforehand, namely what it is and that it is. Therefore there are only two things cognized beforehand, so there are not three, as the Philosopher says in the text.

            On the other hand, it is argued that only those things are cognized before demonstration that are received in the premises of the demonstration, since one does not have a demonstration before he has a conclusion. Now there are only three things received in the premises of a demonstration, namely subject and passion, which are incomplex, and the complex principles, the major and minor premises themselves. Therefore there are no more nor less than three things cognized before demonstration.

            It must be held in regard to this that there are three things cognized before demonstration, namely the subject, passion, and axiom, and that it is necessary for there to be three things cognized before demonstration is apparent through the first proposition of this book. For the first proposition is that every teaching and every intellective learning has its origin from preexisting sensitive cognition, so that a certain motion toward knowledge is understood by “teaching and learning,” and this motion is called teaching as it proceeds from the teacher, and is called learning as it is received by the pupil. But these things cognized beforehand are first principles, which are to the sciences as the entrance is in a house. The Commentator, noting this in Metaphysics II, says that there are some things in every genus of beings that are related to the others as the entrance in a house. And further on he says what they are, since first principles, which are naturally possessed and cognized by a man, are these first things from which there is every teaching and every learning etc.

            It is plain, then, that it is necessary to cognize some things before demonstration. But these are three, namely subject, passion, and axiom. And the reason for this is because that of which knowledge is sought through demonstration is a conclusion in which a proper passion is predicated of its proper subject, but the principles from which such a conclusion is drawn are axioms and common conceptions, which each person approves without a teacher, once they are heard, as Boethius says. Now a cognition of principles always precedes the cognition of what they are principles of, and therefore it is necessary to cognize, before the cognition of the conclusion, an axiom that is related to the conclusion as a principle. Again, cognition of the simple precedes the cognition of the complex, and therefore, since a conclusion is composed from two things, namely the subject and the passion, it is necessary that both of these be cognized before a conclusion is cognized. Therefore it is necessary to cognize three things before a conclusion is cognized.

            But it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the axiom that it is, that is, that it is true that it is. For a true inherence of predicate in subject must be there, for it is necessary to cognize beforehand of that which is the cause of truth in others that it is true, but an axiom is like this, therefore it is necessary to cognize beforehand of an axiom that it is true. But it is necessary to cognize of the subject beforehand both what it is and that it is, since, as a certain Greek expositor says, the subject is related to its passion in two ways, for a subject is the cause of its passion, and also, for this reason, stands under its passion. Therefore, that which is a cause of a passion is only a cause of the passion through its what-it-is. Therefore it is necessary to cognize beforehand of the subject what it is. Again, since a subject stands under a passion, and that which stands under another must be some being, therefore it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject that it is. Therefore it is necessary to cognize beforehand these two concerning the subject, what it is and that it is. But it is necessary to presuppose concerning the passion what it is that is indicated by the name, but not that it is, nor what its definition is. Therefore the Philosopher says here that it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the passion what it is that is signified by the name. Thus it is in this way obvious how many are cognized beforehand, and how many it is necessary to cognize beforehand.

            But it must be noted that even though there are three things cognized beforehand, there are only two cognitions beforehand, and the reason for this is that those things that we know are four. For the questions that are asked are equal in number to what we truly know, and we ask four questions, so that we truly know four things, namely what it is, that is it, if it is, and why it is. We do not know why it is before demonstration, since we have why this is in that only because of the demonstration. Therefore it is necessary to cognize beforehand these three, if it is, what it is, and that it is. Now it happens that if it is reduces to that it is, as is obvious from the Philosopher in the second book of this work. Why it is cannot be cognized beforehand, and if it is reduces to that it is, and then there remain two cognitions beforehand, namely what it is and that it is. And this is what the Philosopher says, that there are two cognitions beforehand, namely what it is and that it is.

            In response to the arguments: As regards the first, when it is argued “just as it is necessary to cognize the subject before demonstration etc.,” I hold that the Philosopher embraces all these under the name “axiom,” since the name “axiom” embraces every complex principle. Therefore there are three things cognized beforehand, namely subject, passion, and axiom, understanding by the name “axiom” all complex principles that are not demonstrated.

