Second Set of Questions on the Posterior Analytics

by Simon of Faversham

Question 1

            “All teaching and all learning” etc. Concerning the Posterior Analytics it is asked whether this proposition is true, “all teaching” etc.

            And it seem that it is not, for as it is with sensory cognition, so it is with intellectual cognition. But sensory teaching does not arise from preexisting cognition. Therefore etc.

            Again, there are many things which are known naturally; therefore they do not arise from

preexisting cognition. The antecedent is obvious, since principles are of this sort.

            The opposing view is clearly true from what the Philosopher says here.

            In response to this, it must be understood, in accord with what Alexander says here, that there are two manners of cognition, cognition through discovery and through learning. Hence the intent of the Philosopher, according to Alexander, is, “every teaching” etc., that is, from preexisting discovery. But Alexander imposes this interpretation on the text, and if he said this, he spoke badly, since he said that our every cognition arises from prior discovery. For if this is so there must be another cognition prior to the first cognition, or else if we have learned anything at all we have already learned an infinite number of things beforehand. Hence it must be said that all teaching arises from intellectual precognition, and because of this two contrary things must be explained. The first is that every cognition arises from preexisting cognition, and the second is that it arises from intellectual cognition. The proof of the first: Since nothing else is understood by this statement that all teaching and all learning arise from preexisting cognition than this, that every conclusion arises from preexisting cognition. But a conclusion is a name for something unknown, and we arrive at the cognition of an unknown through something known.

            Again, the argument of Themistius is to this effect. Everything which is moved has something else to which it is moved; if then we are to cognize a conclusion it is necessary that we have some cognition about the conclusion beforehand.

            Again, the proof of the second: Since the cognition of a conclusion comes from the cognition of principles, it is from intellectual cognition. And cognition of principles is from the cognition of terms, and the cognition of terms is from sensory cognition. Hence, bringing all this together, the Philosopher said that all teaching and all learning arise from preexisting sensory cognition, and that is the end of the series.

            In response to the arguments, in response to the first argument I maintain that there is a similitude here because just as sense is potential, and arises from what is first in actuality, so also the intellect. But there is a dissimilitude in this as well, for intellectual cognition is caused from sensory cognition, but not conversely. But, someone might argue to the contrary, the posterior is not the cause of the prior, and sense is posterior to intellect, therefore etc. I maintain that “prior” is said in two ways, either according to substance and perfection, or according to generation. Sense is prior according to generation, and intellect according to substance and perfection.

            In response to the other argument, I maintain that there are two ways in which something is known naturally, either because something is in the substance of our soul, and in this way nothing is naturally known by us since then our soul would not be like a blank tablet. Or it can be naturally known because our intellect has an immediate capacity to understand it, and first principles are of this sort. Hence there is a prior sensory cognition of these, but not a prior intellectual cognition.

Question 2

            Next it is asked whether it is possible for there to be a science of demonstration.

            And it seems it is not, for if there were a science of demonstration, since science occurs through demonstration, I ask concerning this demonstration whether there is a science of it or not. If not, then neither is there science of the first, if there is, I will ask about that science as before, and so on ad infinitum.

            Again, one does not have knowledge of a conclusion unless he first knows a demonstration for that conclusion; if, then, he first knows himself to have a demonstration for that conclusion, before that he knew himself to have a demonstration for that demonstration, therefore he has demonstration before he knows demonstration. But this is impossible. Therefore etc.

            The opposite view is obvious through what the Philosopher says here.

            I reply to the question that: (1) There can be a science of demonstration, (2) there is a science of demonstration, and (3) there is a science of demonstration through demonstration.

            Proof of the first point: There can be a science of anything which is understandable by the intellect, and has properties and passions. But demonstration is like that.

            Proof of the second: There is a science of that which is common to every special science; but demonstration is common to every special science; therefore etc. And this science is common, not special, since it is decided by the same argument in one science and another, and so it is decided in a common science. Logic is like this, but since logic is in one part about demonstration and in another part about probable syllogism, it must be understood that as far as that part which is about demonstration is concerned, it is merely a teaching science, and not a science in use, since it proceeds from common things, and demonstration in the special sciences is not from common things. But insofar as the other part is concerned, it is both a teaching science and a science in use. It is a teaching science since it teaches from which and what sort it is to be argued probably, and it is science in use because its operation occurs within the other sciences.

            Proof of the third point: Every science hands down some teaching through demonstration. Since logic is a science it passes on its knowledge about demonstration through demonstration, and this is known through demonstration which is the same in species as the demonstration one learns about but not the same in number. And as it is not absurd to proceed to infinity in a circular manner in generation, so also it is not absurd in demonstration. Thus it is in the operation of the intellect when it understands another, in understanding the other it understands itself to understand, and afterwards it understands itself to understand itself, and so on ad infinitum.

            In response to the arguments: In response to the first I grant that demonstration arises through demonstration, nor is it absurd that there should be a process to infinity there. Alternatively, if one cannot proceed to infinity in demonstration a first demonstration can be received in some sense, as we can receive a demonstration about this rule: every whole is greater than its part, and a house is a certain whole, therefore etc. All of this can be grasped by the senses, hence if demonstration has thus been produced in the mind, I believe that one has it through discovery.

            I reply to the second objection that science is of two sorts. In one sort the science and its way of knowing differ, as for instance in all special sciences. In the other sort the science and its way of knowing do not differ, and logic is like this since it is its own way of knowing. For one knows demonstration and how to demonstrate simultaneously, so that a logician may know a demonstration, and there is no need for him to have a demonstration for it. So the major premise is only to be understood as applicable to the special sciences.

Question 3

            Next we ask about the part,”Now it is necessary to know beforehand in two ways, etc.,” whether there are two cognitions beforehand as he says, namely what it is and that it is, and in the second place, whether the definitions indicating what a reality is and what the name signifies are one and the same.

            Concerning the first we argue that it is not, for every question is a certain cognition beforehand, for everything that is asked can in some way be cognized beforehand—otherwise it would never be discovered. But there are four questions, as the Philosopher has it in the second book of this work. Therefore etc.

            Again, to whatever is cognized beforehand, there corresponds its cognition beforehand. But there are three things cognized beforehand, namely the subject, passion, and axiom (dignitas). Therefore etc.

            Again, just as cognition beforehand that it is occurs, so also cognition before of what sort it is, and how much, and so on for the others <that is, the other categories>. Therefore etc.

            The Philosopher takes the opposite view.

            I reply to the question that there are only two cognitions beforehand, and as the philosopher has it in the second book, there are four questions, namely if it is, whether it is, what it is, and why it is. And therefore there are four things we truly know, namely the aforesaid. From this, it is argued that there are only two cognitions beforehand, since since of the number of those knowables those alone are cognized before before demonstration of which cognition is not to be had through demonstration, but what the subject is and what its name signifies, and that the subject is, and what it is that the passion signifies, and that an axiom is <true>, is not to be had through demonstration, and therefore there are only two cognitions beforehand, since these alone are cognized before demonstration. Proof of the minor: since quidditative cognition of the subject is the cause of every passion which can be demonstrated of the subject, and if that is the cause, it is not to be had through demonstration, since it is before every demonstration. In the same way, it is necessary to know concerning the passion what it is, since nothing can be demonstrated of anything unless we know what it <the item to be demonstrated> is. Since, therefore, something must be proved of the passion, it is necessary to cognize beforehand what it is, and similarly of an axiom.

            But you will say, it seems that we ought to have three cognitions beforehand, namely what the subject is according to its substance, in the second place, what the name signifies, and in the third, that it is. It must be said that one of these cognitions beforehand is reduced to the others, namely that which is according to the substance and nature of the subject to that concerning what it is that is signified by the name. For it is never known what is signified through the name unless it is known what the reality is which is made the subject.

            To the arguments, to the first I reply that the number of questions and the number of cognitions beforehand do not arise from the same thing, for the number of questions arises from those which we truly know, are known through demonstration, of which sort there are four; but the number of cognitions beforehand arises from those things which are assumed for the sake of demonstration, and such are only two, what it is and that it is.

            To the other, I reply and grant that there are three things cognized beforehand in number, namely the subject, axiom, and passion, but they reduce to two, to the complex and the incomplex, and of such it is cognized beforehand what it is and that it is.

            To the other, I reply that it cannot be cognized beforehand that something is of some sort or quantity, since understanding something to be of a certain sort is understanding a quality to inhere in it, and we know a quality inheres in something through demonstration, and nothing known through demonstration can be cognized beforehand, and so we cannot cognize that something is of some sort or quantity beforehand.

Question 4

            Next we inquire about the second question, namely, whether the definitions indicating what a thing is and what the name signifies are one and the same.

            And it is argued that they are, since the what it is of a reality is signified by the name of the reality, for instance, the what it is of human being is signified by the name of a human being. But the definition of human being indicates the what it is of human being, therefore it indicates what is signified by the name of human being, and consequently what the name signifies. Therefore the definition indicating what a thing is and the definition of the name are the same.

            On the other hand, it is argued thus: a definition indicating what it is of a name and what it is of a reality is not the same, since a reality and a name are not the same, but the definition of the name indicating what the name signifies is not a definition indicating what the reality is.

            In response to this question I maintain that the definition indicating what it is of the name and the definition indicating what it is of the reality are not the same. For the Philosopher, in Posterior Analytics II, says that the question what it is presupposes the question if it is, and therefore Avicenna says in his Metaphysics that whoever says something is a reality and has a whatness and says it is not, does not belong to the company of those who know. From this, I accept that a definition signifying what a reality is is only of a being, but a definition indicating what a name signifies is of beings and non-beings alike.

            Again, Themistius says, commenting on this passage, that if anyone orders (principiat) a boy to go to a stable where there are both horses and donkeys, and lead out a horse, he will lead out a horse, and he would not have done this if he had not known what is signified by the name of a horse, and yet he does not know what a horse is according to its substance.

            Again, we can know what is signified by the name of a passion before demonstration, but what the passion is we cannot know before demonstration, since one knows this from the passion’s inherence in the subject. So Avicenna says that of each of those things of which there is a definition signifying what it is of the name, there is also a definition signifying what it is for the reality to be, either according to the being it has in the soul or according to its being in the eternal reality. And hence there is not for each thing of which there is a definition indicating what is signified by the name, also a definition indicating what it is for the reality to be eternally. For we can know what is signified by the name of a vacuum, and yet we can know that a vacuum is not, since it in fact is not. And the Philosopher says in Metaphysics IV that we can know what is signified by a name, not knowing what the reality is. Avicenna says that everything with a definition has being either in eternal reality or the soul.

            In reply to the argument, when it is said “the what it is of a reality is signified by the name of the reality,” I reply that this is true. And you say, “therefore the definition indicating what it is of a reality is a definition indicating what is signified by the name of the reality.” I hold that this does not follow, for even though it follows that the definition will indicate what it is according to its substance that is signified by the name of the reality, still, to say this is not to say what the name signifies.

Question 5

            Next we ask about the part “To know, in our opinion,” etc., first, whether knowledge can be generated in us through teaching.

            And it seems it cannot, since it is impossible for that to be generated in us through teaching which is not generated in us at all. But knowledge is not generated in us at all. Therefore etc. Proof of the minor premise: That which comes to belong to something through its being calmed and brought to rest is not generated in it, since being calmed and at rest are opposed to generation, which is change. But knowledge comes to the soul through its being calmed and brought to rest, for the Philosopher says that in being calmed and brought to rest the soul comes to be knowing and wise. So knowledge is not generated in our soul. Therefore etc.

            Again, if a teacher generated knowledge in us this would occur through knowledge. But it cannot be done through his knowledge since then his knowledge would have an active power, for in every case what an agent uses to act has an active power over that on which he acts. But knowledge does not have active power because it belongs to the first species of quality. Therefore a teacher cannot generate knowledge in anyone through his knowledge, therefore knowledge cannot be generated in anyone through teaching.

            The contrary is argued thus: That is perfect that can generate in another something similar to itself. If then a teacher is perfect in knowledge he will be able to generate a similar habitus in a student, and so will be able to generate knowledge in someone through teaching.

            It must be understood that the opinion of Plato was that knowledge is in our soul’s inmost part intrinsically, so that it has all knowledge and every habitus of knowledge actually and from the beginning due to its origin. And when he was asked, “since we have in us the habitus of knowledge, why do we not bring it to mind when we wish to?” he responded that this was due to our union with the body, for from such a union one is inclined to sensory pleasures that strongly draw a man away from interest in knowledge and from actually bringing it to mind. Hence a soul united to a body cognizes everything universally, but through turning to the separated idea it has cognition of all things in particular.

            But this opinion is no good, for the Philosopher says, in De Anima III, that the intellect, before it learns or discovers, is none of those things that are, and is, as it were, a blank tablet, in capacity to every knowledge. But this would not be if our soul had a habitus of knowledge from the beginning, due to its origin.

            Again, the Philosopher, in De Anima II, says that someone can he in capacity when he knows in two ways, first because he has a habitus of knowledge, but does not actually bring it to mind, as with the geometer who has a habitus of geometry, but does not actually bring it to mind; second because he neither has a habitus nor actually brings it to mind, as with a boy who knows nothing of geometry. But it is obvious that if there were knowledge in us as Plato thinks the boy would not be said to know in capacity in the aforesaid way, so that this opinion is directly opposed to the philosopher.

            It must be said, then, that knowledge can be generated in us by something extrinsic and through teaching. To make this evident it must be noticed that some things arise from art, as, for instance, a house, some arise from nature, as plants and other such things do, and some by both art and nature, for instance health. For knowledge arises partly from art and partly from nature, from nature as from a principal agent, but from art as from an instrumental agent, exactly as it happens in the generation of health. For nature is the principal agent in causing health in animals, regulating the undigested humors, and expelling superfluous humors. The doctor, who is the agent by art, is an instrumental and assisting agent. For he aids nature through positioning, through baths, and through plasters, and if the internal natural power is deficient the doctor can never bring about health. It is similar in the generation of knowledge in us, for it is generated in us by a teacher as an assisting agent who removes hindrances. But it is generated in another way by what is knowable per se, in the way appropriate to an intrinsic and principle agent. For example, the knowledge of this conclusion is generated in a student if he knows (sciat) that per se known (notum) proposition that an extrinsic angle of a triangle is equal to the sum of the two interior angles opposite it. And if he knows that, then the teacher applies it to the conclusion and produces knowledge in him by removing what prevents it. But if the student does not know that the extrinsic angle etc., then it is necessary that the teacher resolve this progressively until he reaches the nature (ratio) of the being <i.e. the various geometrical figures involved> and the terms <i.e. the nominal definitions of the terms>, for if it has these no intellect can be ignorant. Hence, if the teacher needs to cause knowledge in the student it is necessary that the student presuppose something known per se in its nature.

            And with this in mind Grosseteste said that if we wish to speak truly neither does he teach who makes sounds eternally, nor does the letter teach in writing, where there is eternal vision, but these two only move and excite, and the true teacher is what illuminates the mind and shows forth the truth. And what is this? Surely the nature (ratio) of first principles which, according to what Albert says, are first lights illuminating the possible intellect.

            In response to the first argument, when it is said, “it is impossible to generate knowledge in us, therefore not even through teaching,” I reply that the consequence is necessary but deny the antecedent. And when it is proved that what comes to one through being calm and brought to rest is not generated, it is true of that generation which accompanies the arrival of a contrary and destruction without qualification, but it is not true of that generation which marks the attainment of a perfection or change which is owed to itself per se, as when air becomes, or is generated, transparent. And in this way knowledge can be generated in the soul through its being calmed and brought to rest.

            In response to the other I reply that knowledge certainly does have such an active virtue as suffices to acting as an assistant. Or else, it can be said that although knowledge by itself is not an active quality, since it is generated through a significant expression, it also acts on students through such an expression. For the expression is formed by the teacher and received in the student.

Question 6

            Next it is asked whether it is possible for us to know anything.

            And it seems that it is not, since we do not know any truth unless we know the cause which is first without qualification, but we cannot know the cause which is first without qualification; therefore we know no truth at all. The major premise is explained as follows: The first cause is the cause of every truth, but the cognition of the cause is required for the cognition of the effect, whence the cognition of the first cause is required for the cognition of every truth. The minor premise is also obvious from the author of De Causis, who says that the first cause is above every explanatory account (narratio), and the tongue lacks an explanatory account of it. But he uses `explanatory account’ for `cognition’. The first cause, then, exceeds every cognition of our intellect,’ therefore etc.

            Again, there is nothing that does not have contrary judges. For even concerning the first principle there arise judges and opponents contrary to one another. By whatever reason, then, the judgment of one is to stand, by the same reason does the judgment of the other stand. But if there is no judgment more to be believed, then it is not possible to demonstrate that one knows anything. Therefore it is obvious that knowledge of any reality is impossible for us.

            On the other hand: It is argued that a natural desire is not directed to what is impossible so that it is in vain. But all men naturally desire to acquire some knowledge, therefore it is possible for each human being to do so, so that it is possible for us to know something. And this is the argument of the Commentator on the second book of the Metaphysics.

            It must be said in response to the question that knowledge of some reality is possible for us, which becomes apparent in two ways: In the first place, if the causes that must lead to some effect are possible, then the effect will be possible. For to posit a cause the effect of which is impossible is to remove from it the form of a cause, since a cause is that upon the being of which another follows. But the causes from which there is generation of knowledge are possible, not merely without qualification, but for us. For two causes (principia) concur in the generation of knowledge, a passive cause, the possible intellect, and an active cause, the phantasm and the agent intellect—hence the agent intellect, upon the presence of a phantasm and through the power of first principles, which are the first lights illuminating the possible intellect, as Albert says of the introduction and generation of knowledge, and therefore, since it is possible for all this to be found in us, if indeed it is not necessary, it is obvious that it is possible to generate knowledge in us.

            And this is also apparent from another argument, for to be moved and to have been moved are of one definition in this regard, that if one is possible, the other will be possible, too. But we see that it is possible for a human being to be moved towards knowledge, and to be sure those who seek cognition of the posterior through the prior are so moved, some, of course, through discovery and some through the instruction of others. And therefore it is obvious that a power for the comprehension of knowledge is in men, in such a way that not only was this power for being moved toward knowledge, but also to be a knowing thing from having been so moved (a moto esse). But according to the Commentator there are two signs upon which depend one’s rightly having knowledge about anything. One is that the opinion he has can be taken back to sensibles and things known in themselves, for the experience of true statements (sermonum) is that they agree with things that are sensed. The other is that if any other opinion can be taken back to these, then it cannot contradict the opinion in question by knowledge-producing (scientificam) argument. It is obvious, then, that a philosopher having an opinion about reality is disposed to knowledge; thus, through argument, and through these signs, it is obvious that knowledge is possible for us; and in this the error of the Academics, who said we are ignorant of all things, and have cognition of no real thing, appears obvious.

            In response to the first argument, when it is argued “we do not know” etc., this is true. I reply that the first cause of truth can be taken in two ways, either as what is first in being or what is first in cognizing. The first cause in being of every truth is that first cause that is the highest being the most true. The first cause in cognizing, at least as far as we are concerned, is first principles in which, as Albert says, there are certain lights through which our intellect brings it about that we are knowers in act. Therefore, because it is said that we do not know unless we know the first cause of truth, it must he maintained that it is true of the first cause in cognizing, but not of the first cause in being.

            But you will say the first cause in being is the cause of each truth, but for the complete cognition of each effect a cognition of the cause is required, therefore also for the cognition of each truth. I reply that a complete cognition is of two sorts, a cognition complete and perfect without qualification, and a cognition complete in its genus. Then I maintain that it is not required for a cognition of an effect which is complete in its genus that there be a cognition of the cause that is first without qualification. But it is true that a cognition of the first cause is required in a cognition complete without qualification of the effect, although nothing is cognized by us through a complete cognition in this way, but only in the first way.

            In response to the other argument, when it is argued that whatever reason we have for believing one, we have the same reason to believe the other, who has a contrary opinion, it must be replied that not every judge is equally to be believed, but the judgment of the wise is more to be believed than that of the ignorant, and that of the waking more that the judgment of the sleeper. And you will answer that there are contrary judges as to whether this one is knowing or ignorant. It must be replied that whoever is well disposed in his mind at once perceives whether this one is knowing or ignorant. The signs upon which this may depend have been listed above.

Question 7

            Next it is asked whether there is a definition and what it is of a passion and other accidents.

            And it is argued that there is not, since a what it is is what this something, this unity, is, but an accident is not like this, but is rather this sort or so many; therefore etc.

            Again, a what it is intends being something absolute, but an accident is not something absolute; therefore etc. The major premise is obvious since it intends being something absolute independent of others. The minor is also clear, since accidents are not defined without a substance.

            The opposite view is argued thus: There can be a what it is of each thing grasped by the intellect, but accidents can be grasped by the intellect; therefore etc.

            It must be understood that there is a what it is of accidents, since as something stands to being, so it stands to what it is; for ‘a being’ indicates that absolutely which the what it is indicates with reference to a definition. But there is being per se of accidents themselves, since being per se is divided into ten categories. But there is not a what it is of accidents themselves in the same way as there is of substances, for primary being without qualification belongs to substances without reference to anything extrinsic, but accidents have being in a certain respect. For an accident is not called a being except because of its being in definition, therefore the what it is of an accident depends on a substance, and so there is no primary what it is of these without qualification, but in a certain respect and as an accident including a substance. Whence the Commentator, on Metaphysics Xl, says that to deny what it is of accidents is to deny of them what coincides with them, and to attribute to accidents what it is without qualification is to attribute to them what must not be attributed to them. And so a middle ground must be held, that they have a what it is through what is prior.

            But although accidents have a what it is and definition, which of these do they have more truly? I reply that they have a what it is more truly than definition signifying what it is, for they have a what it is without respect to an extrinsic substance, since the what it is of accidents is not the what it is of a substance, but they have a definition with respect to an extrinsic substance. Hence the definition of accidents occurs through something added.

            And through this a response to the arguments. To the first I reply that accidents are not wholly simple and therefore a primary and per se definition does not agree with them.

            To the other I reply that a what it is can be absolute in two ways, in one way because something extrinsic does not belong to what it is, in the other because it is not directed toward some extrinsic thing. The essence of accidents is absolute in the first way, but not in the second.

Question 8

            Next it is asked whether one who learns a conclusion knew it beforehand.

            And it is argued that he did, since one who learns a conclusion either knew it beforehand or did not. If he did, we have what is proposed. If he did not then if he does obtain it he will not recognize that it is that of which he seeks cognition rather than some other, and so he seeks no definite thing, and this is absurd.

            Again, the intellect does not receive anything from scratch unless it is through some alteration made in it. But there is no alteration with reference to the intellectual part of the soul. Therefore etc. The minor premise is clear from the Philosopher in Physics VII.

            On the other hand, it is argued that if one who is learning knows the conclusion beforehand, this is not learning, but remembering.

            In response to this question, I maintain that one who learns a conclusion knew it beforehand in the universal case. For according to what the Commentator says on De anima III, just as matter is related to particular forms in such a way that it first receives the forms of simple bodies and afterwards those of complex bodies, so the intellect is related to universal forms in such a way that it first grasps principles and the more confused and afterwards applies them to the conclusion. Whence one who learns a conclusion knew it beforehand in the universal case, and in its principles. For according to Grosseteste principles have an active and virtual unity, but one who knows a conclusion did not know it beforehand in the particular case, whence one who learns a conclusion knows it beforehand in the universal case, and virtually, but is ignorant of it in the particular case.

            Whence a response to the arguments: To the first I reply that one who learns a conclusion knew it beforehand in the universal case. But you will prove that he knew it beforehand in the particular case since otherwise he would not recognize it when he happened on it, as Themistius says, who presents the example of the fugitive slave. whence it must be understood that it is necessary for one who learns a conclusion to have a cognition beforehand adapted more to that conclusion than to any other. For example, the head of a family seeking a fugitive slave without having a cognition more adapted to pick out that slave than any other will never recognize him. The same applies to one who learns a conclusion. Whence a cognition in the universal case is possessed in a demonstration through the major premise, and a more determinate cognition is unfolded through the minor premise. And so in a demonstration we need two premisses. But you will reply that the Philosopher says that one who learns a conclusion knew it beforehand only in the universal case. I answer that it is true that he knew it only in the universal case prior in time, but nevertheless it is necessary that he have a more determinate conclusion prior by nature. whence, since this last cognition is had through the minor premise, the minor, which is by nature prior, is known beforehand. A cognition is had beforehand through the major premise, so the major is known prior in time.

            The response to the first argument is clear. I reply to the other that alteration can be understood in two ways: Either the attainment of a perfection or some change produced by a contrary, that is, a change which arises through the mediation of active and passive qualities. Whence the major premise is true of alteration understood in the first way. I reply to the major premise that the intellectual part of the soul does not receive that alteration that arises through the mediation of active and passive qualities, for never does heat or cold, or wetness or dryness arise in the intellect, but there is in it that alteration that is the attainment of a perfection, and this is not absurd.

Question 9

            Next it is asked whether this proposition is true, “everything because of which <something has some character,> is also itself more <of that character than the thing it makes to be of that character>.”

            And it is argued that it is not, since someone is hot because of being something that has been moved <to that state, to being hot>, yet the motion <to a state> is not more a hot thing <than the thing moved>. Again, ignited <i.e. glowing> iron is hot because of fire, and yet fire is not more a hot thing.

            Again, Socrates is a human being because of Plato bringing him into being, and yet Plato is not more a human being than Socrates. Again, a human being is drunk because of wine, and wine is not more drunk than the human being is. Again, flames give out light because of fire, and yet fire is not more a giver of light than flame is. Therefore this proposition is false.

            On the other hand, it is argued thus: the cause is more noble than what is caused, for according to Proclus everything producing another is nobler than its product, but that because of which another is is the cause of that other; therefore if that other comes to be, that will become more because of which that other is, since it is more noble.

            To clear this up it must be understood that “because of which” indicates causality, whence it is signified through the proposition at issue that that which is cause of another’s being disposed in a certain way is itself more so. But cause is two-fold, univocal and equivocal cause. An univocal cause is one that produces in another what is in itself, as fire does in igniting. But an equivocal cause is one that causes in another what is not formally in itself, for instance, the sun causes heat and yet is not hot. Whence this proposition can be understood either respecting univocal causes or equivocal causes. But respecting univocal causes the proposition, “everything because of which is also itself more” is true formally, and respecting equivocal causes it is true virtually.

            Again, the proposition is true respecting causes and caused that are essentially ordered and not accidentally ordered. Again, it has truth respecting agent causes univocally that are sufficient by themselves to cause the effect in another.

            Whence, in response to the first argument, I reply that the motion is more hot virtually. Or else it is as was said, the proposition is true respecting essentially ordered causes. Now motion is not essentially ordered to cause heat, but motion is essentially the act of a being in potentiality.

            To the other I reply, according to what was said, that a proposition has truth in respect of causes sufficient to produce the effect in another, but fire is not sufficient in itself to produce heat to such a high degree in a cold thing. Rather its being brought together with a cold thing produces this, and therefore the proposition does not have truth in respect of such causes.

            To the other I reply that, as was said, the proposition has truth respecting causes ordered essentially. But wine is not essentially ordered to making one drunk, but it is only ordered to this considered as vaporous, according to Albert, and this is accidental.

            To the other, I reply in the same way that the proposition has truth in respect of essentially ordered causes. Now it is accidental to Socrates that he is brought into being by Plato, since, if it is essentially in Socrates that he is brought into being by Plato, by the same argument it is essential to Plato that Plato be brought into being by his father, and so on to infinity. And so some effect depends on an infinite number of essentially ordered causes, which is impossible. Therefore this proposition is not true in respect of such causes.

            To the other I reply in the same way, for it is accidental to fire that it flames, for flames are not in fire unless the fire is in some particular sort of matter, and therefore the proposition does not have truth in respect of such causes.

Question 10

            Next it is asked whether knowing without qualification is through the cause.

            And it is argued that it is not, for if knowing is through the cause, then there is no knowledge of those things having no cause. But there is no cause of first principles, therefore etc., which is contrary to the Philosopher.

            Again, every demonstration produces knowing through the cause, if it is not a demonstration that it is so, but every demonstration produces knowing without qualification; therefore etc.

            Opposed to this is the Philosopher.

            In response to this question, I reply that knowing without qualification is through the cause, but one must understand that knowing without qualification is not cognizing the cause, since knowing properly speaking is through the cause when it is of conclusions. And the proof of this is that a reality has being without qualification and is known without qualification through the same thing, but a reality has being without qualification through a cause. Therefore etc.

            But it must be understood that in order to know without qualification what is required is not a simple cognition of the cause alone but a three-fold cognition: A cognition of the cause obtained in cognition of the actual cause, a cognition of the cause obtained in the application of the cause to the effect, and certainty in the cognition, obtained through its being impossible that it should be otherwise. And therefore Aristotle placed three clauses in the definition of knowing, that is, “knowing is cognizing the cause, and cognizing that it is the cause of this, and cognizing that it is impossible that it should be otherwise.” Through the first clause the first cognition, through the second the second, through the third the third. But since a cause can be regarded in two ways, either as it is substance or as it is a cause, one can ask whether a cognition of the cause regarded in both of these ways is required for cognition. And I reply to this that both are required, for one could have cognition of the cause regarded as the substance of the cause, and fail to know the effect. For example, the interposition of the earth is the cause of a lunar eclipse, and it can be known by someone what an interposition is and if it is, even though he be ignorant whether there is an eclipse of the Moon. And, attending to this, the Philosopher said that knowing is cognizing the cause and that it is the cause of this. It is understood in the first that a cognition of the cause as regards its substance is required for cognition of the effect, and it is understood in the second that a cognition of the cause considered as a cause is required.

            In response to the arguments, I reply to the first that there is no being without qualification of those things of which there is no cause, and since there is no cause of first principles, therefore there is no knowledge of them. But you will say the Philosopher says that principles are better known than conclusions. I reply that this is true of knowing in the common sense, which is, in the common sense, a grasp of the truth. But knowing is, strictly speaking, cognition through the cause, so that, strictly speaking, there is understanding of principles but not knowledge of then.

            To the second argument, I respond by destroying the minor premise, for there is a certain demonstration proceeding from what is prior without qualification; and there is a certain demonstration proceeding from what is prior for us, and this sort does not produce knowing without qualification. And therefore the minor is false when it says that every demonstration produces knowing without qualification.

Question 11

            Next it is asked whether a cognition of every cause is required for a cognition of the effect.

            And it is argued that it is not, since the definition of the substance is sufficient for the cognition of the substance, but the definition of the substance does not collect in itself every cause, but only the material and formal cause; therefore etc.

            Again, medicine is a complete cognition of health, and yet it does not consider every cause. For according to the Philosopher in Ethics I, speaking against Plato, the doctor does not consider the first idea of health.

            Again, a demonstration that makes evident is the highest according to the Commentator on Metaphysics II, and yet it does not consider every cause; therefore etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued thus: the effect is from every cause, therefore it is cognized from every cause, since the principles from which it has being and from which it is cognized are the same.

            To this question I reply that it is necessary for one having a cognition of a reality to cognize every cause both extrinsic and intrinsic, since knowing is cognizing through the cause. So insofar as one lacks cognition of the cause, one lacks knowledge of the reality.

            Again, this is obvious from Aristotle in Metaphysics III, who maintains that a complete cognition is a resolution of every doubt, but if we knew only one cause it would be possible to doubt concerning the others. Therefore there is no complete cognition unless every cause is cognized.

            Again, this is obvious since we don’t know a thing until we know how to resolve it into all its principles, but we don’t know this unless we know every cause; therefore etc.

            But it must be understood that since a science considers a reality under the form of a species, it suffices that it consider the causes of the reality according to its own kind. For instance, a doctor considers health in respect of health, but it is not necessary for him to discuss it in respect of being, and carry this all the way to the cognition of the first cause, since this is not a cause of health considered as health, but a cause of health considered as being. In the same way, the Philosopher in De Animalibus ought not to consider first matter, since it is not a principle of an animal as animal, but he considers sperm, and this suffices.

            In response to the arguments: To the first I reply that it is well to grant that the definition of a substance is a sufficient cognition of it in the genus of quidditative cognition, and that does not require every cause. And so it is complete only within such a genus, but it is not perfect without qualification, since it does not consider every cause, and for this reason no special science produces perfect knowledge of a reality. And so they depend on one universal science, and Metaphysics is this sort of science.

            To the second argument I reply that medicine does not consider health as it is a being, but as it is health, and so it is not necessary that it cognize every cause of health. Nor is it necessary that it cognize the first idea of health, since it does not consider it as it is a being.

            To the third it is to be replied that mathematical demonstrations cause knowledge through every cause. For those realities of which there is a mathematical science do not have every cause, for they don’t have a material, efficient, or final cause. For instance, Aristotle says in Metaphysics III, that in mathematicals there is no end nor any good. Therefore it considers the formal cause alone. Hence if it does not produce knowledge of a reality except through the formal cause, and so mathematical demonstrations produce knowledge of a reality through one cause alone, still they are the most certain demonstrations, since other causes are not required for this sort of demonstration.

Question 12

            Next it as asked whether demonstration arises from true premisses.

            And it is argued that it does not, since demonstration through indirect argument per impossibile is demonstration, and it does not proceed from true premisses, since it proceeds from a false hypothesis in order to conclude that something is false. Therefore etc.

            On the other hand: The Philosopher intends the opposite view of this question.

            I reply that demonstration is from true premisses, since one cannot know what is not, but what is false is not, Therefore etc.

            Then I argue that the conclusion that is known is true, and what is true is not known except through truths, therefore etc. But since truth, according to Grosseteste, is divided into the contingent and the necessary, it is needful that demonstration be from necessary truths. For every demonstration is a syllogism causing one to know, but only the necessary is known, and it is not known except from what is necessary; therefore etc. But although a demonstration is from necessary premisses, it is not only important that it be from necessary premisses without qualification, but that these premisses be necessary in relation to ourselves. For a demonstration is a knowledge-producing (scientificus) syllogism through which we know, but we do not know except from what is known (notus) to us. Therefore it is necessary that demonstration be from necessary truths without qualification, and in relation to ourselves. Such a demonstration is clear, and therefore such is the highest sort of demonstration. But if anyone proceeds from what is better known (notior) to us alone, this is not a demonstration without qualification, nor is any demonstration proceeding from what is better known in its nature alone, but only that which proceeds from what is better known to us and in its nature. Such demonstrations occur only in mathematics.

            In response to the argument, I reply That in demonstration from indirect argument this is false. The first process is concluding from a false hypothesis, together with a certain true assumption, that something is false, and this is syllogistic. The second moves from the destruction of that falsehood to the destruction of the hypothesis. The third proceeds from the destruction of the hypothesis to the truth of what was proposed, and this last process is demonstrative, and proceeds according to the general principle (illam maximam) that the same cannot both be and not be simultaneously of the same. And in this third process, it proceeds from true premisses.

Question 13

            Next it is asked about the part “Priora autem ad posteriora,” where he compares the singular to universals, and where it is asked whether universals are better known to us or singulars.

            And it is argued that universals are better known to us, since that from which we proceed naturally to cognition of others is more known to us, but universals are like this, as is apparent from Aristotle, Physics I.

            Again, this <i.e. what is known> is what it is <i.e. something known> through the intellect, therefore what is better known to us through the intellect is better known without qualification, but universals are of this sort; therefore etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued that what is nearer to the senses is better known to us, but singulars are of this sort; therefore etc.

            To this question I reply that singular is said in two ways, singular without qualification, and singular in a certain respect, singular without qualification because it is not predicated of others, but others of it; a singular in a certain respect because it is predicated of others and others of it, as intermediate species and genera are. So I reply to the question that sinqulars without qualification are better known to us than universals are, since they are cognized by sensory cognition and universals are not cognized thus, and for this reason are not as well known to us. But it must be understood that although singulars are, speaking absolutely, better known to us than universals, still universals are better known to us in respect of the intellect, since what is cognized per se by a power that is in us is better known in respect of that power than what is cognized accidentally by it. But universals are cognized per se by the intellect, and singulars accidentally, since they are cognized through reflection; therefore etc.

            And just as in the intellect the more universal is more quickly perceived by the intellect, so more confused singulars are more quickly perceived by the senses. Whence Avicenna says that it is perceived earlier of a human being at a distance that he is a being than it is perceived that he is this animal, and that he is this animal is perceived earlier than that he is this human being. So the Philosopher says in the beginning of the Physics that a child at first calls every man `father’ and every woman ‘mother,’ and afterwards distinguishes its own father from another. And the reason is that our intellect goes from potency to act, and the senses likewise, and so that which is more confused is grasped earlier by the senses and by the intellect since they are more in potency.

            But you will ask, since the singular is better cognized by the senses and the universal by the intellect, which of these is prior? I reply that in the intellect the singular is prior to the universal in real being, since the universal is either nothing or is posterior, for every community proceeds from singularity.

            In response to the argument, I reply that from cognition of universals we proceed to the cognition of universals in a certain respect, and not to the cognition of singulars without qualification. But from the cognition of singulars without qualification we proceed to the cognition of universals, so what the Philosopher said in Physics I is to be understood as comparing a universal to a singular in a certain respect. But it is not true comparing a universal to a singular without qualification.

            To the second argument, I reply that it would conclude truly if an intellectual cognition in us were not from another cognition, but in fact it is from another cognition.

Question 14

            Next it is asked whether it is suitable to believe the conclusion more than the principles.

            And it seems that one must believe the conclusion more, since that is more to be believed the cognition of which is more certain, but the cognition of the conclusion is more certain since it occurs through the cause, while the other sort of cognition, i.e. of principles, occurs through experience., which is fallible; therefore etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued thus: a cognition that does not occur through a collecting together of premises is more certain and more known than is one that occurs through a collecting together of premises, since in the former way it happens in a manner similar to that in separated substances, that is, in angels. But cognition of principles is not through a collecting together of premises, and the cognition of a conclusion is through a collecting together of premises; therefore etc.

            I reply to this question that a conclusion is to be spoken of in two ways, either after it is proven or beforehand. But beforehand the conclusion is not more to be believed than the principles, since it is unknown then, and the principles are known beforehand. For neither one who knows nor one better disposed than the knower believes those things that he does not know more than those he knows. And you will reply, “prove to me that principles are more to be believed than the conclusion after the conclusion is demonstrated.” I prove it thus: what has being from itself has being more truly than that which has being from another. But it is from one and the same that a disposition is in being and in truth, therefore those things that are known from themselves are more truly known than those known from others. But the cognition of principles is from themselves and the cognition of conclusions is from others. Therefore etc.

            In response to the argument in opposition, I grant the major and deny the minor, for certitude regarding cognition of the conclusion is received from principles, so principles are more certain. And you reply that cognition of the conclusion occurs through the cause. I reply that I can prove from this that the cognition of principles is more certain, since the cause of the cognition of the conclusion is from principles, and so whoever goes astray in the principles goes astray in the conclusion, but not conversely, therefore etc.

            But you will say experience, which is the way to the cognition of principles, is fallible. I reply that experience is two-fold. One is that experience from which cognition of universals is received in speculative thought, and the other is that from which cognition of universals is received in action. Now experience in action is fallible, but in speculative thought it is not. And we have cognition of principles from the latter sort of experience.

Question 15

            Next it is asked whether there can be knowledge through demonstration of everything that is known.

            And it is argued that there can, for everything that is is either a cause or an effect. But an effect is demonstrated through the cause, and conversely; therefore etc. The major premise is evident since cause and effect divide being into opposites. The minor premise is evident since the effect is demonstrated through the cause why, and the cause through the effect that it is so.

            Again, if circular demonstration occurs, then there can be knowledge through demonstration of everything that is known, for thus the posterior can be demonstrated through what is prior, and conversely. But it is possible to demonstrate in a circle according to Aristotle in the second book of the Posterior Analytics. For instance, if there is rain, it is necessary that the earth he soaked, and if the earth is soaked, it is necessary that vapor arise, and if vapor, then it is necessary that there be rain. Therefore a primo if there is rain there is rain.

            The opposing view is argued thus: If everything that is known is known through demonstration then nothing will be known. But this second statement is false, therefore the first is also. Proof of the antecedent: For if everything that is known is known through demonstration then there is nothing that is first without qualification, since everything is demonstrated, and thus it is not possible to know first things, nor, consequently, what is posterior.

            One must reply to this that there is not knowledge through demonstration that it is so of everything that is known, nor is there knowledge without qualification of everything that is gotten through demonstration, since there is no knowledge without qualification of first principles.