            In response to the second argument, when it is maintained that “to every thing that is cognized beforehand, etc.,” I hold that to everything that is cognized beforehand there corresponds its cognition beforehand, so that to different things cognized beforehand there correspond different cognitions beforehand, but not as cognitions beforehand differ according to reality, but as they differ according to form. For the two cognitions beforehand that are separated in axiom and passion are found together in the subject, so that it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the axiom that it is, about the passion what it is, and about the subject both what it is and that it is. And as they coincide in the subject they are not different according to reality from what they were as they occurred separated in the passion and the axiom, but they are different as they coincide in the subject according to form. So I hold that just as things cognized beforehand are three, so there are three cognitions beforehand according to form.

Question 6

            Since it was supposed in the preceding question that it cannot be cognized beforehand concerning the passion that it is, therefore we ask whether it is necessary to cognize beforehand that it is concerning the passion.

            And it is argued that it is, for one can know nothing concerning what is not, therefore it is necessary to cognize beforehand that it is concerning anything about which something is known. But something is known before demonstration about the passion, namely, what it is, therefore it is necessary to cognize before demonstration concerning the passion that it is. If this is so, then it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the passion both what it is and that it is.

            Again, the question what it is presupposes the question if it is, as is said in the second book of this work. Therefore a cognition what it is presupposes a cognition if it is. But we cognize concerning the passion before demonstration what it is, therefore we cognize concerning the passion before demonstration if it is.

            The opposed view is clear from the Philosopher, whose point is that it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the passion what it is, but not that it is.

            It must be held that we cannot cognize beforehand that it is concerning the passion, and the reason for this is that what we have by demonstration is not cognized before demonstration. But we have the being of the passion by demonstration. The reason for this is that the being of a passion, just like that of every other accident, is inherence, for the being of an accident is a being in something. Now we have the inherence of the passion in the subject by demonstration, for this is what we know by demonstration, and therefore we have the being of the passion by demonstration, and nothing of this sort is cognized before demonstration. Therefore etc.

            Again, this is explained more fully: If it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the passion that it is, either it is cognized concerning the passion that it is in actual existence, or that it is some reality and some nature. It is not cognized before demonstration that it is in the being of actual existence, since, speaking of that sort of being, the being of a passion depends on the being of its subject, but it is not necessary to cognize before demonstration concerning the subject if it is, speaking of the being of actual existence, for it is certainly possible to know something through demonstration concerning that which is not in the being of actual existence. Therefore, neither is it necessary to know beforehand concerning a passion if it is in the being of actual existence.

            Again, it is not necessary to know beforehand concerning the passion that it is some reality and nature, since the passion, in regard to its essence and nature, is caused from the essential principles of the subject. Now I argue that the principles of being and cognizing are the same. But the essential principles of the subject, which are conveyed by the definition of the subject, are the cause of the passion’s being with regard to its essence and nature. Therefore, it is through the subject that it is cognized concerning the passion if it is some reality and nature, and this is not cognized before demonstration, but it is demonstrated through the definition of the subject, as was said before. But it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the passion what it is, but not what it is definitionally, as is in a way obvious from what has been said, since the definition of a passion includes the essential principles of the passion, as well as the essential principles of the subject. Now we do not cognize the essential principles of the passion before demonstration, if we cognize the essential principles of a passion by demonstration through the essential principles of the subject, which are conveyed by the definition of the subject, the middle term in a demonstration. We do not cognize the inherence of the passion in the subject before demonstration, but we know this through a completed demonstration. If this is so, then we cognize the definition of a passion through demonstration, so we don’t cognize it before demonstration. Because of this those persons went astray who said that the middle term is the definition of the passion in the highest sort of demonstration. It is obvious, then, in a way, and this will appear below, that the definition of the subject is the middle term in the highest sort of demonstration, since the cause of the passion and of the essential principles of the subject is the definition of the subject.

            In response to the arguments: In response to the first, when it is argued, “concerning what is not etc.,” this is true, taking “know” strictly, that is, as “to know through demonstration.” And you say “therefore concerning that etc.,” and this is true. And you say that “concerning the passion before demonstration, etc.,” and I hold that this is not true. That it is is cognized concerning the passion speaking of every sort of cognition, not of knowledge in the strict sense, nor in such a sense that it is not possible to know anything concerning that which in no way is. And you say, “concerning a passion etc.,” and this is true. It is necessary to cognize beforehand that these are, in the sense of being something signified, and when it is said “before demonstration we cognize what it is,” I grant that we cognize what is said by the name, and therefore it is necessary to know beforehand concerning the passion if it is, in the sense of being something signified.