            For not every cognition is knowledge. For instance, sensory cognition is not, for then the beasts would know. Again, neither is every intellectual cognition knowledge. For instance, cognition of the incomplex is rather understanding (intellectus). Again, not every cognition of a complex is knowledge, but only of whatever is through some cause. And so there is no knowledge without qualification of what has no cause. But there is no cause for first principles. Therefore there is no knowledge without qualification of first principles. But nonetheless cognition of these is the beginning of knowledge, since we arrive at cognition of the conclusion from a cognition of the principles.

            So there is not knowledge through demonstration of everything that is known, although even if there is no knowledge without qualification of principles, still there is accidental knowledge of principles, since accidental knowledge occurs when one knows accidentally. Now there is accidental knowledge of principles, since they have no cause, therefore cognition of them is accidental.

            In response to the argument, as regards the major premise, I reply that it is true. As regards the minor premise, I reply that it is true that the effect is demonstrated through the cause without qualification and is therefore known without qualification. But the cause is demonstrated through the effect by demonstration that it is so, and therefore is known only in a certain respect.

            In response to the other, the Philosopher denies the major premise, since there is not knowledge through demonstration of everything that is known, but only of what is convertible. Still, one can reply to the minor premise that it is not possible to demonstrate in a circle without qualification. Albert the Great, writing on the Philosopher in the second book of the Posterior Analytics, teaches us how to respond. And he says that a circle cannot arise by nature among things that are generated in a circle, for there is no return from the same in number into itself, but only from the same in species. And because of this there is no circle without qualification. Nor is yesterday’s rain prior by nature to the rain today, since the circle keeps arising into infinity, and in an infinite there is no prior, since there is no first. And whatever is said to be prior is said to be so in respect of some first. And so there is no rain prior to another rain by nature.

Question 16

            Next it is asked whether this status per se is possible among existing things.

            And it is argued that it is not, since ‘per’ indicates cause, and ‘se’ is a reflexive pronoun. `Per se,’ then, indicates that something is the cause of itself. But this is impossible along existing things. Therefore etc.

            Again, that is said to be per se which does not have another for a cause, since it lacks causality with respect to another, but there is nothing that does not have another for a cause except the first cause, therefore etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued thus: these three statuses (conditiones) are related in this order: universal, per se and primary. But this status ‘primary’ is possible in things that exist, and so per se is too.

            As regards this question, I maintain that per se can be said so as to be understood privatively or positively. If privatively, there are four possible ways: in one way through privation of every causality, and in this way only the first cause is per se, for only the first is something that is not an effect of another, and everything else is an effect of the first. So according to that sense that indicates privation of an efficient cause, only the First cause is per se. In the second way per se indicates privation of material cause, and in this way every separated substance is per se. In the third way something is said to be per se that is not because of another in the way that something is because of a subject, and in this way every substance is said to be per se, since no substance needs another as subject of inherence for its generation. Grosseteste gives these three ways. We can add a fourth way, in which something is called per se because it is of such a sort in itself, so that the thing itself is not of such a sort because of another, not, that is, because of another that is an efficient cause, and here we speak of the proximate efficient cause. And in this way every proposition is called per se in the first and fourth ways of calling a proposition per se. For in these ways the predicate belongs to the subject neither formally, nor efficiently and proximately, because of any other. For instance, in the first way a human being is an animal but not formally because of another, and similarly in the fourth way the one killed perishes but not efficiently and proximately because of anything other than being killed.

            In another way the per se can be predicated positively, and here there are two ways. One way is because it signifies that to which being its own cause is added. And this condition is not possible in existing things since nothing is a cause of itself, for a cause is that upon which the being of another follows, and such a thing is not other than itself. Also, a cause is prior to the thing caused, and the same thing is not prior to itself. In another way a thing is called per se because it has in itself the cause why another is in it, and this condition is being per se in the second way.

            The answers to the arguments are obvious, for they each proceed on their own way.

            To the first I reply that it indicates either something’s being its own principle, or something’s having in itself the principle by which that is in it. And in this last way this condition per se is possible.

            To the other I reply that everything aside from the First has a remote cause, but at least some things have no proximate cause.

                                                                         Question 17

            Next it is asked whether those things that pertain to what it is inhere per se in the first way.

            And it is argued that they do not, for matter and form pertain to the what it is of a sensible substance, but matter is not in the form per se in the first way, nor is the form in matter per se in the first way.

            Again, genus and difference pertain to what it is of the species. Now the genus is not predicated of the species in the first way. Therefore etc.

            The opposing view is argued thus: what pertains to what it is either inheres in the first way or the second. Not in the second, since then a proper passion would pertain to the what it is of its subject. Therefore what pertains to what it is inheres per se in the first way.

            To this question I reply that those that pertain to what it is can be referred to one another or to that of which what it is is. They are in the nature and substance of the reality. Therefore etc. But if they are referred to one another they do not inhere per se in the first way, since of those which inhere per se in the first way one is posited in the definition of the other. But of those which pertain to what it is, one is not posited of the other, since if it were every definition would be nugatory. Proof: for when some two are joined to one another immediately and one is in the formula of the other, it is nugatory. But this occurs if one of those pertaining to what it is is posited in the definition of the other, therefore etc. But it is necessary that, when some two are referred to what it is of something, and are of this essence, that one be in potency and the other in act, whence a logician says that the genus is like matter, but the difference like form.

            The response to the arguments is clear since it proceeds by equivocation.

Question l8

            Next it is asked whether genus is predicated of difference in the first way of speaking per se. In the second place it is asked whether this is per se, “The human being is a human being.” In the third place, “The animal is a human being.” In the fourth place, “Callias is a human being.”

            And first it is argued that the genus is predicated of difference. But then it is predicated either per se or per accidens, and if per accidens, then either because the subject belongs to the predicate or the predicate to the subject, which cannot occur because they are the same reality, or else because both belong to some one third thing, which is not true since both signify substance, and a substance belongs to nothing.

            Again, whenever two things are wholly the same whatever is predicated of one is also predicated of the other, and in the same way. But genus, species and difference are of this sort, since Aristotle in Metaphysics VII says the last difference is the whole of the species. But the genus is predicated per se of the species. Therefore etc.

            Again, no animal is rational per se, every human being is rational per se; therefore etc. The conclusion is false and the minor premise is not, so the major premise is false. Therefore its contradictory is true per se, namely “Some rational thing is an animal.”

            The opposite view is argued thus: if the contracted is (predicated) per se of the contracted, the abstract is also predicated per se of the abstract. If, then, this is true, “The rational is an animal,” per se, this will be true per se, “Rationality is animality.” But this is false since there are different definitions (rationes) for these.

            For this question two things must be understood. The first is that genus and difference are not distinct according to nature and reality. The second is that genus and difference are different in formula.

            The proof of the first, for the substance of a thing is once and for all (that is, it is without qualification), therefore what pertains to the essence of a reality ought to convey a simple essence. But I maintain that it is simple not because it is wholly simple, but because it is not divided (partita).

            Again, the Philosopher says that in the substance of a thing there is no order, and he regards one form through which it is a substance, and the other, through which it is an animal and a human being, as not differing from one another. For if the forms do differ they differ accidentally, and the reason for this is that if a substantial form comes to matter, insofar as it is complete it gives being in act to matter, for it gives the sort of being through which matter can remain in act through its species, as is obvious in the case of the form of an element, which is the most incomplete sort of form. But every advenient form of a being in act is accidental according to its species. From the conclusion in De anima III, there is a difference between substantial and accidental form, for the substantial form is that which gives primary being without qualification. Accidental form receives being without qualification from that to which it advenes, and it gives being-such according to the species if any form advenes to some actual being. It does not give being primarily and absolutely to that to which it advenes. Therefore it gives such being to itself. Therefore it follows that the substantial form is posterior to accidental form.

            But you will reply that although it does not advene to a being that is completed in act, yet it can advene to a being that is incomplete in act. l ask you: Either the advenient form gives primary and absolute being or it does not. If it is (already) established that it does not, since it first obtains something with an incomplete form, therefore it gives complete being only not primary absolute being, and that is being-such. And in what do an incomplete and complete form differ? It is true that, comparing forms among themselves, one is more complete and another more incomplete. But speaking of the form as it is in itself, it is not in this way incomplete, so that it would not give being according to species to its matter. Whence it must be said that the genus and the difference indicate one reality.

            And this is clear. For if the genus conveyed one nature common to the two species, the difference would then convey an added essence; for otherwise the genus indicates the whole essence of each species, which it cannot do. If you reply that the genus indicates part of the species, then, since part of the whole is not predicated (of the whole) essentially and in respect of the essence, the genus is not predicated essentially, and in respect of the essence, of the species. (And this is absurd.) And this is Avicenna’s argument. But the genus and difference differ in formula, for being immediately adjoined and differing neither in reality nor in formula is the cause of a nugatory definition. If, then, they signify the same thing under the same formula, every definition is nugatory.

            But you will reply, “How am I to imagine that it signifies one thing according to different formulae?” I reply that there are degrees in reality, for instance, in the genus of a substance. For one substance is a subject that is not corporeal, another a corporeal substance that is not animated, so that the prior is in the posterior virtually. whence in a human being there is a form by which the human being is a human being, and this form has a power in itself through which it is a substance and an animated body, and so on for the rest, just as a triangle is contained in a quadrilateral (virtually). Whence the nature, which is not multiplied by a multiplication of predicates in respect of the essence, has a diversity of predicates according to the diversification of the operations of the animal. For instance, inasmuch as he senses, a human being is in agreement with a donkey, and through this, that he is rational, he differs from the others. Whence the genus signifies the same under an indeterminate formula that the difference signifies under a determinate formula. And just as it happens in natter, so that from matter and form there is one thing in essence, thus it is that from genus and difference there is one thing according to essence.

            Whence to the matter at hand—I say that genus is not predicated per se in the first way of difference, since predication per se in the first way needs the formula of one to be included in the formula of the other. But the formula of the difference is not included in the formula of the genus, nor conversely. Therefore, etc.

            To the first argument, I reply that the genus is predicated of the difference accidentally, not because the reality belongs to the reality, but because the formula belongs to the formula, and that an absurdity results if the reality belongs to the reality.

            To the second argument I reply that the genus, difference and species are the same in reality, but differ in formula. For, per se is restricted to the formulae of subject and predicate, even though, since the formulae of species and difference are different, it is not necessary that anything predicated of the species per se be predicated of the difference per se.

            To the other argument, I reply that it commits the fallacy of accident, for the fallacy of accident occurs when two things that are in part the same and in part different are taken, and a third that belongs to the diversity of these, and something is then required from both of them which is required from one alone. And so every rational being is related to animal and human being in such a way that if we remove from a human being that he is also an animal it is the fallacy of accident.

            Again, what has been said, namely that the genus is not predicated of the difference, is proved thus: Aristotle says in the Topics that a being cannot be a genus, since it is predicated per se in the first way of every difference, and the genus, by the argument given there, is not predicated of the difference per se. And this is because the formula of the genus is included in the formula of the species and not in the formula of the difference. And so the genus is not predicated per se of the difference, unless by mediation of its species, and therefore this (human being) is per se rational (only) insofar as a human being is an animal.

            Again, this is obvious from the Philosopher, who says in Topics VI that if the genus is predicated per se of the difference, one animal is many animals. And this is clear since if an animal is a rational animal per se through the formula of the rational it is then an animal, and since the formula of rational is included in the formula of human being, human being will be one animal through the rational. But human being is also one animal because of this, that animal falls in its definition, and animal does not fall in the definition of human being through the formula of the rational. Human being will be animal, then, but not through the rational, and so it will be another animal, and so one animal will be two animals. This is also a proof that animal does not fall in the definition of human being through rational, since it would then be a nugatory definition.

            Again, if animal falls in the definition of human being through the formula of rational, with which the formula of animal does not fit, since in that case donkey would not fit the formula of rational it does not fit the formula of animal, which is a fallacy.

Question 19

            Concerning the second question, it is argued that “Human being is human being” is not per se, since ‘per se’ signifies that that to which it is adjoined is a cause of something. One who indicates that a human being is a human being per se indicates that something is because of itself. But this is impossible. Therefore etc.

            Again, if this is per se, either it will be so in the first way, or the second, or the fourth. It is not per se in the first way, since human being is not the definition of human being, nor part of the definition. It is not per se in the second way, because human being is not a proper passion of human being. It is not per se in the fourth way because a human being is not the effect of a human being.

             On the other hand, it is argued that no proposition is more true than that in which the same is predicated of the same. But “human being is human being” is thus, therefore it is most true, and so it will be per se.

             Some have said that this is per se since we have a per se proposition when the subject is the cause why the predicate is in it. But “Human being is human being” is thus, since a human being is human being through the form of human being which is in the human being, and so the sentence is per se. This conclusion is true, for “human being is human being” is per se, but it is not true in the way these have understood it to be, since the form of human being is another thing than a human being, for a human being includes matter with the form. Still, through nothing other than the human being is it a human being. Therefore human being is not human being through the form of human being. Proof that a human being is human being through nothing other than the human being: For according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics IV, it is said that although there are many causes of a human being, thus the sociable, the bipedal and the like, still a human being is human being through that which is human being.

             Again, neither does “human being” in this proposition, “a human being is a human being,” signify in such a way that it means a human being is a human being through his form, for the locution also has reference (i.e. just as “se” does) to what precedes (i.e. the first occurrence of “human being”). But not only the form of human being precedes, and therefore when it is said “a human being is a human being per se,” “se” does not have reference only to the form of human being but to the whole composite. Whence it must be said that human being (is) through that which is human being. And this is not per se positively, so that it has a cause of itself, but privatively, so that it has no other cause. Whence it must be considered that some propositions are true in such a way that the formulae of the terms are familiar to all, for instance, concerning whatever etc. There are some per se true (propositions) of which the formulae of the terms are not familiar to all, for instance, these: “Human being is human being,” and the like, nonetheless to one familiar with the formulae of the terms it is per se. The major premise is proved because that proposition is per se, privatively per se, that is, the truth of which depends on the signified subject and predicate alone. But “Human being is human being” is such as this; therefore etc. And noting this, the Philosopher said at the end of Metaphysics VII that one who seeks out why human being is human being seek nothing, since whoever seeks in this way seeks and presupposes the same thing. For human being is human being because it itself is itself.

             Whence you will say that it is not possible to seek thus, since whoever seeks why knows that-it-is and if-it-is. And it is not possible to know that human being is human being, and if human being is human being and why human being is human being. Whence it must be answered to one who seeks thus that a human being is human being because it is a human being, and its being is indivisible.

             Again, it is proved that one who denies “Human being is human being” cannot predicate anything of human being truly, since the first in every genus is the cause of everything posterior (in the genus). But the first in the genus of predication is the predication of itself, since this is the simplest. So whoever denies predication of the same of itself denies every predication.

             But you will say if it is thus in the genus of the complex, that predication of the same of itself is the first, then this is not the first of every being or non-being. I reply that this is true: this prior being is a being; and in the second place, a non-being is a non-being, and in the third place, (it is true) of every being and non-being; and in the fourth place of every affirmation or denial.

             In response to the arguments: To the first I reply that ‘per se’ as it is understood positively marks that to which being a cause of another is adjoined; but when ‘per se’ is understood privatively it marks there being no cause of that to which it is adjoined, and this is how it is taken here.

             To the other I reply that this is per se in the fourth way. That it is per se in the fourth way because it is per se is clear from the Philosopher, Metaphysics V, where every way is reduced to the fourth. It is also per se in the first way, since it is per se in the first when the formula of the predicate is the formula of the subject, or the formula of the predicate is included in the formula of the subject. So, since the formula of the predicate in the case at hand is the formula of the subject, this is per se. Again, it is per se in the fourth way since there is no other cause of it.

Question 20

            Concerning the third question, it is argued that this is per se, “the animal is a human being,” for what is a human being through its own nature, and not through anything else added to it, is a human being per se.

            But the animal is of this sort. Therefore etc. The major premise is obvious since “per se” indicates the same thing as “not through another.” Now the animal is a human being though being a rational thing, since it is not other than that.

            Again, if an animal is not a human being per se, then it is so accidentally. Therefore, either because the subject belongs to the predicate, or else conversely, or else each to the other.

            And it is not in the first or the second way here, since the same nature is conveyed through both, nor in the third way, since what truly is belongs to nothing.

            Again, “the human being is an animal” is converted to this, “the animal is a human being.” But this is per se, “the human being is an animal.” Therefore etc. And the argument is confirmed since just as what is true only converts to what is true, so what is per se true converts only to what is per se true.

            On the other hand, it is argued, “per se” supposits concerning every case, if therefore this is per se, “the animal is a human being,” this will he per se, “every animal is a human being,” but it is false, therefore also the first.

            Some say that considering it in respect of those things which a metaphysician considers, it is per se. But considering it as a logician does, one would argue that since an animal is a human being through being a rational being, and being rational adds something more than animal to this, therefore it is accidental. But this opinion is false, since if it were per se it would be so in the first way, since it is not in the second, for human being is not a proper passion of any other thing, nor in the fourth way, since another is the cause of that way of being per se.

            But it can be proved that it is not in the first way, for it is per se in the first way, strictly speaking, when the predicate indicates what it is of the subject or a part of what it is. But animal is not such in respect of human being.

            Again, they are wrong in saying that the metaphysician does not consider formulae in per-se-ness, because otherwise this would be per se, “the rational being is an animal,” which the metaphysician denies.

            Others say that this proposition, “the animal is a human being,” is per se by a per-se-ness of the subject. For “per se” indicates a cause, and therefore per se indicates per-se-ness in the subject of the subject or the predicate. If it indicates per-se-ness of the predicate, this is per se since the animal, insofar as it is a human being, is a human being. If it indicates per-se-ness of the subject it is false, since in that case it signifies that animal considered as such is human being. But this opinion is false, for no proposition seems to be per se except by per-se-ness of the subject. To explain this: that proposition alone is said to be per se by the per-se-ness of that of which per se is a condition, but per se is only a condition of the subject, therefore etc. Proof of the minor premise: since from what is said by then, since per se indicates a cause, therefore it is only found in that in which there is a cause of inherence, but a cause of inherence is only to be found in the subject. Therefore etc.

            Again, if this, “the animal is a human being,” is per se by per-se-ness of the predicate, then it signifies that the animal, through human being, is human being. But this does not signify this proposition, “the animal is per se human being,” since by the relative pronoun “se” it has reference alone to that which precedes, but the word “animal” alone precedes. Therefore it must be said that this is accidental, “the animal is a human being,” since per-se-ness does not attend upon the reality alone but also upon the formula. Then, although the same reality is conveyed by the name of animal and of human being, still in the nature of animal there is not found any determinate formula by which animal is human being, but it is accidental to animal that it is human being. But it must be understood that these are accidental in different ways: “the animal is a human being” and “the rational thing is a human being” and “the human being is white.”

            For this human being is white accidentally because the reality is accidental to the reality; and this is accidental, “the rational thing is a human being,” because the formula of the predicate is accidental to the formula of the subject and conversely.

            But you will say, “is not this, “the animal is a human being,” reducible to another per se?” I reply that it is, considered in disjunction with its opposite, as, for instance, in “the animal is human being or non-man.” If this indicates a negation within the genus and not outside the genus, it is per se in the second way.

            As regards the arguments, in response to the first I reply to the major premise that it is insufficiently argued, for not only is identity of the reality required for per-se-ness, but also of the formula. Whence that which by its nature, and not through something added to it, is a human being is in reality a human being, but still is not so per se.

            To the other I reply that it is accidental. Then I maintain that the predicate is accidental to the subject since the formula of the predicate is accidental to the formula of the subject. But the reality is not accidental to the reality, for it is a reality by the same thing in either case, but this does not suffice for per-se-ness.

            As to the other, I grant the major premise, but it does not follow that a proposition is true per se just because it is converted into a true proposition per se. This is obvious in this proposition, “Everyone who can read and write is of necessity a human being.”

Question 21

            Next it is asked whether this is per se, “The animal is rational.”

            And it is argued that it is not, since if it is per se it will either be so in the first way, or the second, or the fourth. It is not per se in the first way, since neither “rational” nor “irrational” indicates what it is of the animal. Nor is it per se in the second way, since these are not proper passions of animal. Nor in the fourth, since the fourth way occurs when the predicate is related to the subject as effect to cause; but it is not thus in the case at hand. Therefore etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued that per se indicates privation of causality, but there is no other cause of this, therefore etc.

            It must be maintained that this is per se, “An animal is rational or irrational,” since, as Avicenna says, the relation of the genus to its differences, and of the subject to its proper passions, is the same; for just as not every passion belongs to every subject, so neither does every difference belong to every genus. Now “animal” is indicated per se through “rational and irrational,” and these differences are not suited to divide any other genus. Therefore I argue thus: those things which are of the same generality (communitatis) with another and are made proper (appropriatae) to it, are in it in the second way, but rational and irrational are like this with regard to animal, therefore etc. But still rational and irrational are not proper passions with regard to animal. But since a proper passion predicated of animal has the formula of what informs the subject genus, every per se formal predication of material must be reduced to the second way of speaking per se. Since, then, they must indicate a formula of something informing the genus, this per-se-ness must be reduced to per-se-ness in the second way. But this is not per se, “the animal is rational,” since rational is not universally in every animal, just as even is not universally in number, either. But this whole disjunction, “even or odd,” is in number, and it is the same way with the animal, it is rational or irrational.

            In response to the argument: I reply that it is per se in the second way but not because the predicate is related to the subject as a proper passion, but because the predicate is related in the same way to the subject as form to matter. So, speaking somewhat more loosely than when proper passions are predicated, “the animal is rational or irrational” is also said to be per se in the second way.

Question 22

            Next it is asked whether this proposition, “human being is an animal,” is true per se when no human being exists.

            And it seems it is not, for in things ordered essentially to one another, it there is no first, neither is there anything posterior. But now, composition in reality and in the intellect, and composition in speech, have an order so that if there is no composition in reality, then neither is there composition in anything posterior. But if human being is not, there is no true composition in reality of animal to human being, since there is no human being among existing things, so that there is no composition in the intellect either, nor in speech. Therefore etc.

            Again, what is destroyed as regards its essence is destroyed as regards every essential predicate inhering in it. But if no human being exists, human being is destroyed as regards its essence, hence as regards every essential predicate inhering in it, hence as regards its being an animal. Therefore etc.

            Again, what is corrupted essentially does not remain the same, neither according to its name nor according to its formula of definition. But if human being does not exist, then human being is destroyed essentially, so that it does not remain the same according to its definition, hence neither human being nor the definition of human being is predicated of it. But animal is part of the definition of human being, therefore if human being is destroyed animal is not predicated of it truly, nor per se. The major premise is obvious from the Commentator on De Anima II, where he says that generation and corruption are changes such that if anything is changed in accord with then it does not remain, it is gone both according to name and according to its formula.

            Again, nothing dead is animal per se, but if a human being does not exist, then the human being is dead; therefore etc.

            Again, a being is not predicated of non-being per se. But if no human being exists, “human being” does not signify a reality outside the soul. But “animal” is a name of that which is outside the soul, for it might be a donkey. Therefore if no human being exists, this proposition “human being is an animal” will be false.

            On the other hand, it is argued that in every case that occurs, always both the definition and each part of the definition is predicated per se of what is defined. But animal is part of the definition of human being. Therefore etc.

            Again, whenever any two things signify the same essentially, and only differ as determinate and indeterminate, one is predicated essentially of the other, for predicating the superior of the inferior is like this. But human being and animal signify the same in respect of substance, and only differ in the way determinate and indeterminate things do. Therefore animal is predicated of human being etc.

            Again, whenever anything is the per se cause of and sufficient for something, whatever else might be posited or removed, what does not take away the cause does not take away the effect. But “human being”’s signifying animal is the sufficient cause why human being is animal, for the Philosopher says in Metaphysics IV that human being is animal because it signifies this. Therefore whoever does not take away “human being”’s signifying animal does not take away man’s being animal. But whatever case occurs, “human being” always signifies animal. Therefore etc. And this is confirmed since an utterance does not fall away from what it signifies.

            Again, if no human being exists, human being is human being per se, and human being is animal, therefore, if no human being exists, human being is animal per se. Some assume that in things caused actual existence does not differ really from being, but only in the manner in which it is understood. Yet they also say that this is per se, “human being is animal,” when no human being exists. The reason for this is that, from this that it is human being, human being neither actually exists nor fails to actually exist. For if it did, then from this that it actually was an existing human being it could not fail to be, and again, neither could it be a non-being considered as it is human being, for non-being is prevented lest human being never be able to come to be at all. Therefore it neither is according to itself (i.e. considered in regard to its essence), nor is not according to itself. And this argument is from Avicenna. From this it is argued that the accidental does not change the essential. But the inherence of animal in human being is essential. Therefore even though human being is not assumed in actual existence, this will be per se, “human being is an animal.”

            But someone might say, “You maintain that being and non-being are accidents of the essence of a reality.” But I hold that being in actual existence is of the essence of a reality, as will appear in the discussion of the second book of the Posterior Analytics. Still, those holding to a different position say that it (being) is not (of the essence of a reality), for one does not understand something perfectly while ignorant of what its essence is, though when no rose exists I can understand the same thing non essentially that I can understand when a rose exists. According to Algazali I can understand a notebook and yet not know it there are any notebooks, and therefore being is not of the essence of a thing.

            But you will reply, “if no human being is, the essence of human being nonetheless has some being, at least whatness, and that sort of being is true being outside the soul. But being outside the soul is being in actuality.”

            To this it can be answered that being the whatness of a human being is true being outside the soul. But on this account it is true that it does not depend on the soul, hence I maintain next that true being outside the soul is not being in actuality, for true being outside the soul must belong absolute to the thing, but being in actuality does not belong to a thing absolutely, but only insofar as it is the product of coming-to-be.

            But you will ask next, “if it is the case that human being is not animal through being in actuality, there is no sort of being to be found except these three, being in actuality and being understood and signified; therefore human being will be an animal through one of these, and these are accidental to the essence of human being; therefore human being will be an animal through some accident.” I reply that Aristotle leaves something out in listing (the sorts of) being, for there is another being, namely true whatness outside the soul, and through this human being is an animal.

            In response to the arguments. Sticking to this position, it can be replied to the major premise that it is true, and as to the minor, “this was ordered essentially” etc., it is entirely conceded. And when it is said that “when no human being” etc., I reply that this is false, and still this is true as far as existence in actuality is concerned. Indeed it is a true composition as far as being a real whatness is concerned, through which animal is in it. For animal is in the whatness per se through the being of a human being, which is enough.

            In response to the other argument, the major premise is granted. To the minor premise I reply that when no human being exists human being is not destroyed in respect of the being in actuality that belongs to a human being through Avicenna’s argument. So human being is not corrupted in respect of his being a whatness. And you will answer, “that is destroyed through destruction (of a substance) which was acquired through coning-to-be, but this was the substance of a reality; therefore etc.” In response to this I grant the major premise. To the minor, when it is said “through coming-to-be is acquired the substance of a reality” etc., I reply that the substance of a reality is not acquired absolutely through coming-to-be, but that substance which exists in actuality (is acquired). For instance, when Caesar comes into being the existing substance of Caesar comes into being. But you will reply, “if substance comes to be absolutely, we have what was proposed, if an accident etc., there is alteration.” I hold that neither one nor the other (come to be absolutely), but both substances (substance existing in actuality and substance taken absolutely) (come to be), namely, (they come to be) in respect to accident; nor do I say this (“in respect of accident”) in respect of anything added unless it is added according to reason. For if a human being has come to be white, white comes to be neither absolutely nor per se, for it is not compared to itself in those ways (I.e. does not differ from itself absolutely or per se?). Thus I maintain that substance comes to be in respect to accidents, and not absolutely, etc.

            In reply to the other argument I grant the major premise. To the minor I answer that it does not cease to be essentially in respect of its essence absolutely, but as it was an end product of coming-to-be. And in this way that is a singular with which coming to be and passing away coincide. And because of this it is true that a human being ceases to be with regard to his essence as it was a product of coming to be, (that is,) as it was a single thing. Nor is it necessary then to ask where its being is. This is a bad question since its essence is measured neither by place nor by time.

            To the other I reply that “dead human being” can indicate the privation of life, and taking it in this way the major premise is true, or it can indicate the privation of the operation following on life. And I reply that a human being can be dead in this (second) way in respect of his essence.

            In response to the other, I grant the major premise. To the minor premise I reply that when no human being exists, human being is not a name of that which is not outside the soul. Indeed, I hold that when no human being exists human being has a true being outside the soul that does not depend on the soul, and its true real whatness is being of this sort, but this is not being in actuality.

            One can also uphold the view that it is not per se, and the reason for this is that “per se” indicates cause. Now in every genus, when the cause is destroyed the effect is destroyed. But the essence of human being is the cause why human being is animal, and if this essence is destroyed this proposition, “human being will be animal,” is false. But if the singulars are destroyed this essence is, therefore etc. And this is strengthened by what Aristotle says at the end of Metaphysics II, when one says a triangle is mutable, there is a doubt as to whether it has three angles etc. We can speak in the same way in the matter under discussion.

            Again, when something is a proper disposition immediately consequent on something’s essence, when that disposition is destroyed the essence that it is consequent on is also destroyed, as is clear of the power of heating in the case of fire. But being in actuality is a disposition consequent on the essence of human being, as well as whatever else it causes. Therefore if being in actuality is destroyed the essence of human being is destroyed, and it is through the essence of human being that human being is animal. Therefore etc.

            Again, human being and animal are in one category, but being outside the soul is what is divided into ten categories, and it is essentially predicated of every animal, therefore the predicate concerning human being and being itself are truly outside the soul. Therefore, it being assumed that no human being is, if this is false, “human being is a being outside the soul,” this will be false, “human being is animal.”

            In response to these arguments, to the first I reply that definition and a part of a definition are predicated per se of what is defined. But if we suppose an essence to be defined, whoever destroys the essence of the defined indicates its definition is not in it. Now whoever assumes human being not to be destroys the essence of human being, therefore etc.

            In response to the other argument I reply that it does not suffice for per se predication that they signify the same, for signifying is an accident of essence, but it is required that they be the same in essence. Now if (an existing) human being is destroyed then that human being and animal are not the same in essence. Therefore etc.

            In response to the other argument, they say that this is per se, “human being is human being,” and yet that this is not, “human being is animal.” For whoever says “human being is human being” indicates the same of itself, but whoever says “human being is animal,” if human being is destroyed the cause why animal is in it is destroyed. And so this is not per se, “human being is animal,” when human being is destroyed. And whoever says “human being is human being” says that a human being is that which is human being in essence. But now it seems that this is no good, for observe how “human being is human being” follows since the being of one is the essence of the other, and then it will seem that it follows, therefore, that human being is animal in the same way.

Question 23

            Next it is asked whether this is per se, “Socrates is a human being.”

            And it seems it is not, since just as question is related to question, so proposition to proposition, for every question can be transformed into a proposition. But the question what it is presupposes the question if it is. Therefore etc. Therefore this, “Socrates is a human being,” presupposes this, “Socrates is,” but the latter is not per se, since he can be destroyed, therefore neither is this per se, “Socrates is a human being.”

            Again, that is not in something per se which is in it for some determinate time, for Socrates signifies a human being for a determinate time.

            Again, when (words) signify under opposed formulae one is not predicated of the other per se. But “human being” and “Socrates” are like this, since human being signifies under an indeterminate formula, and Socrates under a determinate formula. Therefore etc.

            Again, expressions are true insofar as realities are as well. Therefore, propositions concerning mutable realities possess mutable truth. Therefore, since Socrates is a mutable realities, there will not be any truth there except the mutable sort, and such is not per se, therefore etc.

            The Philosopher intends the opposed view. In Metaphysics V he says that this is per se, “Callias is a human being,” and therefore also in the case at hand.

            Some say that this proposition, “Socrates is a human being,” is per se in one way, but in another way per accidens. For they say that Socrates and every other individual among material substances conveys something real over and above the species, whence they say that “Socrates” conveys two things, namely human nature and something added to the formula of human nature. It is per se by the formula, but not by what is superadded, just as in this proposition, “the bronze triangle is a triangle.” And they confirm it thus: when some first is in an aggregate in such a way that by reason of one it is in it per se, and by reason of another it is in it per accidens, in one way it is per se, and in another per accidens. Therefore, since Socrates is something aggregated from substance and accident, by reason of his substance he is a human being per se, and by reason of what is superadded he is a human being secundum accidens.

            The first thing they say, that is, that an individual reality adds something over and above the species, does not seem to have truth to some, since that added reality that they introduce is nothing except the accident through which the individual is an individual, but the introduction of an accident that is a reality does not occur here, therefore etc. Proof of the minor premise: since that which is an individual in itself is not a positive cause of individuation. But no accident is per se individual, for that only is per se individual that exists per se, but no accident exists per se.

            But some say that the major premise is not necessarily true, for what is not in itself a being is when you regard it as a form of being in some other. Similarly, something can be a cause of individuation in another which is not in itself an individual.

            It is obvious that since the cause and the caused are per se differences of a being it is necessary that there be beings. Hence, although a form is not a being in the way that a composite is, since being it, in the same way as a composite, is that which must be the cause of individuation, it is necessary that it be individuality (indivisio) or that it have individuality. It cannot be individuality since individuality is only a privation, and no positive accident is such. Therefore it must be that the cause of individuation is something having individuality in itself, and the only such thing is an individual. Therefore the individual is the cause of individuation.

            Again, what they say is not rational, that an individual is a being accidentally, for a substance is that which is a being in itself and not accidentally, and so it does not seem that that which is most a substance would be a being accidentally.

            It must be held, then, that in material substances the individual does not add anything real above the species, since if it adds such a thing it is perhaps of the genus of accident, but this cannot be, for every accident, from its being such, can be found in many, and through no such thing is an individual an individual. Therefore, it is necessary that it be a substance, and in that case, either the matter or form or composite. But it cannot be the matter or form, since either of these can be found in many, nor can it be the composite, since that is what we are asking about. But then the individual adds nothing real over and above the species. But you will ask, through what, then, is an individual an individual? I reply that an individual is an individual through this very individuality, nor does it have any other positive formal cause apart from this.

            To the matter at hand, I reply that this is per se in the first way, and so per se because it is not per accidens. And the reason for this is that that proposition is said to be per se in the first way in which the subject adds nothing real over and above the predicate, and the formula of the predicate is included in the formula of the subject. But both are found in the proposition at hand, therefore etc.

            But you will ask, if Socrates adds nothing real, what is it that he adds? I reply that it only adds a habitude toward accidents and that happens (accidit) to the substance since it is a substance. And you will reply that Socrates adds that accident, and an accident is something real, therefore it adds something real. r reply that this is said to be an accident, since it is not in a substance considered as a substance, but it is not said of an accident as a reality is said of the accident, but is rather a certain relation. And there are many relations that are of the genus of accident, for instance, the relation matter has to form. But form is in matter through its substance, as I now suppose, whence that respect which it has to accidents and to generation, of which it is the per se result (terminus), is not a reality belonging to an accident. Hence this substance is formally this because of this relation it has to accidents. And the Philosopher said in Metaphysics VII that everything is generated in another, intending by this that generation does not belong to anything except insofar as that thing is referred to another, as for instance to accidents and to that generation of which it is the per se result.

            In response to the arguments, I reply to the first that the question what it is presupposes the question if it is, but if it is in actuality. But that which is supposed to have a what it is must not be repugnant to being. Whence being in actuality is not a proper passion of anything but what, from its formula, is not something prohibited from being. But since he says Socrates is a human being, he says that the what it is of Socrates is true, so he supposes Socrates to be true. This is so because Socrates is not prohibited from being, but not because Socrates is in actuality. And since the being of Socrates is not prohibited, he can have a what it is.

            In response to the second argument, I deny the minor premise. I reply to its proof that “Socrates” signifies a human being of a definite time, that is, “Socrates” signifies a human being as he has a relation (habitudinem) to a definite tine and a definite place. And this still is not included in Socrates’s formula, and so, since the is accidental to the essence of Socrates, and that is of the essence of Socrates, Socrates will not be a human being because of this.

            In response to the third argument, I grant the major premise, and deny the minor. And in response to the proof, since it is said that “human being” signifies under an indeterminate formula, that is, “human being” signifies something that is of itself determinate, but “human being” is determined by another, and since human being is not determinate of itself, and Socrates is determinate of himself, in saying “Socrates is a human being,” the formula of the predicate falls under the formula of the subject, for that it is not determinate of itself agrees with its being determined by another.

            In response to the fourth argument, I reply that there are two things to consider in Socrates, the nature of human being and the relation to accidents. By the formula of human nature it does not fall under coming to be and destruction. By the formula of relation it is subject to change, and so falls under coming to be and destruction. And in this latter way human being cannot be made true per se of Socrates, but in the first way human being can be made true of Socrates.

Question 24

            Having asked a few things about the first way of saying per se, let us inquire about the second way of saying per se, and first let us ask whether an accident is a being per se.

            And it is argued that it is, for the Philosopher, in Metaphysics VII, divides being into being per se and accidental being, and divides being per se into ten categories. And accident is one of the ten categories. Therefore etc.

            On the other hand, the Philosopher intends the opposed view, holding that an accident, for instance, musical and white, is not a being per se. It is obvious that among beings one can arrive at some first which has being from its own formula, for if anything has being and does not have being in its own formula, it is in capacity to being, and therefore it is necessary that it be determined to being through some else that has being, for nothing brings itself from capacity into actuality. I ask now if it is determined to be or has being from its formula, or is it in capacity to being? If it has being from its formula, we have what was proposed, and if not, it is determined to being through some other. I ask about that other, and thus to infinity, or else some first will be arrived at, and that first is the cause of all the others. Hence this is per se, “God is a being.” And in every case, everything said about the Lord that does not pass into extrinsic matter is said in this way, of which sort are “God is a mover” and the like. Motion is not in the first substance, but motion is in the reality moved as something is in a subject, but not in the mover. But we do not ask in this way whether an accident is a being per se, but we ask whether it is per se in some other way.

            In response to this, it must be understood that something is a being per se in two ways, either so that being per se which has being in such a way that it does not depend on the soul in its being, and thus it is said to be per se in the ten categories, and thus they are not called being in the third way of speaking per se. In the other way, something is said to be per se that does not need another for it to exist, and individual substances are like this, for instance, Socrates and the like. And what is a per se being thus is per se in the third way. So Socrates subsists per se in the third way, for he subsists through what is not another from its essence, as through the presence of matter in form.

            But some say if Socrates exists per se in such a way that in his being he does not need another, then he is not caused. I reply to this that these two are consistent, that something is caused by another so that it is in actuality by another, and yet the form is from itself, as a human being is formally a being per se, but in actuality from a first cause, which is in every case the cause of all this.

            The arguments proceed on their own ways. For the argument to the first part shows that an accident is per se in such a way that in its being it does not depend on the soul, and this is granted. And the other argument proves that an accident is not a being in such a way that it does not need another for its being, and this too is granted.

Question 25

            Next it is asked whether any accident is in its subject per se.

            And it is argued that none is, since the per se and the essential are the same thing, so that where, in nature, we have a per se transmutation into something else, we have an essential transmutation. But no accident is essential. Therefore etc.

            Again, what is in something per se is in it of necessity. But accidents are not in things of necessity. Therefore etc.

            Again, different ways of inhering are required by different sorts of things that inhere. But when substance inheres and when accident inheres, different sort of things inhere. Therefore different sorts of inhering take place. But substance inheres per se, and therefore accident inheres per accidens.

            On the other hand, it is argued that the conclusion of a demonstration is per se, but in the conclusion of a demonstration an accident inheres in a subject; therefore etc.

            It must be replied to this that some accidents inhere in a subject per se. To make this evident, it must be considered that some accidents follow an aggregate according to its species, and some according to the individual. Accidents that are in things according to species are in the aggregate through the proper essence of the aggregate, not so that they are included in the formula of its species, but so that the aggregate is per se their cause.

            From this two things follow. The first is that every accident that is proper and per se is predicated per se of its subject. The second is that no accident is predicated per se in the first way. Proof of the first: since some predicate is said per se of its subject when the cause of the predicate is in the subject, but in every case the subject is the cause of its proper passion; therefore etc. Proof of the second: since in a proposition per se in the first way the predicate is not outside the concept of its subject, for the passion is to the subject as effect is to cause, but the effect is not part of the concept of the cause; therefore etc.

            There are certain accidents that follow the aggregate according to the individual, and such do not have a proper cause in the subject, and therefore are not in the subject per se. They are either separable or inseparable, so this is not per se, “the crow is black.” But some will say that it seems inseparable accidents are in things per se, since they are always in them and in then of necessity, and therefore per se. To this one responds from the position that not all inseparable accidents are in their subjects per se, since if there are such accidents that are neither posited in the definition of the substance, nor the substance in the definition of the accident, they are not in their subjects per se.