            In response to the other, when it is argued “the question what it is presupposes etc.,” I hold that what it is is two-fold, namely what it is definitionally, and what it is that is signified by the name. Now the cognition what it is definitionally presupposes that it is, but the cognition what it is that is signified by the name does not presuppose if it is. But such a what it is is that which is cognized beforehand through the name of the passion, and therefore one does not necessarily presuppose if it is, except as it is something signified.

Question 7

            We ask whether it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject if it is.

            And it is argued that it is, since the question what it is presupposes the question if it is, therefore the cognition what it is presupposes the cognition if it is. But it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject what it is, therefore also if it is.

            Again, it is argued that it is necessary to cognize beforehand if it is in an effect (in effectu), since every being is either being in the soul or is true being outside the soul. If, then, it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject if it is, either this will be if it is in the soul, or if it is outside the soul. Not if it is in the soul, since this is diminished being, therefore if it is outside the soul. But this is being actually. Therefore, etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued that if it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject if it is actually when we have a demonstration concerning the subject, then there could not be a demonstration concerning that which is not actually. But this is false, as is apparent concerning rain and other things that are not.

            It must be said that it is not necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject if it is actually, and the reason for this is that it is necessary to cognize before demonstration concerning the subject only that which pertains to the essential principles of the subject, for the passion is demonstrated of the subject through the essential principles of the subject alone, and not through any accident of it. Now being actually does not pertain to demonstrative principles, but is accidental to them. But it can be objected that one must take into account what is said elsewhere concerning this, for instance, in Metaphysics IV. Still, the authoritative statement of Avicenna, at the end of his Metaphysics V, can be adduced, for he says that the being of a reality is of two sorts: one is the being a thing has naturally from itself, and that is the being of essence, and one is the being it receives from another, and that is the being of existence. Through the first being the reality is placed in a determinate category and in a determinate species of being, and this being is attached to the definition, from which it is said that the definition is an expression indicating what the being of a reality is. According to Avicenna the being of existence, before actual being, only exists in the conception of the mind, and this second being coincides with a reality insofar as it is an effect of some other, so that the reality is said to be in an effect insofar as it itself is the end result of the action of some agent. And since that which is the end result of the action of some agent is singular (for every action involves singulars), it is said that the being of actual existence, strictly speaking, occurs only in singulars. Boethius, noting this, says that everything that is is because it is one in number, and this also seems to be the intention of the Commentator on Metaphysics V, for he says that a question concerning being can be a problem concerning a genus or a problem concerning an accident, and insofar as it indicates being of existence it is a problem concerning accident. And so it is obvious that being of existence is distinguished from being of essence because it does not pertain to the essence of a reality.

            And now to resume the argument, it is necessary to cognize before demonstration concerning the subject only that which pertains to its essential principles, but being actually does not pertain to the essential principles of the subject; therefore etc. Nevertheless, it is necessary to cognize before demonstration concerning the subject if it is absolutely, that is, if it is some reality and nature. And that it is necessary to cognize beforehand if it is some reality and nature is obvious, since just as the question what it is is related to the question if it is, in the same way the cognition what it is is related to the cognition if it is. But the question what it is is related to the question if it is in such a way that it asks about the determinate being of a reality, for example, in what genus it is placed, and in what species, and the question if it is asks about the indeterminate being of a reality. Therefore the cognitions will be similarly related. But the determinate presupposes the indeterminate. Therefore, if it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject what it is, it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning it if it is, but not if it is actually, but rather if it is absolutely considered. But it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject what it is since the subject has the form of what is known to the greatest extent in knowledge. This, however would not occur unless it were cognized beforehand concerning the subject what it is; therefore etc.

            In response to the arguments: in response to the first argument I grant what this argument proves, since it proves only that it is necessary to know beforehand concerning the subject if it is absolutely, and it does not prove that it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject if it is actually.

            In response to the other, when it is argued, “the being of a reality is either being the soul, etc.,” I hold that it is necessary to cognize beforehand concerning the subject if it is outside the soul, that is, if it is some reality and nature that does not depend on the soul in its being. This is necessary in the real sciences, though not in the others. For I call being outside the soul that which does not depend on the soul, and being of essence is of this sort, and being actually and being understood and the like are accidents of this. For being actually occurs in the reality as it is singular, but being outside the soul occurs in the essence of the thing absolutely, and it is said to be outside the soul because it does not depend on the soul.