            But next this same person will ask how we know which inseparable accidents are posited in the definition of the subject and which are not? And one answers to this that if they are such accidents as have their proper cause in the subject, so that they cannot be found in any subject differing in species, such are posited in the definition of the substance. Now as it happens blackness is found in other things differing from crows in species, and therefore blackness is not posited in the definition of crow, nor conversely.

            But you ask whether, when some accident is in a thing per se, such an accident is first in its subject? For it seems that is not, since what is first in a subject seems to be part of its substance, and an accident is not part of the essence of a subject; therefore etc. Again the compounding intellect follows the apprehending intellect. But that which is first apprehended by the intellect is the substance of the thing, therefore what is first composed with the thing is of its substance. Therefore no accident is first composed with the subject.

            To this it must be answered that we can consider a thing predicated of a subject in different ways, universally or in some one genus, so that we take all essential and accidental predicates universally, but we take accidental predicates alone in some one genus. In the first way, it is obvious that no accident is first in its subject, since that which is thus first in its subject is the substance of the reality. In the second way, some accident is per se first in its subject. Of this sort is the ability to laugh in respect of human being. And this is necessary since there is no accident so common that it is not first in something, since, if an accident is in a subject, either it is in it first or or through another. If it is first we have what has been proposed, if not, then it is in the subject through some other and I ask of this other as before. And so there will be an infinite regress in essential predicates, which is opposed to Aristotle in Metaphysics V.

            The replies to the arguments are obvious. In response to the first I grant the major premise, taking “essential” in a broad sense. With regard to the minor premise, I hold that “some essential being” can be taken in two ways, in one way as that which is in the thing’s formula, in the other as that immediately and essentially caused by the subject. And in this second sense accidents are essentially in the subject.

            In response to the second argument, I deny the minor premise. To prove it wrong, I hold that this is intended to be about accidents that follow an aggregate as it is an individual, for these accidents are corruptible, and are in nothing per se.

            In response to the other, I reply that it does not conclude anything more than this, that the mode of inherence of the accident is not per se in that way in which themnode of inherence of the substance is. And I grant this. I also grant that accidents are in things per accidens, that is, they are not in things per se in the same way that those things are that are in things per se in the first way. Those are in things per se in the first way when the predicate falls in the definition of the subject. The second way is when the subject is the cause of the predicate, and that is when a proper passion is predicated of its proper subject.

Question 26

            Next we ask whether two accidents can be first in the same subject, for instance, even and odd in number.

            And it is argued that they cannot, since as two subjects are related to one first accident, so two accidents to one first subject. But two subjects cannot be the first subject of one first accident, for then the two subjects are one subject. Hence two accidents cannot be first in the same subject.

            Again, a subject is through its essence the immediate cause of an accident, but of one cause there is one per se first effect, therefore etc.

            Again, whatever is said through superabundance agrees with one thing only. But “being first in” is something said through superabundance, therefore etc.

            The opposite view is the intention of the Philosopher in the Metaphysics. Pythagoras thought that what is in something first is the substance of its being. The Philosopher argues against this, since if that which is first in something were its substance, many would be the substance of one subject. But this inference does not hold unless many accidents are immediately in some subject.

            Some who wish to resolve this question say that something is said to be in something first because it is not in it by the mediation of something prior. But this can be unmediated by a prior subject in the way this is, “a triangle has three.” Having three is in a triangle first since it is not mediated by a prior subject, but, still, it is in it by mediation of a prior predicate, since, because it has two angles, it has three extrinsic angles opposite one another. Or it may not be mediated by a prior predicate. And in this way the definition is in the defined, since it is not mediated by a prior subject, nor by a prior predicate. Then, when it is asked whether two accidents etc., they say that two accidents can be first in the same subject at the same tine in such a way that they are not mediated by a prior predicate, for if it were thus, a passion would be indemonstrable of its subject. For a demonstration is through a cause, but if there were no first essential that is said of a subject prior to the passion, there would be no cause why a passion is said of a subject. For if there is no definition of the substance, there is never any other, and so neither a proper passion nor any accident would be proved of the subject. These speak truly, but they do not resolve the problem. For it is certain that two accidents are not in a first subject unmediated by a prior predicate, but if they are first in it they are first in it in such a way that they are not mediated by a prior. But this is what we seek, and to that they do not respond.

            And so it must be said that in this way there cannot be two accidents in one first subject through one first thing, but only through distinct things. And the explanation of this is that different capacities correspond to different actualizations, since a capacity and actualization must be proportionate to one another. But if two accidents are in the same first subject, those accidents are two different actualizations. It is necessary, then, that in the subject there be two different capacities, so that through one capacity it receives the one accident first, and the other through the other.

            But you will reply, from what you have said it follows that nothing is first in one subject insofar as it is one except one first accident, which seems to be false, since one is a number and yet both even and odd are in it first. I reply that if these two accidents, even and odd, are in a number first they are not in it except as it is one. And one in what way? One in genus, since number is one in genus. But if even and odd are considered according to their own formulae, thus considered they are not in number as it is one something, but as it is diversified in different species--which Grosseteste says, namely that nothing prevents one and the same being said about many in such a way that it is first of every one of then, as a genus is in many species in such a way that to each of these it is first, thus too of various accidents in respect of a subject. If we consider some one to be first in two, this only occurs in one of these two ways: either because those many are considered as one, or because that one is considered as many. Thus it is necessary to consider the second of these ways in respect of species inasmuch as they are first in those. Thus it is obvious that two accidents are first in the same, but through different causes, as in ensouled body. For life is first in it through the soul, and being mortal is also in it first, but this is through matter. And this makes the reply to the arguments apparent.

Question 27

            Next it is asked whether this is per se, “number is even.”

            And it seems it is not, since in a proposition per se in the second way, it is necessary that the predicate be in the subject of necessity, but even is not in a number of necessity, therefore it is not per se.

            On the other hand, it is argued that accidents are in subjects per se which are received in the formula of their accidents, as the Philosopher intends in this chapter. But in the definition of even I number is posited, since an even number is a number not having a middle, whence it seems that this is per se in the second way.

            It must be replied that this is not per se, “number is even,” but this is per se, “a number is even or odd.” In the same way, this is not per se, “a line is straight,” but this is per se, “a line is straight or curved.” The first is obvious, since for the proposition to be per se in the second way it is necessary that the predicate be in the subject of necessity and in every case. But this predicate, even, is not in number of necessity and always and in every case, nor is straight in line, for a line is not necessarily straight, nor is every line straight. And in the same way number is not of necessity even, nor even in every case, whence it will not be per se, for per se and of every case are the same, and what is per se is necessary, as was shown above.

            But someone will reply that, as we have seen, nothing is required for a per se proposition except that in the subject there be the cause of the predicate. For per se conveys cause, so it suffices that the cause of the predicate be in the subject or vice versa. But in a line a sufficient cause of straight is found, and in a number, of even, therefore etc.

            It is to be replied that it is true that is is required for a proposition per se in the second way that the subject be the sufficient cause of the predicate, but also this is required, that the subject be the precise cause of the predicate. And this is obvious from the preceding, since for a proposition per se in the second way it is necessary that subject and predicate be said convertibly, but this will not be unless the subject is the precise cause of the predicate. But this is not so when it is said, “number is even,” since number is not a cause in respect of this that I call even, for it is the cause of another as well. But this is per se in the second way, “a number is even or odd,” since this is per se in the second way, “a number is a number having a middle or not having a middle,” just as this, “an animal is a “`an or a non-man,” as has been shown. But everything having a middle in the genus of numbers is even or uneven, which is per se. But what is in something per se is in it of necessity, so these, “a number is even or uneven,” “a line is straight or curved,” are per se in the second way. Hence these three propositions differ: “a number is even,” “a number not having a middle is even,” and “a multiple of two is even.” For this, “a number is even,” is in no way per se. This, “a number not having a middle is even,” is per se in the first way, since the subject is the cause of the inherence of the predicate. In response to the argument, this, “a multiple of two is even,” is per se, but not first, since a multiple of two is not even because it is a multiple of two, but because it is a number not having a middle.

            In response to the arguments. To the first I reply that the major premise is true. I suppose that these accidents are in the subject in every case, for this is a necessary condition for a per se proposition. To the minor premise I reply that although number is posited in the definition of even, still even is not in number in every case. An so this is not per se, “number is even.” And if we wish to say otherwise, that it does not suffice for a per se proposition that the predicate include the subject in its definition, but it is also required that the subject be immediate to the predicate. Again, that the subject itself be the efficient cause and the precise cause of this, and insofar as this is a number it is not the cause of even because it is number, but through this, that it is a number not having a middle.

Question 28

            Next, we ask concerning the third way, whether it is a way of inhering or of being.

            And it is argued that it is a way of inhering, since a way of being per se is a way of inhering when “per se” is a determination of inherence. But in the third way there is a per se determination of inherence? since this is per se in the third way, “Socrates is per se,” and “per se” here is a determination of the inherence of being to Socrates, therefore etc.

            Again, the Philosopher in the chapter on per se only enumerates ways that relate to demonstration. But those which relate to demonstration are ways of inhering. Therefore etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued that that way of per se is not a way of inhering according to which an incomplex is called per se, but rather, that of which there is inherence is a certain complex of a predicate with the subject. But in the third way an incomplex is called per se, for instance, Socrates is, and every first substance. Therefore etc.

            Grosseteste says that all the ways of per se which the Philosopher names lead back to three ways, namely to ways of being, inhering, and causing. The first and second ways are ways of inhering, the fourth way, a way of causing, the third, of being. And in this he agrees with Themistius on that passage, who says that the Philosopher does not give the third way as relating to demonstration, but only to complete the number of per se’s. But it is clear that it is a way of inhering it relates to demonstration, so that it is obvious that this third way is not a way of inhering.

            Again, that it is not a way of inhering is obvious, since in this third way a singular substance is called per se. But, now, of a singular substance there is no inherence in another, nor even of a universal substance, for by the name “substance” something absolute is conveyed. And these are the ways through which the Philosopher distinguishes substance from accident, namely, that substance is a per se being, but accident is one inhering in another. Therefore it is obvious that this third way of saying per se is not a way of inhering, and this is what the Philosopher says in the text, for according to this way, things are said per se which are not said of a subject, and singular things are the only things of this sort. But singulars are per se subsisting things, for they subsist through something not outside their formula, and hence it is not required that there be anything other to which they belong. These are, therefore, per se subsisting things. Therefore this third way is not a way of inhering, but a way of per se subsisting.

            In response to the argument, I grant the major premise, and deny the minor, since per se in the third way does not indicate the inherence of a predicate to the subject. I reply that per se can determine this word “is” or inherence. If it determines inherence, I reply that this, “Socrates is per se,” is per se in the second way, and the sense of “Socrates is per se” is that being is in Socrates per se, supposing that actual being is in him per se in the second way. But if it determines the word “is” in that way Socrates is per se in the third way, and the sense is that Socrates is per se, that is, by himself.

            But someone will say, from the aforesaid it must seem to you that per se produces a modal proposition, since per se determines either inherence, or this word “is,” per se, and so this proposition will be modal, “human being is an animal per se,” and those like it. I reply that this is true, for not only these modes, necessary and impossible and so on, make propositions nodal, but an indefinite number of others make propositions modal.

            Again, all of these are modal: “Socrates runs well” or “quickly,” for a mode is nothing except a determination of the inherence of the predicate to the subject. And so every determination which can determine the inherence of a predicate to the subject can make a modal proposition. But things of this sort are indefinite in number, and this is the intention of Ammonius and Simplicius on the De Interpretatione.

Question 29

            Next it is asked whether Socrates is per se in the third way, and in the second place, whether the fourth way is a way of inhering.

            Concerning the first, it is argued that it is not, since “per se” indicates privation of causality from any other. That therefore is per se in the third way, and only that, which does not have causality of its being, for to be caused is contradictory to per se in this way. But Socrates has causality of his being. Therefore Socrates is not per se in the third way.

            Again, nothing that is a being accidentally is per se in the third way. But Socrates is a being accidentally, since being in is conjoined to accidents, and also, according to some, two realities are included in its formula, of which one is accidental to the other, therefore etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued that everything which is a species or individual of the genus of substance is per se in the third way, for a substance is what is first and primarily. But Socrates is in the genus of substance. Therefore etc.

            For this, it must be understood that Socrates is per se in the third way, since everything that exists through its formula, and is not through anything outside its formula, is per se in the third way in its formula, therefore etc.

            Again, everything that signifies some this is per se in the third way, as the Philosopher intends in the text, for that is per se in the third way that is not said of anything, as white and educated are. But Socrates is some this, for an individual and a this are the same. But he is called an individual because he is not divided into many parts, and a this because he subsists per se. whence Socrates subsists per se, and every such is per se in the third way.

            But you will say those are per se in the third way that signify some this and subsist per se1 for it seems that universal substances are not per se in the third way, since they do not subsist per se, but rather in singulars. Nor do they signify some this, for they are said of singulars and all those are per se in the third way which are not said of a subject by which they are, and since universals are said of a subject, it seems that etc.

            It must be replied to this that “universal” is said in two ways, universal in act and universal in potency. A universal in potency is a nature of a reality understood in potency, and this nature is one in one thing and many in many, and not one in many before it is understood, and so it is not another than the nature of the singulars. But indeed, if singulars subsist per se they subsist through this, and so they are, thus considered, realities per se in the third way of saying per se. In another way they are called universals in act, and such is the nature of a reality understood in act insofar as the formula of universality is founded on this, and so two things are considered in the universal in act, namely the nature subject to the universality and the universality itself. Considering the nature subject to the universality, it is per se in the third way, since through that nature particulars are that which they are. But, indeed, singulars are not per se in the third way, unless it is because they are through their nature. Considering the universality, it is not per se in the third way. Thus it would be an accident, and considering this, Aristotle, in Metaphysics VII, said against Plato that universals are not substances. And this is true, considering them in respect of the formula of universality. And this is what the Commentator says, on Metaphysics XII, that universals according to Aristotle are collected in the soul from many singulars by the intellect that considers and makes then into one intention from their similitude. And this intention belongs to the reality, and with respect to that universals are not per se in the third way, nor are universals in singulars Therefore they are not per se in the third way. For the argument considers the matter well, if the universal is in singulars as an accident is in a subject, but it is not thus, rather the universal is in singulars as a nature is in what has a nature.

            In response to the other, I reply that this is not, strictly speaking, a universal. It is in something as in a subject. For a subject is named an actual being from its formula, and through this the subject is distinguished from matter by the Commentator. If, then, something attaches to the subject it is an accident, since the subject is already in actual existence. And therefore even though every principal of the subject as subject is an accident, still, it is not true to say on account of this that universals are predicated of singulars as of a subject, since universals are of the substance of singulars. It appears, then, that Socrates is per se in the third way, and in every case every substance, both primary and secondary, is per se in the third way of saying per se, just as it seemed earlier.

            In response to the arguments opposed to this, when it is argued that per se indicates privation of causality, I reply that per se, strictly speaking, does indicate privation of causality, but sometimes of one cause and sometimes of several. For when God is said to be per se, per se indicates privation of every cause, since the First Cause <principium> is not through any other cause. “A se” indicates, in another way, privation of causality by matter when it is said that Intelligences are per se1 since their form is not received in natter. It indicates privation of the subject in another way, and in this way both primary and secondary substances are per se, since they don’t need another as their subject to subsist. But in this way every substance is per se in the third way, since it doesn’t have any other as cause of its being in the genus (of subject), therefore etc. it is said in the minor premise, “Socrates has another as cause,” This is true for efficient and material causes, but he does not have another as cause in the genus of subject.

            In response to the other argument, one can reply in two ways. For he who holds that an individual includes two realities will say this, that something is said to be accidentally in two ways, either because being in the composite is in accidents (inesse coniunctum inest accidentibus), or because it is not unless it belongs to something. Whence, that which is a being accidentally in this second way is not per se in the third way, but that which is a being accidentally because being in the composite is in accidents is per se in the third way. But according to another opinion, it must be held that nothing that includes two realities, of which one belongs to another, is a being per se in the third way. But Socrates does not include two realities of which one belongs to the other. Therefore Socrates, and every other substance, can be per se in the third way.

Question 30

            Concerning the second question, namely that the fourth way is a way of inhering, it is argued thus. to cause is not to inhere per se. Indeed, from the fact that something causes another per se it can be concluded that the one is not the other, for the cause and what is caused differ in essence. Since, then, the fourth way, according to Grosseteste, is a way of causing (for he only posits ways of inhering), therefore the fourth way etc.

            Again, since “per se” indicates cause, wherever there is a way of inhering per se it is necessary that the predicate be related to the subject as cause, as in the first way, or as caused, as in the second way. So every way of inhering per se will be the first or the second.

            On the other hand, it is argued that every way that falls within a demonstration is a way of inhering. And it is for this reason that Themistius holds that the third way is not a way of inhering, for it does not fall within a demonstration, therefore etc.

            It must be replied to this question that the fourth way is a way of inhering per se, for there is a way of inhering per se where the subject is related to the predicate as cause to caused. In the fourth way the subject is related to the predicate as cause to caused, and this is under the ratio of efficient cause. For instance, a killer kills because of killing, and there is no other cause of this, so it is obvious that the fourth way is a way of inhering. Hence the subject is related to its passion in two genera of cause, namely the genus of material cause and the genus of efficient cause. As it is related to its passion in the genus of material cause it is the second way. As the subject is related to its passion in the genus of efficient cause it is the fourth way. Hence the subject as it is related under the formula of efficient cause is a principle for demonstrating the passion of its subject under the genus of material cause, for the subject is the effective cause of the passion through its formal principles. Therefore the definition which joins the formal principles to the subject is the middle term for demonstrating the passion of the subject, as will become apparent later. And as for the subject at hand, both ways are ways of inhering, but the first way of inhering falls among the premisses of a demonstration, and the second in the conclusion.

            But how does this way differ from the other ways of inhering? Some say this fourth way differs from the first and from the second as universal from particular. And they support this with Aristotle, where he gives the ways of being in a certain respect--the first way is as it pertains to the form, the second as it pertains to matter. And then he adds that as it indicates a relation to all the causes, it is the fourth way. In the same way, they speak of the per se, including the fourth way of speaking per se. But these fellows give too little consideration to the matter. It is true that “in a certain respect” in the first way pertains to the form, and in the second way to matter, but what these say <is> that in the fourth way, “in a certain respect” indicates a relation to every cause. Now Aristotle holds that that is per se in the fourth way of which there is no other cause, in which way “The human being is a human being” is per se. And he does not mention what these say, that “in a certain respect” indicates a relation to all causes indifferently. Therefore, it must be replied otherwise. It is true that per se in the fourth way differs from the first as a universal from particular, not because per se in the fourth way indicates a relation to all the causes, but rather because every proposition that is per se in the first way is per se in the fourth way, for propositions per se in the first way are immediate, and of these there is no other cause, like propositions per se in the fourth way.

            In response to the arguments, to the first, I grant the major premise, for causation per se is not inherence per se, because even though it is caused by another, it can inhere in it per se. But the relation of the caused to the cause can be considered in two ways, either in abstraction or in contraction. If in abstraction, the cause is not predicated per se of the caused, nor vice versa. Thus causation is not per se inherence. But in contraction, I hold that caused can be predicated of the cause per se, for instance, “The killer kills”--the caused is predicated of the cause per se and in contraction. And for this reason a way of causing certainly is a way of inhering, considered in contraction. In response to the minor premise, if Grosseteste understands that the fourth way is so much a way of causing that it is not a way of inhering, then, in the same way, he says that there does not seem to be any reason why the fourth way is more a way of causing than the second, since just as the effect in the fourth way is predicated of the cause, so in the second way the changed is predicated of the matter in the genus of material cause. And if you hold that it is all right, because in the fourth way the subject is efficient cause of the predicate in the subject, and the subject is the material cause only because the efficient cause is the cause of the causality of natter, and so, since efficient cause lies behind the material causality of the subject therefore the fourth way is a way of causing! and the second is not a way of causing—that won’t do, since the end is also an efficient cause, and in the same way as efficient cause and matter do, form and end coincide. And if the power is a <formal> cause caused <by the final cause>, therefore if the predicate is related to the subject as form it will most surely be called a way of causing, and such is the first way. This is opposed to them, and so their account of cause is not sufficient.

            In response to the other argument, I grant the major premise, and when you say, “If the predicate is related to the subject as cause to caused, in this way it is the first way,” I grant it. And next, when it is said that “when the predicate is related to the subject as caused to cause” it is the second way, I reply that this is not true precisely, for the caused can be related to the cause either in the genus of natural cause, and thus it is the second way, or in the genus of efficient cause, and thus it is the fourth.

Question 31

            Next it is asked in what way the ways of saying per se are related to demonstration.

            And it seems to some that the fourth way is not an ingredient of demonstration, for sometimes one can demonstrate a passion of the subject through the definition of the passion. But where the passion is received by means of demonstration the fourth way is not an ingredient, for in such a demonstration, in the major premise the passion is predicated of its definition, which takes us back to the first way of saying per se, and in the second proposition, the minor premise, the definition of the passion is predicated of the subject and the subject is seen to have the passion in the formula of material cause. Again, neither is the conclusion per se in the fourth way, for there the passion is predicated of its subject, and so this is per se in the second way.

            Aqain, sometimes one can demonstrate the passion of the subject through another prior passion, as with a triangle, which has three sides equal to two right angles because it is a figure having an extrinsic angle etc. But in such a demonstration the first way is not an ingredient, for in the first proposition the passion is predicated of a passion, and in the second the prior passion is predicated of the subject, and in the conclusion the passion under consideration is predicated of the subject, and none of these is the first way.

            It must be replied to this that although there are four ways of what is per se, the fourth way is not an ingredient of demonstration except as an incomplex something that per se determines inherence. But it is true that, since every per se inherent depends on some per se being, so every way of inhering per se depends on a way of being per se. And because of this, in the conclusion of demonstration per se of the highest sort, just as there is a way of inhering per se it is necessary that the subject be a being per se. And before such a subject is arrived at, which is a being per se of which the passion is demonstrated, there is no demonstration of the strongest sort of the subject. Hence it is not always true to say that the fourth way does not relate to demonstration, but that it does not relate as it is received in the premisses of demonstration. This is true of the other ways.

            Two things must be understood. The first is that in a demonstration of the highest sort a passion is demonstrated of the subject. The second is that the middle term for demonstrating the passion of the subject is the definition of the subject, which indicates the cause of inherence of the passion to the subject. And this is what Aristotle says in the second book of the Posterior Analytics, that the middle term indicates what it is and why it is. But he says the essence of the subject is the why it is of the passion’s inherence in the subject. Hence, in a demonstration of the strongest sort the passion is attributed to the middle term in the major premise, because the middle term is the efficient cause of the passion, since the middle term in such a demonstration indicates what it is of the subject and why it is of the inherence of the predicate to the subject. And the middle term is the efficient cause of the passion, and so it is per se in the fourth way. In the minor premise the definition of the subject is attributed to the subject, and so it is the first way. In the conclusion the passion is attributed to the subject, and so it is the second way. And so in demonstration of the strongest sort the fourth way is in the major premise, the first in the minor premise, and the second in the conclusion, and thus in the strongest sort of demonstration every way is required.

            In response to the arguments, to the first, when it is argued that the passion is sometimes shown of the subject through the definition of a passion, and the fourth way of speaking per se does not occur there, it can be held that the fourth way is included in the demonstration there, since just as the subject is related in the formula of material cause in respect of the definition of the passion, so it is related in the formula of material cause. Since the definition of the passion indicates the essence of the passion, but the being of the passion is caused from the subject as efficient cause, therefore in such a demonstration the fourth mode is assumed in the second proposition, since in the first the passion is attributed to the definition of the passion, but in the second the definition of the passion is attributed to the subject. Or it can be held that all three ways enter into demonstration where it is the highest sort of demonstration, but where a passion is shown of the subject through the definition of a passion it is not the highest sort of demonstration, since such a demonstration does not proceed through immediate propositions, since the definition of the passion can be shown of the subject through something prior.

            As to the second, it must be replied that the first way does not seem to enter into demonstration there, nevertheless, if it is said that the first is understood through the fourth, since every proposition in the first way is per se in the fourth way, then, since the fourth way is there, the first will be, at least as a particular within its universal.

Question 32

            Next it is asked whether any negative proposition is true per se.

            And it is argued that none is, for no proposition that is only true accidentally is said to be per se. But every negative proposition is true accidentally, as Aristotle says in On Interpretation, the good is not bad only because this is true, “the good is good.” Since, then, every negative proposition is made true by an affirmative proposition, it seems that no negative proposition is per se.

            Again, this is a true negative proposition, “No human being is a donkey,” and yet it is not per se, since if it were per se it would be so in the first way, the second way, or the fourth. But not in the first way, since the predicate does not fall within the definition of the subject, nor in the second, since the predicate is not a proper passion of the subject, nor in the fourth, since the subject is not an efficient cause of the predicate.

            On the other hand, it is argued that demonstration is from what is per se, but it is possible to make a demonstration from some negative propositions, therefore etc.

            For the reply to this it must be understood that in the genus of negative propositions some per se and immediate negative propositions are to be found, for if any negative proposition is to be demonstrated, some negative proposition must be assumed, and this does not suffice by itself, but an affirmative proposition must also be assumed. I ask of that negative proposition from which it is proved, whether it is immediate or not. If it is immediate, we have what was proposed, and if not, then it is demonstrated from some other negative proposition, and I ask about it whether it will be immediate or not, and so on indefinitely.

            Again, a negative proposition cannot be proved unless an affirmative proposition be assumed. But there is a stopping place in affirmative propositions, so in negative propositions, too. But there would be no stopping place there unless some negative proposition is immediate, therefore etc. The minor premise is proved from Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I, namely that there is a stopping place in affirmatives, and in essential predicates as well as accidents.

            Again, in each genus what is accidental. leads back to what is per se in that genus, but in the genus of negative propositions an accidental negative proposition can be found, therefore there will be something per se in that genus back to which it leads.

            Again, just as in affirmative propositions some first is to be found, for instance, one put in terms of being, so in the genus of negatives it is possible to find a first than which no other is more necessary, and this would be in common terms of being, for instance, “non-being is not being,” or “being is not non-being.”

            But you will say, if this is so, and there is an immediate negative proposition, and an immediate proposition is one to which no other is prior, and is most necessary, then there will be some negative to which nothing is prior, and this is contrary to the Philosopher, who says that to every negative proposition some affirmative proposition is prior. It must be replied that if anything is immediate then nothing is prior to it, but “some thing is immediate” is said either without qualification, or in a genus. Hence if something is immediate in a genus, nothing is prior to it in that genus, and so it is possible to arrive at a first negative in the genus of negative propositions1 and yet for something to be prior to such an immediate proposition.

            But you will say, since no negative is immediate without qualification, because there is something prior, it seems that demonstrations do not arise from negatives, since a demonstration arises from propositions immediate without qualification. I grant that no demonstration of the highest sort is from negative propositions, whence it must be noted that not every demonstration is from affirmative first principles without qualification, but some are from affirmative propositions immediate in their genus. For if a demonstration always arose from immediates without qualification, there would be no more than one demonstration, and so concerning negatives as well.

            But you will ask next if any negatives are per se in any way that is to be found among these ways of saying per se. It must be understood that, as in affirmative propositions there is an assertion of the predicate of the subject, so in negative propositions the subject is such that it includes the opposite of the predicate in its definition, as for instance, in this proposition, “No human being is a donkey.” And such negative propositions are per se in the first way. Sometimes the subject is such that the predicate is removed from it in such a way that the subject is a proper subject in respect of the opposite predicate, for instance1 in this, “man is not unable to laugh.” And thus it is the second way. And sometimes it happens that the subject is such that it is the efficient cause of the opposite of the predicate, as1 for instance, in “nothing killed lives.” And this is the fourth way.

            In response to the arguments, in response to the first, when it is argued that “no proposition” etc., I hold that for something to be accidentally occurs in two ways, either that accidentally which is opposed to what is per se, or that which is opposed to what is first. Hence I grant that no proposition accidental so that it opposes what is per se is per se, but a proposition that is accidental by being opposed to what is first can be per se. For there are many per se propositions that are not first, for such are negative propositions.

            In response to the other argument, I reply that this proposition, “no human being is a donkey,” is per se in the first way, for the predicate is removed from the subject in such a way that the opposite of the predicate is included in the definition of the subject.

Question 33

            Next it is asked about per se in comparison to according to itself (secundum quod ipsum). First, whether per se and according to itself are the same.

            And it is argued that they are from the Philosopher, who says this. For he says that “per se” and “according to itself” indicate the same being. For a triangle according to itself has three angles equal to two right angles. Therefore etc.

            Again, those that signify the same are the same, but “per se” and “according to itself” signify the same, therefore etc. The major premise is obvious, and the minor premise is proved because the same is signified through this proposition, “human being is per se animal," and “human being according to itself is animal.”

            On the other hand, it is argued thus: to be in something according to itself and to be in it first are the same, therefore etc. For not everything that is in something per se is in it first. Again, if per se and according to itself are the same, wherever they are found one is the other. But this is false, since in speaking thus, “an isosceles triangle has three angles equal to two right angles,” it is per se, but not according to itself, since an isosceles triangle does not have three angles etc. considered as isosceles triangle, but only considered as a triangle.

            I reply that per se and according to itself are in one way the same, in another way different. They are the same because “per” indicates cause, and “se” is a reflexive pronoun, and so per se includes two things, namely the relation of identity and the nature of causality, and so wherever it is found in any other proposition the being of causality is denoted and that causality is of the subject upon the predicate. This is because “se” is a reflexive pronoun. Therefore it only refers to that which precedes, and so it refers only to the subject, and doesn’t refer to any other causality, but only that. In a similar way “according to itself” includes two things, namely identity and a name of causality. In this, therefore, these two, namely per se and according to itself, agree. That both convey causality is obvious from the Philosopher in Metaphysics V, where he posits three ways in which “according to” is most used. The first way is as the essence or form of a thing is that through which something is, as the idea of good is that in respect of which something is good. The second way is as “according to” indicates the subject in which something is suited by nature to arise first, and in this way we say that body is colored considered as surface since the surface is that according to which body is colored first. The third way is said as “according to” denotes someone, that is, the cause why someone comes, and this third way reduces to the fourth here. Whence in the fourth way not only is the predicate related to the subject in the formula of efficient cause, but also of final cause. Reasoning thus, it is clear that “according to” conveys causality and “according to itself” and per se are in a way the same.

            Again, in a way they are different, and to make this evident one must consider that these are per se in different ways, “the triangle has three etc.” and the isosceles has three etc.” For a triangle according to all that it is has three etc., through its principles it is the cause of its having three etc., and hence considered as a triangle it has three etc. But although an isosceles, according to all that it is, has three etc., having three is not in it first, but is prior in triangle. So this is per se, but not according to itself, since if it were according to isosceles, having three etc. would be first in it and through this it would be in every other. But this is false, since a triangle has three etc. per se and first, but not through the nature of isosceles, rather through the nature of triangle.

            But some say that it seems a falsehood is accepted in the argument, since it is said that if an isosceles inasmuch as it is isosceles should have three etc. per se and first, it would be in every other through its nature. For we say that this is per se and first, “Human being is animal,” but we don’t say that animal is in every other through human being, therefore etc. Some would say that the locution is improper, “Human being according to itself is animal,” but this is proper, “Human being secundum se is animal," for these two, secundum se and according to itself (secundum quo ipsum), differ. For then it is said that something is another secundum se when that which is in and that in which it is do not differ really. Therefore this is not secundum se, “Human being is animal according to itself.” Then it is said that something is another according to itself when that which inheres and that in which it inheres differ really, so that one is an accident immediately caused by the essence of the other, and so this is not proper, “Human being secundum se is able to laugh,” but this is, “Human being according to itself etc.”. Moreover, some would say, it is said that this is per se, “an isosceles has three etc.,” so either in the first way, which can’t be since the predicate does not fall in the definition of the subject, nor in the second way, since in a proposition per se in the second way the predicate only agrees with the subject, or if it is in others it is in them through the subject’s nature, but isosceles is not such a subject in respect of having three etc.

            I reply that in the first and the second there are three degrees, since in the first way of speaking per se some are per se and first, and some per se and not first, as this is per se and first, “A human being is an animal,” but this is per se and not first, “Socrates is an animal.” And in the same way some are per se and first, as “A triangle has three etc.” But how can something be in something per se in the second way, unless it is caused from proper essential principles of the subject? Therefore, this is per se and first, “A triangle has three etc.,” because its having three etc. is caused from the essential principles of triangle. But in the case of the second way of speaking per se, it is not necessary that it be per se caused from the proper and essential principles of the subject, rather it suffices that the subject participate essentially in the nature of that which is the cause of the passion through its essential and proper principles, which are in it per se and first. For instance, isosceles is in what has three etc., and in the second way speaking per se, and therefore it is not necessary that having three etc. be caused immediately from its proper principles, rather it suffices that it pertain essentially to the nature of that which it is in first and per se. And thus it is obvious how per se and according to itself are in a way the same, and in a way different

            But you will ask where we posit these to be the same, and where different. I reply that in those which are per se and first, per se and according to itself are the same, but in those which are per se and not first, per se and according to itself are different.

            The arguments each proceed on its own way.

Question 34

            Next it is asked whether any accident which is in a subject primarily and universally can be demonstrated of it.

            And it is argued that it cannot, for there some other is the cause of what is demonstrated. If, therefore, a passion that is in a subject primarily is demonstrated of the subject, it will be demonstrated through some other cause. Therefore that passion will be in that cause before it is in the subject, and this is contrary to what was assumed, for it was assumed to be in the subject primarily. Therefore etc.

            Again, what is immediately in something cannot be demonstrated of it, for of immediates there is no demonstration. But a passion that is in a subject primarily and per se is in it immediately. Therefore etc.

            Again, if a passion that is primarily in a subject is demonstrated of it, either this will be through another, prior, passion, or through some posterior passion, or through the definition of the passion, or through the definition of the subject. It cannot be demonstrated through a prior passion, since it is assumed that it is primary; nor through a posterior passion, since that would beg the question, nor through a definition of the passion, since that is demonstrable of the subject as a passion of it; nor through a definition of the subject, since it is necessary that the middle term be in the same order as the extremes, and if the definition of the subject were taken as the middle term, the middle would not be in the same order with the extremes, for the middle term would be in the genus of substance, and the extremes in the genus of accident. And there can’t be any other way to demonstrate the passion of the subject. Therefore etc.

            The contrary view is clear from the Philosopher in the text, for he says that something is universal when it is demonstrated that it is in the subject per se and primarily. Therefore he intends that the passion, which is in, and primarily in, the subject, can be demonstrated of a substance.

            In response to this, it must be held that a passion that is in a subject per se and primarily can be demonstrated of the subject, and this is demonstration strictly speaking, and nothing else can be demonstrated if such a passion is not. For a passion primarily in its subject is caused by the essential principles of the subject, for in composites the matter together with the form is the cause of every accident, and since this passion is not of the essence of the subject, it will have a cause through which it is in the subject. Then, I argue, everything that has a another cause than the subject why it is in the subject can be demonstrated of the subject, but every passion that is in a subject per se and primarily has a <such a> cause in the subject, just as every accident does, universally. Therefore etc.

            Again, the definition of the subject is the middle term in demonstration of the highest sort, as we shall see in the second book. Since, then, a primary passion of a subject is caused by the subject through the definition of the subject, therefore the definition of the subject can be the middle term for demonstrating the passion of the subject, because the definition of the subject is the cause of the passion. For it is clear that the definition of the subject indicates the essence of the subject, and the subject is the cause of the passion in it through its essence, wherefore the definition of the subject indicates the cause of the passion in the subject.

            And it must be understood next that accidents are three-fold, namely, primary, middle, and last. Primary accidents can be demonstrated of the subject through a cause in the subject, but middle accidents can be demonstrated through the primary accident, and the last through middle accidents. And the last are only demonstrable, and cannot at the same time be middle terms for demonstrating something else, which is why they are last. This is apparent in nature, for fire is the cause of its causal action through its substantial form, and through this causal action it is the cause of lightness and rareness, and so on. It is necessary that one arrive at some passion that is demonstrable only, and this last passion is not a middle term, so that in everything, universally, it is necessary to seek a place where there is a stand, in natural things just as in other things.

            In response to the arguments, to the first, when it is argued, “if an accident is shown of its subject, then this is through another than the subject, aud the other will inhere in the subject beforehand, therefore the accident will inhere in it afterwards <and not primarily>,” this is true under the formula of cause, but the other will not be in the subject beforehand under the formula of subject. So, having three angles etc. is in a triangle through a cause, and it is in the cause beforehand, considered as a cause, but it is not in it beforehand considered as its subject. And so a passion can be demonstrated through its cause.

            In response to the second argument, I reply that something being immediately in another is two-fold, either immediate by the immediacy of the subject or immediate by the immediacy of the cause. whence every proper passion is immediately in a subject by the immediacy of the subject, but not by the immediacy of cause. Indeed, everything demonstrated has a cause of its demonstration in the subject, even though it is primary and per se in the subject. But what is immediate in another by the immediacy of the cause cannot also be demonstrated of the subject by this immediacy.

            In response to the third argument, I hold that through the definition of the subject such a passion is shown of the subject; and when it is said the middle term must be in the same order with the extremes, I reply that it is not needful that the middle be in the same order as the extremes as it relates to its category, but it suffices that it be of the same order speaking of such an order as exists between cause and caused. But such an order exists between the definition of the subject and the passion that primarily and universally is in the subject, an order by which the definition of the subject is the cause and the passion the caused, and this identity of order of the middle with the extremes is sufficient.

Question 35

            Next it is asked if “human being is an animal” is universal by the universality treated in this book.

            And it is argued that it is, for Themistius, on the chapter about errors, says that the genus is predicated universally of its species, but animal is the genus of human being, so it is universally in human being. Therefore this is universal by the universality treated in this book.

            Again, that proposition is universal in which the predicate is in the subject universally, per se, and first. But in this proposition, “human being is an animal,” animal is in human being universally, since this is true, “Every human being is an animal.” And it is per se, for the predicate is of the formula of the subject. Again, it is first, since that predicate is primarily in something which is not in it through any prior predicate, but animal is in ran not through anything prior. Therefore etc.

            In response to this, it must be understood that “universal” can be taken in four ways, in one way according to causality, in a second way according to predication, in another way a universal is the same as a universal proposition, in the fourth way universal is said of a proposition in which the subject and predicate are convertible. A universal according to causality is that by which causality extends to the production of many effects, and in this way the sun is called universal, for it is the cause of generable and corruptible things. In another way, “universal” is said according to predication, and is caused through the operation of the intellect abstracting something from material or individuating conditions. And Aristotle says about this that a universal is one in many and from many. We are not considering such universals here. In the third way, a universal is a universal proposition, for instance, “Every human being is an animal.” we are not considering universal in this way here. In the fourth way, a proposition in which the subject and predicate are convertible is universal, and in this way we say that universal is in the subject’s proper passion in every case, since the subject and its passion are not as the exceeding to the exceeded, but when one is found the other is also, and conversely. And this is what the Philosopher intends here by “universal”, whence he says that proposition is universal in which the predicate is in the subject through the nature of the subject, since the conclusion is convertible in such a way that not through another than the subject is the predicate in the subject.

            In response to the question, then, it must be replied that this proposition, “Human being is an animal”, in one way agrees with the universal, but disagrees in three ways. For it agrees with the universal in this, that animal is in human being universally, per se, and primary, as was shown. But in three ways it disagrees. First, since in a proposition in which the predicate is primary in the subject it is not in another unless this is through the subject’s nature, just as it is assumed here in the first. Animal, however, does not agree with human being in this way, indeed, it agrees with donkey to the same extent as with human being. And in a second way, too, it disagrees, since in a universal proposition the predicate is the proper passion of the subject, and, thus, not like the exceeding and the exceeded. But animal and human being are not related thus, for animal is not a proper passion of human being, nor convertible with human being, for it is said of other species. And again in a third way, since in a universal proposition the subject is related to the predicate in such a way that the subject being assumed, the predicate is too, and the subject being removed, so is the predicate. But animal and human are not related thus, for although human being being assumed, animal is too, human being being destroyed, animal is not.