Question 8

            We inquire concerning the part “But one can cognize beforehand,” where the Philosopher teaches in what order it is necessary to cognize principles beforehand. And he says there that the major premise is cognized prior to the conclusion in time, but the minor premise at the same time, though it is prior in nature. Therefore, we ask whether anyone can cognize the principles and be ignorant of the conclusions.

            And it is argued that one cannot, since whoever cognizes the antecedent necessarily cognizes the consequent. For instance, whoever cognizes a man necessarily cognizes an animal. But the premises are related to the conclusion as antecedent to consequent. Therefore, etc.

            Again, whoever cognizes a proposition cognizes everything that is included in that proposition. Now the conclusion of a demonstration is included in the major premise. Therefore, etc.

            On the other hand, the opposed view is apparent from the Philosopher, in Prior Analytics II. For the Philosopher intends there that one can know the major and minor premises and still be ignorant of the conclusion. For one can know that every mule is sterile, and that this is a mule, and still be ignorant that it is sterile, since he can be of the opinion that it is pregnant.

            It must be understood that something can be cognized in two ways: in something more universal (in universali) and in its particularity (in particulari). Now I hold that when one cognizes the major and minor premises he necessarily cognizes the conclusion in something more universal, and the reason for this is that whoever cognizes the cause necessarily cognizes the effect in something more universal and virtually, since the effect is virtually contained in the cause. But the major and minor premises are related to the conclusion as cause to effect, and therefore whoever cognizes the major and minor premises necessarily cognizes the conclusion in something more universal and virtually.

            But someone who cognizes the major and minor premises does not necessarily cognize the conclusion in its particularity and its own form. The reason for this is that when one cognizes the universal and remote cause he does not necessarily cognize the effect in its particularity and its own form. But in demonstration the major premise is the universal and remote cause with respect to the conclusion, and therefore when one cognizes the major premise, etc.

            But one cognizes the major premise prior to the conclusion in time, and the reason for this is that one thing is cognized prior in time to another if the other is cognized through it, though when it is cognized the other is not cognized immediately, but some other intermediate cognition is required. Now the conclusion is not immediately cognized when the major premise is cognized, but an intermediate cognition, namely that of the minor premise, is required, and it is necessary to get this cognition by way of the senses, or by induction. Therefore the major premise is cognized prior to the conclusion in time. But I do not understand that the major premise is cognized prior in time to the conclusion in such a way that the act of cognizing is measured by time, since, just as its substance is not measured by time, neither is its action. But it was said in the manner of a similitude, since just as we say that that is prior in time to another after the being of which there follows another, an intermediate time cutting between them, so we say something is cognized prior to another in time when we cognize it, with an intermediate time cutting between, before that other. Now since an intermediate cognition cuts between the cognition of the major premise and the conclusion, the cognition of the major premise is said to be prior to the cognition of the conclusion in time. And that the major premise is thus cognized prior in time is obvious from Grosseteste, who says that since, from its description, every triangle has three angles, and from the description of this triangle that is in a semicircle the conclusion is drawn, the other of these, namely the major premise, one cognizes much earlier in time. Nevertheless, at the same time as one cognizes the major and minor premises and applies them to the conclusion one cognizes the conclusion. I understand the Philosopher to mean that those which are cognized at the same time are those in which the intellect, understanding continuously in act without interruption, is proceeding from the cognition of one to the cognition of the other. Now when someone considers the major and minor premises in relation to the conclusion, then the understanding, understanding continuously in act, is proceeding from the premises to the conclusion, therefore etc.

            Nevertheless, even though the premises, when actually considered in relation to the conclusion, are cognized at the same time, the premises are still cognized prior to it by nature, and the reason for this is that that is cognized prior to another by nature the cognition of which does not depend on the other, while the cognition of the other does depend on it. Now although someone actually considers the major and minor premises with relation to the conclusion, nevertheless the cognition of the premises does not depend on the cognition of the conclusion, but the cognition of the conclusion does depend on that of the premises, and therefore the premises are cognized by nature prior to the conclusion.