            And so I hold that this proposition, “Human being is an animal,” is not universal by the sort of universality treated in this book, from which it is apparent what sort of condition this “universal” is. For if it is not universal unless there is convertibility of predicate and subject, the universal will either be of the predicate or of the predicate in relation to the subject, and the last is the more true.

            In response to the arguments, to the first, when it is argued, “According to Themistius the genus is universally predicated” etc., I reply that the genus is universally predicated of its species, not as “the primary” which is prior to human being rather than donkey, but because it is “primary” in virtue of not being in human being through anything prior. But this does not suffice for it to be universal. It is required that “primary” be a <proper> accident of the subject, and so convertible with it.

            As for the second argument, I grant the major premise. I reply to the minor that although the predicate is in its subject primarily in such a way that it is not in it through anything prior, still this is not primary absolutely. For if the predicate is to agree with the subject primarily, strictly speaking, it is necessary that it not be in it through anything prior, and this in such a way that it does not agree with any other in the same way. But animal is not in human being primarily in this way, since it is in donkey, and all its other species, just as much as it is in human being.

Question 36

            Next is it is asked whether a multitude of supposita is needed for the nature of a universal.

            And it is argued that it is. The Philosopher says that a universal is one in many and from many. And Porphyry says that a universal is suited by nature to be predicated of many. Themistius says, in De anima, that a universal is a certain concept of the intellect, or hypostasis, collected from all by a similitude. But a similitude is not except in many. Therefore etc.

            Again, from the formula of whole considered as a whole is having many parts, for according to Boëthius it is impossible for a whole considered as a whole to consist in one part. But a universal considered as such is a certain whole. Therefore, etc.

            Again, according to the Philosopher in De Caelo et Mundi, in everything having a form in matter it is necessary that there be a multitude of supposita in act, but in every universal there is form in matter; therefore etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued that the Philosopher says in Metaphysics VII that sun and moon are universals, and if a definition is applied to them it will be universal. But sun and moon don’t have many supposita. Therefore etc.

            Again, a multitude is not required for that nature which can be preserved in any part, but a universal as such can be preserved in respect of any part of it, therefore a multitude of individuals in act is not required for the nature of a universal as such.

            In response to this, it must be understood that four genera of universals are found in beings, two in generable beings and two in sempiternal beings. In generables things some are found that are generable through propagation, some through putrefaction. Among those generated through propagation there must be several supposita for the nature of the thing to be preserved, namely a male and a female, and one will act and the other receive action. Among those generated by putrefaction it is not necessary that there be many supposita in act, for the form is brought into these by the power of superior body. Hence the Philosopher says that the father of things generated through putrefaction is the sun.

            The reason why the universal among things generated by propagation necessarily requires many in act, and why these must be distinct in sex, is that for the nature of the species to be preserved in such, it is necessary that a family (genus) of individuals arise, and so the Philosopher says that in these beings there is generation because of the constitution of the species. But generation of individuals cannot be unless, through the action of these, one is agent and one patient. And because of this, even though a female is not intended by the nature of the species, yet it is intended by a nature, namely, that of the universal, which is to continue the species in being.

            But a universal among things generated by putrefaction does not require many supposita in act, but only in potency. The reason is that no individual is found among these that can always remain, nor indeed is anything in the species active. But a species of this sort cannot be preserved except through some individual. Therefore it is necessary to assume a succession of individuals, so that the nature of the species is preserved in such a way that when one is corrupted, another is generated. Thus the universal found in these, although it does not have unchanging supposita in act, yet it necessarily has many in potency.

            Among sempiternal things, too, there are two genera of beings. One is corporeal sempiternal substance, the other incorporeal sempiternal substance, which is abstracted from motion and matter. In corporeal sempiternal substances there are not many individuals in act, nor in potency, for if there were potential there for many, that potential would be ordered to something impossible. Therefore, there cannot be many suns and many moons, and the reason for this is that in those in which there is a plurality of individuals the cause of multiplication is that all the matter devoted to that species is not taken up in one individual, and again because the individual is not such that the form of one individual can produce the appetite for the matter of the species. Now in sempiternal things all the matter devoted to the species is taken up in one individual, and under its form. And the form of one individual produces the whole appetite for matter, as occurs in the sun. Aside from the sun, nothing is found that is in potency to the form of the sun, and so all the matter is taken up in one individual, and its form produces the appetite for matter. Again, when it is under the form, it does not have an appetite to be under any other, nor is any privation mixed in there. And the same is true of the earth, the moon, and so on. And so there is no multiplication of individuals among these, either according to act or potency. But in certain others there is multiplication according to act, and in yet others according to potency, as we have seen.

            But you will ask why it is thus in corporeal things, that one individual should take up the whole nature of a species, and not this(??). I say it is because those approximate most closely to that which is most one and most perfect, and so furnishes their nature so that those are incorruptible both in species and in the individual, and that lower things are corruptible, at least according to the individual. But even though in sempiternal things a multitude of supposita is not found either according to act or according to potency, yet it may well be that a multitude of supposita is still to be found according to aptitude, for being in many is not contradictory to form alone, and therefore we say that it is suited by nature because it is not contradictory to it. And it does not follow, then, that it has aptitude to this and therefore it has potency, as is clear in the case of a blind human being, for a blind is suited by nature to seeing, but does not have the potency to see, for due to his privation etc. But in incorporeal sempiternal substances a multitude of supposita is not found according to act, nor according to potency, nor according to aptitude, for every multitude of supposita is from a division of matter, and division of matter arises from the ability of quantity to have parts, and so, since there is no quantifiable matter in these, neither is a multitude of supposita found in them in any way, according to the Philosopher, although perhaps the opposite is in truth to be maintained. Hence Rabbi Moses says that in these no distinction is found except that between cause and caused. And the author of De Causis agrees with this, saying that it knows intelligibles above itself because it is caused by them, and it knows things below them because it is the cause of these, this distinction being only between causes and the caused.

            But you will ask in what way these are universals? I hold that they are universal because they are in act multiple, whence the Philosopher in De anima III says that everything separated is in act understanding and understood, and so they are universals in act. Whence, the formula of universality in these and in inferior things are very far apart. But up to now the question does not seem to concern this definition, for the question is whether, concerning the formula of universal whence the universal is such that it has a multitude of supposita, perhaps concerning the formula of universal whence universal is what has a multiplicity of supposita according to aptitude, but according to act or potency, for something is universal due to this, that it is in act absolutely, aside from conditions of individuation. But such absoluteness is possible if many are not found either according to act or potency, as I can understand substance alone aside from quantity and all such accidents. An absolute concept makes the formula of universal wherefore aptitude alone is required for the formula of universal to many. And if you say there is no aptitude to many in separate substances, I reply that the formula of universal is otherwise in these and in the others, as was said.

            In response to the arguments, to the first I reply that all these definitions conclude well enough that concerning the formula of universal there is an aptitude to many. Whence the Philosopher says elsewhere it is apt by nature to be predicated of many. And if you reply that what contradicts the act contradicts the aptitude, therefore when the act for many contradicts something the aptitude for many contradicts it, I answer that the major premise is false. For not every aptitude is ordered to act.

            It must be replied to the second that in the way it is a whole, thus it does have parts according to potency. And it if it is a whole in act, it has parts in act, and if in aptitude, it has parts in aptitude, and when it is said that a universal is a whole, this is true according to aptitude, as was said.

            To the other, when it is argued that in those having form in matter there is also a multitude of individuals under on species through the matter, it must be said that if the major premise is taken universally, it is false, because some have form in matter, by which the matter is in potency to form and not to privation of form, and in such, a multitude of individuals under one species is not required because of matter, and in such, one and the same in number can remain sempiternally. But others have a form in matter by which it is in potency to form and to privation of form, and in these a multiplication of individuals according to matter under one species is required, since one in number cannot remain sempiternally.

Question 37

            Next it is asked whether a genus requires a multitude of species.

            And it is argued that it does not, since just as the species is related to the individual, so the genus to the species, for in both cases there is a relation of the universal whole to its part. But a species does not require a multitude of individuals in act, therefore neither does a genus.

            Again, an integral whole differs from a universal whole, as the Philosopher intends it in Metaphysics V, since the universal whole has parts of which every one is its own whole. But an integral whole has parts of which none is its own whole, as is obvious in the case of a house. But genus is related to species as the universal whole to its parts, therefore the nature of a genus etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued it is of the formula of a whole to have parts, but genus is a certain whole, therefore a multitude of species is required for the nature of a genus.

            It must be understood that there are two things to consider in genus, namely its essence and its being. If it is considered according to its essence it does not require a multitude of species, and what is more, no species pertains to its essence, neither one nor many. And it is like this because genus contracts to its species through contrary differences. But no difference belongs to the essence of a genus, since genus is related to differences as matter is to form, and subject to accidents, but form is not of the essence of natter, nor accidents of the essence of subject, therefore neither are differences of the essence of genus. And since a genus is determined to its species through their differences, a species will be outside the formula of the genus, both one and many.

            But someone night say that genus considered according to its essence is nothing other than every one of its species. How is it, then, that its species are not of its essence? I reply that unity is found in the genus, and not unity in form, but unity in concept and formula. Then, even though what is one in form can be made many through diversity in number, still it is impossibile that one and the same form be made diverse through diverse species, for then one thing essentially would be many essentially. And, therefore, when we assume the genus is made many through many different species it is obvious that genus is not one in form and essence, so that by the name genus many, or at least two, realities are conveyed, and these several realities agree under one common concept in the intellect. For the intellect certainly attributes the formula of genus to then. And this concept of the soul is taken from something appearing in reality, in such a way that different essences are conveyed through the genus under a common formula, which is a certain formula common to things different in species. And from this it is obvious that a species does not pertain to the essence of a genus as such. For what pertains to the essence of a genus as such is something one in formula that is found in many in species, but no species, whether one or many considered in their proper natures, can have such a common formula through which species can be found in things diverse in species. And so neither one nor several species pertain to the formula of genus as such. Nonetheless, every species has a common formula in the genus, but to consider a species thus is to consider the nature of the genus and not the nature of the species.

            But if it is considered in its own being, this can occur in two ways, either this will be according to the being it has in the soul, or the being it has in the reality outside the soul. In the first way, many species are not required. For just as neither one species nor many pertain to the essence of the genus, neither do they pertain to the understood essence of the genus, for the disposition of a thing is the same in being and truth. If it is considered according to the being it has in the thing outside, it requires a multitude of species not in act, but in potency. For although a genus is suited to be divided through opposed differences the genus of necessity exists under one or the other of the opposed differences. For the subject existing under one of the contraries is in potency as such under the other. And since differences are formal causes of things in respect of species, it must be held in a similar way of the genus in respect of the species. And so genus, as far as its being outside the soul is concerned, requires a multitude of species in potency. Thus it is clear in what way a multitude of species is required for the nature of the genus, and in what way it is not.

            Now we must reply to the arguments. To the first, I answer that there is a certain similitude. There is a similitude because just as the species can be preserved in one individual, so the genus can be preserved in one species; and just as the species is predicated in quid of an individual, so the genus is predicated in quid of the species. But there is a dissimilitude as well, since the genus, through its differences, is determined to its species through differences that are received on the part of a form having a contrary. And so it is necessary that since a genus is under one species, it be required that it can be under another, for if one of the contraries is innate, the other also will be of necessity. And so, since a genus is determined to its species through differences, it necessarily has potency as such under both. But a species is determined to the individual through matter, and matter as such is contrary to nothing, and so, by the formula of contrariety there is no cause why species requires a multitude of individuals. Indeed, it happens that there are individuals that always remain, since when the matter is under that individual it is not in potency as such under another, and such are the sun and moon, therefore etc., as has been seen.

            In response to the other argument, when it is said, “genus is a universal whole," I grant this. And so every species is that which is the genus in reality, etc. It is said, therefore, “it can be sufficiently preserved in one species,” and this is true in act, and the reason has been given.

Question 38

            Next it is asked whether one who cognizes every particular triangle to have three angles equal to two right angles cognizes triangle to have three angles etc.

            And it is argued that he does since whenever things are related to one another as relatives, when one is cognized the other is cognized, for whenever one of two relatives is cognized, etc. But all particular triangles is convertible with triangle said universally. Therefore etc.

            On the other hand, the Philosopher says that even though someone demonstrates of isosceles and the rest that it has three etc., he does not demonstrate of triangle that it has three etc., except sophistically.

            I reply to this that one who cognizes every particular triangle to have three etc.—speaking of knowledge without qualification, since for someone to know the passion of the subject it is necessary that he know through the formula proper to the subject, and not through any accident, but the formula of every particular triangle is accidental to the formula of triangle in common, indeed, their formula is outside the formula of triangle in common--therefore one who cognizes every particular triangle to have three etc. does not cognize triangle to have three through the formula proper to triangle.

            But someone will claim, the Commentator says on Metaphysics II that universals are by the formula of mixture with universals, for they inhere more strongly in their particulars than accidents in their subjects. But from the cognition of proper accidents the intellect arrives at the cognition of the subject. So all the more from the cognition of its particulars will we arrive at a cognition of the universal, and so knowing that every particular triangle has three etc. one knows triangle to have three etc. Now it is true that no accident that is per se, primary and in its own power leads to a quidditative cognition of a substance, but it is also true that from its operation we sometimes arrive at a <non-quidditative> cognition of a substance. So, when, in an animal the operation of sensing is apparent, and this operation cannot be reduced to matter, nor does it sense in its dimensions, nor in its first qualities, since in that case fire would sense that it is hot, nor in posterior qualities. And so we reduce it to some substantial form, therefore the intellect runs in this way from the operation to a cognition of the substance from which such an operation arises. And not from everything, nor in every way, does one arrive at a cognition of the substance, but only as it is the cause of that operation. Do you have, in this way, an essential concept of the substance? I maintain you do not, for sometimes you understand one subject in relation to another subject, and in the matter at hand, I hold in the same way that particulars by their own power do not lead to a cognition of the universal. You say, by the power of what, then, <do they lead to the cognition of the universal>? I hold that it is by the power of the agent intellect, for the agent intellect, seeing every particular to agree in one common nature, abstracts this nature from every principle of individuation, and produces the universal. Whence the Philosopher says well enough that one who cognizes every particular triangle to have three etc. cognizes without qualification that triangle has three, considered as triangle, but perhaps he does so accidentally <and not in virtue of cognizing every particular triangle>.

            In reply to the arguments, to the first I answer that relatives are said in two ways, for they are said according to substance, and according to being, according to substance, as definition and the defined, and according to being, as universal and particular. Whoever, then, cognizes how to define one relative cognizes how to define the other. And whoever cognizes a relative according to being does not necessarily cognize the other except according to being. And so, since all particulars in being are together the same as the universal and convertible with it, one who knows every particular knows the universal according to the being that it has in the eternal reality. But this cognition of the universal is not a cognition of it according to its substance, for, indeed, the universal according to its substance, and all its particulars taken together, are not convertible, nor are they relatives in respect of one another. So one who cognizes every triangle to have three etc. does not cognize without qualification, concerning triangle according to its substance, that it has three etc. And that is how the Philosopher understood this.

Question 39

            Next it is asked whether the genus taken in its commonness is predicated of the species, for instance, if animal taken in its commonness is predicated of human being.

            And it is argued that it is not, since if animal in its commonness can be predicated of human being, then human being is not contrary to whatever animal is not contrary to in its commonness. But donkey is not contrary to animal in its commonness, so neither is human being. So this will be true, “A human being is a donkey.”

            Again, in an affirmative proposition the predicate is the same in number with the subject, but animal taken in its commonness is not the same in number with human being, therefore etc. Proof of the minor premise: according to the Philosopher in Topics I one in number is said in three ways, namely one by definition, one by property, and one by accident. But animal in its commonness is not a property or an accident of human being. Proof that it is also not one definition: since a definition is convertible with the defined, and animal in its commonness is not convertible with human being, therefore etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued that nothing that is not taken in its commonness can be predicated of another as its genus, but animal is predicated of human being as its genus, therefore as such as it is taken in its commonness.

            It must be understood that two things are conveyed by the name of genus, namely the intention of genus and the reality subject to that intention. And when we say it is predicated of the species, that the intention of the genus is predicated is not to be understood, for that which is predicated of its part is something existing in it. But the intention of the genus is not like this, for it is only in the soul, for if it were outside the soul then something restrained to the intellect would flow outside it, which is false, for no logical intention flows outside, since it is restricted to the intellect. Because of this, when we say of a genus that it is predicated of a species, this must be understood concerning the reality subject to the intention.

            But next, it must be understood that a term predicates what it signifies, and nothing else. Now name and definition signify the same thing, for the formula of which the name is a sign is a definition, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics IV. And therefore that which a definition of a reality indicates is what the term makes subject, and predicates, and that which the definition of animal indicates is this animated sensible substance. Thus, in saying “a human being is animal,” nothing is said but “a human being is an animate sensible substance.” Whence the intention is not predicated, but the reality is predicated to which the intention is applicable, while the intention remains within the soul.

            But is animal predicated as it is superior and common and universal? I hold that it is not. For although that which is predicated is common, it is not predicated as it is common, the reason for which is that commonness, universality and the intention of genus do not happen to animal except insofar as animal is understood. And this is obvious, since Avicenna says that natural realities have accidents in accord with two manners of being. For material realities have being outside the soul, and in accord with this manner of being such accidents belongs to then as white and black. And such realities also have being in the soul, and in accord with this manner such accidents belong to then as being in a genus, and being a species, and so on. From this it is clear that such accidents as being a genus or being universal do not agree with animal except insofar as it is understood, and it happens that this predication is accidental, “A human being is an animal insofar as it is understood,” for the predicate is affirmed of the subject under an accident. Now it is obvious that being a genus and being a species are accidents of animal and human being, and so if the genus is predicated of the species per se, it is not to be held that animal is predicated of human being insofar as it is a genus, nor inasmuch as it is common. What, then, is predicated there is common, but it is not predicated insofar as it is common, nor insofar as it is a genus.

            But someone will reply, “what animal signifies is something as it is undetermined, a singular as it is common, therefore animal signifies something as it is common, therefore that which it signifies it also predicates, and conversely, and therefore in predicating animal of human being one predicates something as it is common,” I answer that when we say that “animal” signifies something undetermined, I believe that “undetermined” is neither included in what “animal” signifies nor in its node of signification. But the nature of animal as it is signified through “animal” is neither determined nor undetermined. And the reason for this is that what agrees with a nature does so insofar as it agrees with everything participating in it, as is obvious with having three angles etc. in the case a triangle. If, then, you say that the formula of the undetermined agrees with animal as it is thus signified <through “animal”>, then it agrees with human being as well, for human being will be undetermined to several species, since animal is predicated essentially of human being. Hence “animal” does not signify indeterminately in such a way that determination or indetermination falls within its formula.

            But you will answer, “why do we say, then, that animal signifies something indeterminately?” I reply that the intellect grasping the nature of animal as such grasps it as indifferent to it several species. And so we say that it signifies indeterminately in regard of its several species, and because of this it must be held that, since a term predicates what the same term signifies, and since “animal” signifies something common, when it is predicated of human being something common is predicated. But it is not predicated as common, for “animal” does not signify as common. Indeed, if we attend only to what it signifies, we hold that it does not signify anything except the being of animal in the <actually existing, individual> composite, as every concrete name does. And so it is obvious that universality and particularity belong to this formula accidentally.

            In response to the arguments, to the first, when it is argued, “if animal is taken” etc., I reply that it does not follow, since animal is not common to donkey and human being as this suggests it is, that is, in act, but rather in potency. For that which signifies animal signifies that human being does not differ from donkey, and “human being” and “donkey” signify these natures as distinct from one another. And therefore human being cannot be predicated of donkey, for it signifies something as distinct from donkey. But you will say, “whatever are the same as one and the same are themselves the same. But the animal said of human being is the same in number with human being, and the animal said of donkey is the same in number with donkey, therefore the human being and donkey are themselves the same.” I reply that whatever are the same as one and same determinately are themselves the same. But human being and donkey are not the same in number as animal determinately, hut indeterminately, and so being the same in number here is nothing but being the same in genus. And so it is not necessary that they be themselves the same <in number>.

            To the other argument, it must be replied that the animal that is predicated stands in its commonness, and yet is the same in number as human being. And these both hold at the same time, but they could not hold at the same time if the animal predicated of human being were predicated of itself as common, and it would stand as common. And this is denied, for something common is predicated, but not as common.

            In reply to the other, when it is argued, “either it is the same in definition” etc., I hold that animal is the same as human being in definition inasmuch as it pertains to the definition and whatness of human being.