            Briefly, bringing together what has been said, it must be held that one who cognizes the premises immediately and at the same time cognizes the conclusion, either in something more universal or in its own form. So it is only necessary for one who cognizes the major alone to cognize the conclusion vitually and in something more universal, and when he cognizes the major premise he does not at the same time cognize the conclusion in its particularity and its own form. But if one who cognizes the major and the minor premises considers them in relation to the conclusion, then at the same time he cognizes the conclusion, but he cognizes the premises beforehand by nature.

            In response to the arguments: in response to the first argument I hold that whoever cognizes the antecedent cognizes the consequent simultaneously in such a way that it is understood or included in the antecedent. And I grant the minor premise, and so I hold that when one cognizes the major premise he simultaneously cognizes the conclusion, in such a way that it is included in the major premise. But it is included in the major premise as in something more universal, and virtually, and therefore it is cognized at the same time as in something more universal, and virtually, not in particular and under its own form.

            And as to what is said on the other hand, that “the Philosopher says in the second book of the Prior Analytics that it is possible to know the major and minor premises etc.,” I hold that this is because someone having the major and minor premises does not consider them in act in relation to the conclusion, and in that case he can doubt whether the conclusion is true, but not otherwise.

            And as to the other, when it is argued “whoever cognizes some proposition cognizes everything etc.,” this is true. As it is included in this, so is it cognized. And therefore, as before, since the conclusion in included in the major premise virtually, when the major is cognized the conclusion is cognized virtually.

Question 9

            We inquire concerning the part, “But before an induction or receiving it through a syllogism,” in which the Philosopher gives a way of learning or cognizing the conclusion beforehand. According to the exposition of Grosseteste the Philosopher says there, concerning the way of cognizing the conclusion beforehand and learning it, that every conclusion that is received through teaching is known beforehand in the universal, but is not known in the particular. And therefore we ask whether, when one learns a conclusion, he knew it before or not.

             And it is argued that one does, for one who learns a conclusion either knew it beforehand or did not know it beforehand. If he knew it beforehand, we have what is proposed. If he did not know it beforehand, then, if he should happen upon it he will no more grasp that this is that of which he seeks cognition that that any other is. So Themistius introduces the example about the head of the family searching for a runaway slave, for if he did not have knowledge (notitiam) of him, if he should happen upon him he would no more recognize him than any other. Therefore it is similar in the matter at hand, and if this is the way it is, it is obvious that he will never know anything determinately. For he does not any more cognize the conclusion the cognition of which he seeks than any other. But this is absurd. Therefore etc.

             Again, every person who learns desires to know something, but nothing is desired except what is cognized; therefore etc.

             On the other hand, it is argued, the Philosopher says in De Anima III that our intellect before learning is like a blank tablet upon which nothing is actually written. But the intellect, when it is in such a state, has no knowledge within. Therefore the intellect has no knowledge within before learning, therefore it is not necessary that one who learns a conclusion knew it beforehand.

             Again, the intellect of itself no more understands in act than the senses of themselves sense in act. Quite the contrary, the senses sense more in act, since our every intellective cognition has its origin from preexisting sensitive cognition. But the senses come to sense in act when sensing nothing beforehand, therefore the intellect comes to understand in act when understanding nothing beforehand. But it comes to understand in act through this learning, therefore the intellect comes to learn when cognizing nothing beforehand.

             As is apparent from the Philosopher in De Anima II, “one who knows” is said in two ways, one who knows in act, and one who knows potentially. One who actually knows, who has a habit of scientific knowledge and actually considers in accord with its act, is strictly, and according to the truth of the matter, called one who knows. Learning does not pertain to him, but rather teaching, since he has scientific knowledge perfectly, but teaching belongs to those who know, as is said in Metaphysics I. In another way, someone is called one who knows potentially, and this in two ways: in one way because he has an aptitude for knowing, or because he is one who has a habit of knowledge, but is not actually considering according to its act. One who knows potentially in the first way is said to be ignorant, since one who is ignorant is related to knowledge as matter to form, but matter has from itself that it is receptive of form, and similarly one who is ignorant has from himself that he is receptive of knowledge. He who is potentially one who knows in the second way does not, strictly speaking, learn, but rather teaches, for such a one has a habit of knowledge and such a one does not strictly speaking learn. It remains, then, that he who strictly speaking is one who learns is one who is ignorant, but one who is ignorant is said either from the ignorance of negation or from the ignorance of disposition. One who is ignorant in the first way is not called one who learns, since he is said to learn in the strict sense who easily grasps what is set out by the master, and through the teaching which he receives from another, or through the interior reason he has, he comes to the act of knowledge, so that one is moved per se to the grasp of something he did not know before. But one who is ignorant from the ignorance of negation is not like this, since he does not immediately receive that which is set out by the master, but many changes are requires so that from one who knows potentially he may come to be one who knows in act. Therefore he who is strictly speaking one who learns is one who is ignorant from the ignorance of disposition. But every such one is in a way one who knows, and therefore everyone who learns has something of knowledge, everyone who learns, therefore, necessarily knows something, therefore everyone who learns some conclusion knew in some way beforehand.

             Again, this is explained thus, and it is the argument of Theophrastus as it is reported here by Albert. Nothing is moved toward something unless it has something already of that toward which it is moved, for everything that is in the midst of being moved is partly in that from which and partly in that to which it is moved. Now one who learns is one who is moved to knowledge, for one who learns comes to be one who knows, as the Philosopher says; therefore etc. But you will ask in what way he knows this. I hold that he knows this virtually and in the universal, and is ignorant of it in the particular and under its own form, for he knows it in its principles. Now according to Grosseteste, principles have a universal and active influence on the conclusion, and therefore one who learns a conclusion knew it beforehand in the universal.

             But it must be noted that it is not sufficient for one to learn a conclusion that he know it in a universal, confused and indeterminate way, but before he learns a conclusion completely it is necessary that he have a cognition more determinately of it than of any other, since otherwise he would no more desire to know it than any other. And therefore he not only has an indeterminate and universal cognition, but also another more determinate cognition, for instance from the testimony of a teacher, or in some other way—from the testimony of a teacher since it is necessary for the learner to believe him even though the teacher does not always give demonstrations. For instance, as when someone must learn this conclusion, “every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles,” it is necessary that he believe that conclusion on the word of the teacher just as much <as though it had been demonstrated>, and since this <belief> is not enough for him, he will proceed next to the possession of a complete cognition of the conclusion, and then he learns it perfectly.

            This, then, is the coming to be of knowledge in us, so that it should not be assumed that the coming to be of knowledge in us occurs as Plato thinks, that is, in such a way that we know the conclusion that we learn both in the universal and in the particular. And when it was asked of him why the boy did not immediately consider <his knowledge> as soon as he was born, Plato responded that this is because the intellective soul is joined to the body, and therefore is hindered from actual consideration <of its knowledge>. And this seems to be the meaning of Boethius in the first book of the Consolation of Philosophy, for he says there, when speaking about the intellective soul in its first creation, before union with the body, that when he had created the mind, it knew singulars other <than itself>, but hidden within the cloud of its <bodily> members it retained the highest and lost the singulars <below the highest>. But we will not speak of it in this way, but will say that our intellect is not, as it were, first in capacity to every intelligible in order, but only to a certain one, since it is first in capacity to the cognition of first principles, and then from the cognition of first principles it proceeds to the cognition of conclusions. It is obvious that when one learns a conclusion he knew it before in the universal, but was ignorant of it in the particular and in its proper form.

            In response to the arguments. In response to the first, when it is argued, “when one learns some conclusion” etc., I hold that he knew it in the universal, but was ignorant of it in the particular. And when you say, “if he does not know it, then if he happens upon it” etc., I maintain that it is true that unless he has a cognition more determinately of that than of any other, he would no more learn it than any other, and therefore I assume that he has a better cognition of it than of any other, and therefore it is suitably said that demonstration is from two premises, since cognition of the conclusion in the universal occurs through the major premise, but more in particular through the minor premise, and therefore demonstration needs both the major and the minor premises.

            In response to the other, I grant the whole argument. For I contend that he knows it in the universal, and the argument proves nothing more.

            In response to the arguments on the other hand. In response to the first, when it is argued, “the intellect before learning”etc., I hold that the intellect before learning, that is, before it has any cognition of the principles or of the conclusion, is ignorant by the ignorance of negation. But if someone ignorant by the ignorance of negation is to learn something in the universal, which is not learning strictly speaking, it is not necessary that he cognize something beforehand concerning what he learns, either in the universal or in the particular. But when he is ignorant by the ignorance of disposition, if he is to learn it is necessary that he cognize something beforehand. And one who learns strictly speaking is like that, since one learns the knowledge of conclusions through the cognition of first principles. And you will say, therefore it is not necessary that everyone who learns cognize something beforehand. I maintain that this is surely not the case, since everyone who is ignorant by the ignorance of disposition cognizes something beforehand, but everyone who, strictly speaking, learns, is ignorant by the ignorance of disposition; therefore etc. But his being ignorant by the ignorance of negation prohibits nothing, because one does not learn, strictly speaking, when he cognizes nothing beforehand.

             In response to the other argument, I grant the conditional according to which the senses are compared to the intellect before the intellect has any cognition of the principles or of the conclusion, since just as the senses then sense without sensing anything beforehand, so the intellect understands without understanding anything beforehand. Nevertheless, comparing the senses to the intellect as it is informed by first principles, and sets out to acquire the cognition of the conclusion, which is a true comparison of the senses to the intellect, then the senses and the intellect are not similar, since then the senses sense without sensing anything beforehand, but the intellect does not understand without understanding anything beforehand. And it does not follow next that although the intellect at first understands without understanding anything beforehand, that because of this one who learns learns without cognizing anything beforehand, since the intellect is not then, strictly speaking, learning, as was seen earlier. So, as regards the forms of the two arguments, in response to the first, when it is argued, “the intellect is like a blank tablet before it learns” etc., I maintain that the Philosopher takes this in such a way that he extends the name “learning,” so that “learning” names the acquisition of the habit of principles, and not so that “learning” names only the acquisition of the habitus of conclusions, which acquisition is strictly called teaching and necessarily arises from some things acquired beforehand, as he says in the first proposition of this book.

             In response to the other, when it is said, “the senses without sensing anything beforehand,” I hold that this is true, but first it acquires species of sensibles for itself. In the same way, I maintain that the intellect understands, without understanding anything beforehand, when it has first acquired species of intelligibles for itself, but in this way the first acquisition or reception is not teaching, but is called understanding, which is the habit of principles, just as scientific knowledge is the habit of conclusions.

Question 10

            We inquire concerning the part, “but we think we know,” and at present there are two things asked, first, whether knowing is defined correctly as the Philosopher defines it; and second, since the Philosopher in demonstrating the material definition of demonstration through the formal definition concludes that demonstration is from what is primary, true, immediate, better known, prior to and causative of the conclusion, it is asked whether primary axioms are contained in a demonstration.

            Concerning the first question, it is argued that it is not, since the Philosopher says that to know is to cognize the cause. And it is argued, if to know is to cognize the cause, then knowledge is cognition of the cause. But knowledge is cognition of the effect through the cause. Therefore to know is not to cognize the cause.

            Again, if to know were to cognize the cause, since it is impossible to cognize some cause, it is possible to know something. But it is absurd to say that it is impossible to know something, since then a natural appetite of human beings would be in vain. But this is absurd, therefore etc.

            The truth of the opposed view is apparent from the Philosopher, who contends that to know is to cognize the cause, for he says that to know is to cognize cause, both that it is the cause and that it is impossible that it should be otherwise.

            It must be replied that “to know” is properly defined as the Philosopher defines it, and to make this clear it must be known that “to know” is said in two ways, namely to know in a certain respect and to know without qualification. To know in a certain respect is to know a reality as it has being in another, either as an accident in a subject or as a part in a whole or as an effect in a cause. But to know without qualification is to know something in itself as regards its causes and principles, and that knowing without qualification is knowing through the cause is obvious, since everyone who seeks is in doubt, and everyone in doubt about something is ignorant. If, therefore, knowledge occurs principally because of the removal of ignorance, as is obvious from the Philosopher in Metaphysics I, it is clear that knowledge cannot be possessed without qualification unless a cognition of everything sought and doubted is possessed. For it is necessary to know the solution of the doubts if knowledge of anything is to be had. Therefore the Philosopher says in Metaphysics III that the cognition of truth is the resolution of doubts. Therefore it is possible to know without qualification only through that due to which, when one has it, it is not possible to doubt or question further why it is so. Now when the cause is cognized it is not possible to question further why it is so, since to question why it is so is to be in doubt concerning the cause, but when the cause is known no one can be in doubt concerning the cause; therefore etc. Therefore we argue thus: one can know only through that by which, when he has it, it is not possible to be in doubt about or question why it is so, but when the cause of an effect is cognized it is not possible to be in doubt or to question why it is so; therefore etc.

            Albert gives another argument here. The Philosopher says in Metaphysics I that now and at other times philosophizing has begun because of wondering. For when we see some effects the cause of which is hidden from us, then we wonder, and wondering in this way leads us to philosophizing, and so because of wondering both now and at other times, etc. Wonder, therefore, rouses a man to seek knowledge. But it does not rouse a man to seek knowledge unless it rouses him to seek cognition of the cause, for it is because we see an effect of the cause of which we are ignorant that we wonder, and so it is clear that knowledge depends on cognition of the cause, and that perfect and certain knowledge depends on cognition of the cause, from which it is obvious that it is possible to know something with certainty. For these first principles are the cause of all knowledge, but one can know first principles, which are in this way the cause of all knowledge, for they are the most manifest of all to us. Therefore it is clear that one can know something with certainty.

            But according to Grosseteste, “to know” is said in four ways, loosely, strictly, more strictly, and most strictly. To know, loosely speaking, is every sort of cognition of anything, which is indifferently related to being and non-being, and in this way of knowing contingencies that could have gone either way are known, in the way in which it is possible to have knowledge concerning these. To know strictly is cognition of the truth of those which occur in one way frequently and for the most part, and in this way inborn contingencies and natural realities in general are known, since these do not always occur in one way, but frequently, and for the most part. To know more strictly is cognition of the truth of those which always happen in one way only, and in this way principles and conclusions are known in mathematics, for the truth of these is eternal. To know most strictly is the cognition of the truth of that which always occurs in only one way, through something such that it always occurs in only one way, which the cause of the other both in being and in cognizing, and speaking in this way of knowing, we know strictly the conclusions in mathematics, since these are known through such principles as always occur in only one way, and that knowing is the knowing defined here, but the other ways are sophistical. And because of this, he says, excluding those ways, that to know is “in our opinion” etc. without qualification and not in a sophistical way.

            From this it is obvious that demonstration must proceed from such as are causes in being and cognizing, and since such causes are without qualification prior and according to nature, therefore the highest demonstration is from what is without qualification prior and better known, and therefore the Philosopher says that demonstration does not proceed only from what is better known to us.

            In response to the arguments opposed to this view, in response to the first, I hold that the Philosopher understands that to know is to cognize the cause, and therefore I grant that knowledge is cognition of a reality through its cause, and in this way the definition of the word “to know” must be understood.

            In response to the other argument, when it is argued “if to know is to cognize the cause” etc., I grant this, and then I hold that if it is impossible to cognize some cause, it is impossible to know. And when you say “it is impossible” etc., I hold that this is false. And when it is said in proof that “the effect is not cognized unless its cause is cognized” etc., I maintain that the effect is not cognized unless its proximate cause is cognized, but it can very well be cognized without its remote cause being cognized. Hence, an effect can be cognized either under the formula of its species, or under every formula of its species and genera, and so far the effect to be cognized within its species it is not necessary to cognize all the causes both near and remote. And because of this, the Philosopher says in Ethics I that for a doctor to cognize health it is not necessary to run all the way back to the first idea of health. So for the cognition of an effect within the species it is not necessary to run back through every one of its causes. For if someone wants to cognize a reality in its genera and in its species it is necessary go all the way back to every cause, for instance, if one wants to cognize a man as he is animal, and as he is substance, and as he is a being, since the cause of being as it is being is nothing other than the first cause, therefore to cognize man under every such formula it is necessary to run all the back to the first cause.

            Then, as regards the general line taken by the arguments, I maintain that the effect cannot be known in the genera and in the species unless every cause right up to the first cause is cognized. And you say that “the first cause” etc.—I hold that we cannot know the first cause perfectly in this life, and therefore I grant that we do not know any other cause perfectly under every one of its formulae, both of its genera and of its species. But one can know a cause perfectly under the formula of its species, even though not under every one of its formulae, both of its genera and of its species, and therefore that knowledge that teaches us to arrive at the cognition of the first being insofar as it is being is first knowledge through which we arrive at cognition of the first principle. And since we cannot cognize this without qualification, therefore we know nothing as regards all of its causes both near and remote.