Question 40

            Next it is asked whether one can know a necessary conclusion through a contingent middle term.

            And it is argued that one can, since this is necessary, “the noon is eclipsed,” and yet the middle term is contingent, namely the interposition of the earth.

            The Philosopher intends the opposite view.

            I reply to the question that contingent middle term is two-fold. In one way it is contingent in itself and in respect of a conclusion, and such is “that white thing” in respect of this conclusion, that it has three etc. And a necessary conclusion cannot be shown through such a middle term, for to know is to cognize through the cause, and the cause being removed the effect is removed as well. No if a contingent middle is removed the necessary conclusion is not removed, so this middle cannot be the cause of the necessary conclusion.

            Another kind of middle term is neither contingent in itself nor in respect of the conclusion, and such is triangle having an extrinsic angle in respect of having three angles equal to two right angles. And yet another kind of middle term is contingent in itself, but necessary in respect of the conclusion, and such is the interposition of the earth between the sun and the moon. This is contingent in itself, since it sometimes occurs and sometimes does not. But it is necessary in respect of this conclusion, “the moon is eclipsed,” for if we assume the interposition of the earth it is necessary to assume an eclipse, and if the moon be removed the eclipse is also removed. And it is obvious that we can perfectly well know a conclusion through such a middle term.

            But you will object, “it cannot be known if we speak of knowing without qualification.” I believe it cannot, since what is known without qualification has perpetual being, and it is impossible for it to be otherwise. But the moon is not perpetually eclipsed, and it is possible that it be otherwise, for the eclipse can occur, and it can also fail to occur. And again, it cannot be demonstrated with a demonstration without qualification, using that middle term, that is, the interposition of the earth. And Grosseteste says this, that it is not necessarily the case that the noon is eclipsed. For it is obvious that a particular eclipse lis not always occurring. Again, the universal cannot remain if there is not some one of the individuals <falling under it>, and so, since there is not always a particular eclipse, eclipse taken universally does not remain.

            “And Grosseteste contradicts himself,” you will claim, “since he says that it is universal, and yet is not always so. For are not universals perpetual if they are to be preserved as completely universal?” And he responds that it is absurd to assume such a universal not to be because a quidditative universal indicates a nature subject universality. Now a lunar eclipse is universal because it does not indicate any nature, but rather a defect of nature, for it is more a non-being than a being. And to assume such universals not to be is not absurd, and so he says that there is neither demonstration nor knowledge without qualification of eclipse. It is only the necessary without qualification of which there can be knowledge without qualification.

            In response to the argument, when it is argued, “this middle term is contingent, the interposition of the earth, etc.”, this is true in itself, that in respect of this conclusion, that the moon is eclipsed, it is necessary, so that, given the interposition of the earth, it is impossible that an eclipse should not occur.

Question 41

            Next we ask--since the Philosopher says that the destruction of knowledge can occur either through the destruction of the knower, or of the knowable, or of the middle term —whether knowledge is destroyed when the reality is.

            That it seems not to be—for given the causes the effect occurs, therefore if the causes are cognized, so is the effect. But if the knowable does not exist, its cause can still be known. For instance, one can know the cause of rain when rain has been destroyed. Therefore etc.

            Again, when being agrees with a reality in two ways, of which one does not depend on the other, when a reality is destroyed with respect to one way of being, it need not be destroyed with respect to the other. But being in an external reality and being in the soul are two ways of being of which one does not depend on the other. Therefore if knowables are destroyed according to eternal being, they need not be destroyed as they are in the soul. But their being in the soul is their cognition by the soul. Therefore etc.

            On the other hand, the Philosopher takes the other side in Metaphysics V, on . . . Again, the Philosopher says in the beginning that it is necessary to presuppose concerning the subject what it is and that it is. Therefore if it is destroyed in respect of its being it will also be destroyed as regards one’s knowing it.

            It must be understood that by “knowable” we can understand here that which is known, that is, the conclusion of a demonstration. For understanding and knowledge differ, for knowledge is of conclusions, but understanding of principles. And therefore one can understand by “knowable” what is known.

            Again, by “knowable” one can understand that concerning which it is known, as, for instance, the subject of a science. speaking of a knowable in the first way, I hold that if the knowable is destroyed the knowledge is destroyed, the reason for which is that the real knowable does not refer in itself to knowledge, but rather knowledge to it. For there are certain relations, according the commentator on De Anima II, that are founded on substances both of which exist, for instance, father and son, double and half, and some on one existing substance alone, and such are measure and measurable, knowledge and knowable, for knowledge is referred per se to a knowable, but a knowable is not referred per se to knowledge. Then I argue that that to which something is referred per se, if that be destroyed to which it is referred per se, it is itself destroyed. But knowledge is referred per se to a knowable, so if the knowable is destroyed, the knowledge is necessarily destroyed.

            Again, it appears to be so thus: knowledge is nothing other than a formula informing the intellect considered in respect of its relation to the reality itself, hence its conformity to the reality is required. But if the knowable be destroyed, which is the conclusion of the demonstration, then there could not be adequation of knowledge to reality. It is argued that if, the knowable being destroyed, the knowledge is not destroyed, it follows . . . or that knowledge is a false habit, and so if a triangle is assumed having three etc., it is clear that the knowledge is destroyed when this knowable through which it is known that a triangle has three etc. is. For knowledge is a formula existing in the intellect considered in respect of its conformity to a reality. Hence, since knowledge includes these two, some have held that is in the genus of relation (ad aliquid), and so is in the genus of quality.

            But if that subject of which something is known is understood by “knowable,” I reply thus: that if the knowable is destroyed as regards something that agrees with it in itself, knowledge is destroyed. But if it is destroyed as regards its being outside <its essence>, it is not necessary that knowledge of it be destroyed.

            The reply to the first argument is apparent thus. If the knowable is destroyed as regards that which agrees with it in itself, the middle term is destroyed, which is the proper formula of that knowable. But if the middle term, which is the proper formula of the knowable, be destroyed, the knowledge is destroyed, for this is the cause of knowledge, and if the cause is destroyed, so is the effect. so if the knowable is destroyed as regard that which agrees with it per se, knowledge of it is destroyed. And so, if it be assumed that a triangle is destroyed as regards its whatness, it is obvious that that knowledge will be destroyed through which it is known that a triangle has three etc.

            In the same way, if the whatness of human being be destroyed, so is the knowledge through which it is known that a human being is a rational animal. But if the knowable is destroyed as regards its being outside itself, knowledge of the knowable is not destroyed because of this. And the reason is that such being and not being are accidents of the reality. For what it is neither is nor is not in virtue of what it is, as Avicenna proves in his Metaphysics in the chapter on universals. For if it is <in virtue of what it is> it cannot not be. <fit is not <in virtue of what it is> it cannot be through anything, nor through any cause other than itself, since in virtue of itself it is not. Since, then, it does not belong to the concept of a nature to understand things separated from being in it, therefore the intellect can understand a whatness without understanding it to be or not to be. Then it is argued that a reality is only suited to be known from principles that include its whatness. So if the reality is destroyed as regards one of its accidents, it is not necessary that knowledge of it be destroyed, but if the reality is destroyed as regards its being outside the soul, it is only destroyed as regards some accident. Therefore if a reality is destroyed as regards some being outside the soul, it is not necessary that knowledge of it be destroyed. And this is what Aegidius of Rome says on On Coming-to-be and Passing-away I, that realities have such being in themselves, in their causes, <and> in the intellect, and if a. reality is destroyed as regards its being in itself, it need not be destroyed as regards the being it has in its causes. But it is through such being that knowledge of a reality is possessed, and so if a reality is destroyed as regards its being outside the soul, nonetheless, knowledge is not necessarily destroyed.

Question 42

            Next it is asked whether there can be knowledge and definition of corruptible things.

            And it is argued that there can be, for there can be knowledge and definition of natural realities For otherwise we would not have knowledge of natural realities. But natural realities are destructible, since every natural reality has matter, which is the principle of destruction. Therefore etc.

            Again, knowledge is a habit that is always true, therefore there is knowledge of those things of which there can be a habit that is always true. But there can be a habit that is always true of singulars, for I can have this habit concerning Socrates, “Socrates is Socrates,” and this is always true. Therefore etc.

            The opposite is clear from the Philosopher. And it is argued in this way--since knowledge is always of the existing and of perpetual things, but singulars are not always, since, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics VII, when singulars are not present to the senses there is some doubt whether they are or are not; therefore etc.

            In response to the question, I answer that knowledge and definition are not of a reality as it is universal, nor as it is singular, but concerns the reality absolutely considered. The proof is there is not knowledge concerning the reality as it is universal because being universal is accidental to realities, and knowledge is of nothing through what is accidental to it, therefore etc. The minor premise is obvious from the Philosopher, Metaphysics VII, against Plato. For he says that universal is accidental to a reality. Nor is there knowledge of the reality as it is particular, of the options remaining, but a reality as it is particular is corruptible; therefore etc. But knowledge concerns the reality absolutely considered, since it is of that which is neither comes to be nor is destroyed. But the what it is of a thing, taken absolutely, is neither generated nor destroyed, therefore etc. Proof of the minor premise: For everything that comes to be comes to be from matter appropriate to it, and a form appropriate to it, and an agent appropriate to it. If, then, what it is comes to be , it comes to be from matter and a form proportionate to it, and such matter and such a form are not determined to this or that, and by the agent absolutely considered, not by this or that. But thus the coming to be of the first is impossible. Therefore etc.

            Again, if the essence comes to be per se, when Socrates comes to be every human being comes to be. But the consequent is false The inference is clearly valid, since the essence of a nature agrees in itself with everything participating in its nature, but the essence of a human being agrees with every suppositum of human being, therefore if Socrates comes to be every human being comes to be. Therefore the Philosopher says in Metaphysics VII that the essence does not come to be absolutely, but it comes to be in this that is of the essence. Therefore, there is no definition or knowledge of a reality as it is universal or as it is particular, but only of a reality absolutely considered.

            But you will answer, “you hold that there is no definition or knowledge of the reality as it is universal, or as it is particular, so why does the Philosopher says that definition and knowledge are more of the universal than of particulars?” It must be replied to the first that there is no definition or knowledge of universals as they are universals, but it is true that knowledge and definition are certain things in the intellect, and so they do not coincide with any thing except those which are suited to be grasped by the intellect, and every one inasmuch as it is graspable by the intellect has to that extent the formula of a universal. To the second it must be replied that there are two ways to consider Socrates, as essence and as the essence of a human being as it is related to accidents, that is, as Socrates is here and now through the what it is of human being. The what it is absolutely considered Socrates is a human being, and through the what it is of a human being as it is related to accidents Socrates is not human being absolutely considered, but this human being. Now Socrates inasmuch as he is human being is not destroyed, but rather inasmuch as he is this human being, whence the whatness of human being in Socrates as it is absolutely considered is not destroyed, but only as it is related to accidents. And since the whatness of human being in Socrates as it is related to accidents is the whatness of Socrates as Socrates, we say that when Socrates is destroyed the whatness of Socrates is. And so when it is said, “when Socrates is destroyed, the what it is destroyed,” this is true of the what it is of Socrates as it is related to accidents. And since it is necessary that those of which there is definition and knowledge should remain, therefore there is neither knowledge nor definition of the singular considered as Socrates. So, for instance, a copper triangle has three etc., and insofar as it is copper it does not remain, but insofar as it is triangle it does. In the same way, this Socrates insofar as he is this human being does not always remain, but Socrates insofar as is human being always remains. And since knowledge is of things as they remain, I grant that knowledge of Socrates as human being is not corrupted, but it is necessary that it always remain.

            In response to the first argument, then, there is knowledge of natural realities in respect of what they are absolutely considered, not as universals or particulars, and when it is said that natural things are destructible, it is true with respect to their being outside the soul.

            In response to the other argument, it must be replied that the fallacy of the consequent is found there. For wherever there is knowledge there is a true habit, but not everywhere where there is a true habit is there knowledge. For there is a true habit of a first principle, but not knowledge of it. And when it is said there that a habit can always be true of a corruptible thing, for instance, of Socrates that Socrates is always Socrates, I reply that this is not knowledge of Socrates, since there is no knowledge strictly speaking of things per se in the first way, for knowledge is only of the conclusion. But what is per se in the first way does not have the formula of a conclusion in a demonstration. And therefore there is no knowledge strictly speaking of these, so that I say that there is no knowledge strictly speaking of this, “Socrates is Socrates,” but only understanding, nor of any proposition per se in the first way. But you will reply, “from what you have said it follows that there is a more noble cognition of particulars than knowledge, namely understanding.” I answer that it is one thing to say “Socrates” and another to say “Socrates is Socrates.” Now of Socrates there is neither knowledge, nor understanding, nor definition. Of this, however, “Socrates is Socrates,” there is understanding and knowledge, but not knowledge strictly speaking, but only understanding, as was said.

Question 43

            “QUESTIONS ARE EQUAL IN NUMBER ETC.” Concerning this second book, first it is asked whether this proposition is true, questions are equal etc. And this is to ask whether the number of questions attains completely to the number of knowables.

            And it seems that it does not, for if it does, then there is knowledge concerning everything concerning which there is a question; but this is false since there is surely a question about a non-being, but there is no knowledge about this. Again, there is surely a question about first principles, since doubts have been raised about first principles, yet there is still no knowledge of first principles.

            Again, those that we cognize beforehand we do not raise questions about, since questions are not raised about what is cognized beforehand, for a cognition beforehand is not a question. But what we cognize beforehand we truly know, therefore we truly know something that we don’t raise questions about, and so there will not be questions equal in number to those things we truly know.

            Again, concerning separated substances there is no question, and yet there is knowledge about these, therefore there is knowledge concerning some things about which there is no question; therefore etc. The major premise is obvious from the Philosopher, in Metaphysics VII, who says that there is no question about simple things. Now separated substances are simple substances, therefore there is no question about them.

            On the other hand, <that the number of questions is equal to the number of things we know> is clear from the Philosopher’s saying that questions are equal in number to what we know.

            It must be replied to this that questions are equal in number to what we know, since everything known to us was once in part known and in part unknown, and all such can have questions raised about them. For whoever asks, doubts, and everyone who doubts is midway between the ignorant and the knower. And therefore it is said that in every question it is necessary to presuppose something, and to ask something, and so everything about which a question is raised is in part known, and in part unknown. It is well done, then, when the Philosopher investigates the number of knowables together with the number of things about which questions can be raised.

            But it must be understood that some intend to make the number of questions the same as the number of things knowable through demonstration. And their reason is that every question is about things with a middle term, having a cause, for the Philosopher says next that every question is a question about the middle term, and a cause is the same as a middle term. And therefore they hold that every question is about what has a middle term and a cause, but all those that have a middle term are knowable through demonstration, and therefore they maintain that only of such knowables are there questions. But if this is true, there is no question “What is it?” or “Is it anything?” This is not known through demonstration, but is possessed before every demonstration. If, then, a question is only about what is first known through demonstration, the questions what it is and if it is anything are not questions, which is opposed to the Philosopher, who holds that there are four questions, namely whether it is <i.e. whether it has some passion>, what it is, etc. And also, this that they say, that there is no question about immediate things, is false, since there is a question about first principles, and about separated substances. And as for this that they affirm, that every question is a question about the middle term, they don’t understand the Philosopher aright. For it is not called a question about the middle term because it seeks out a middle term, for only one question seeks out the middle term, the question “because of what?” But every question thus seeks a middle term because if the middle term is known, then every question is resolved. For if the middle term of demonstration is known, which is the what of the subject, the subject is immediately cognized. But once this is cognized, it is cognized if it is anything, and once this is cognized it is cognized what passion is in the subject <i.e. whether it is> and because of what it inheres. so if the subject is cognized, every question is resolved.

            But you will reply, “What is the middle term in demonstration?” I answer that that it is the what it is of the subject, or the definition indicating the what it is of the subject, and if what the subject is is cognized, it is cognized if it is anything, that is, it is any essence. Again, it is cognized whether any passion is it, since the what it is of the subject is the cause of the passion, and so it is cognized whether it is. Again, if this is cognized, it is cognized because of what the passion is in the subject. If you reply, “The Philosopher says below that every question seeks the cause, and the cause and the middle term are the same; therefore every question seeks the middle term,” I answer that it is true that every question seeks the cause, but it does not necessarily seek the cause under the formula of cause, but only the question because of what seeks this, since the other questions seek that which is the cause. For instance, the question if it is anything seeks that which is the cause, for it seeks the essence of the reality. But this essence is the middle term and the cause. But it does not seek the cause under the formula of cause and middle term.

            This must be maintained then in another way, so that the Philosopher takes the number of questions to attain to the number of knowables in general. But it must be understood that some are knowables that are only known through demonstration, and such are the conclusions of demonstration But some are known by being cognized before every demonstration, and thus are first principles cognized. Therefore it must be held that the number of questions attains to the number of knowables in the second way, but not in the first way, by his saying that the questions are “equal in number to these, whatever, truly, we cognize.” And so this “truly” is not exposited adverbially, i.e. as “whatever we truly cognize”, but conjunctively <i.e. as “whatever, truly (indeed), we cognize”>. Hence the Greek translation has “whatever, indeed, we cognize,” and this seems to be the intention of the author in this passage. Of knowables, some are known through the whole demonstration, and it is known in this way whether it is, that is, whether a passion is in the subject. Some are known through the middle of demonstration, and it is known in this because of what <the passion is in the subject>. For the middle term is the cause why the passion is in the subject. But some are known through the definition, which is the middle term, but not inasmuch as it is the middle term. For instance, what it is is not known through demonstration, nor through the middle term, but through the definition, which is the middle term. For definition is an expression indicating what a reality is, and it does not indicate being or non-being. And in the same way, if it is <anything>, for if it is known what it is, it is known if it is <anything>. whence Alfarabi says that the question if it is is not settled through the proposition caused, but through a certain conditional, so, if it is cognized what it is it is cognized if it is. And I do not speak of being in actuality. Hence Albert says this, that questions are equal in number to these that we know, questions, I say, not according to natter and number, for such are many more than what we know, as we can ask about contingent and future things, and others, but according to species, which reduce to four. Hence every knower either knows what it is or if it is or whether it is or because of what it is. In the same way, everyone asking a question either asks what it is or because of what it is or if it is or whether it is.

            In response to the arguments, in response to the first I deny the major premise. Next, when you say, “concerning a non-being” etc., I reply that we can take non-being in two ways, either as a non-being without qualification, and concerning such there is no knowledge, nor any question, or we can take non-being as non-being in actuality, but as being in its causes, and concerning such a non-being there is knowledge as well as a question. And when the Philosopher says that knowing what is not does not occur, it is true of what in no way is.

            In response to the second argument, I reply that there is a question concerning first principles, and when you say that there is no knowledge about these, I reply that it is true that there is no knowledge about these strictly speaking, but said of these, it is knowledge said generally.

            In response to the third argument, when it is claimed that what we cognize beforehand we do not ask about, I reply that this is false. For one can know that a triangle has three etc., and knowing this, one can ask about the triangle if it is, and after awhile, having the cognition if it is, one might well as whether a triangle has three etc. Hence there surely is both question and knowledge about the same thing.

            To the last argument I reply that it is true that the Philosopher says in the end of Metaphysics VII that there is no question in simple things, since they don’t have one part and another, for it is necessary to ask something and to suppose something. Therefore in simple things as such there is no question. Hence, considering then according to their natures, in this way there is no question about them, but they can be considered as they are causes of certain effects, for instance, of the motions <of the heavens>. Thus they can be cognized according to something, for instance, according to their operations, and according to something else, for instance, according to their substances, they may be unknown. And therefore there can be knowledge concerning these as such, and a question as well.

Question 44

            Next it is asked whether if it is is a question assuming more than one.

            And it is argued that it is, since a question which asks about the inherence of one to another is a question assuming more than one. But the question if it is is a question asking about the inherence of one to another. Therefore etc. The major premise is obvious, for where there is an inherence of one to another there is a relation of two to one another, and consequently there is number.

            Again, that is a question assuming more than one in which what is asked and that about which it is asked are different in essence. But in the question if it is what is asked and that about which it is asked, namely being and that of which the being is, are different in essence. The proof is that one comprehends one distinctly without the other. Therefore, etc.

            Again, the question if it is is a question either about the subject or about the passion. It is not about the subject, since one does not ask if it is concerning this, rather it is necessary to cognize that beforehand. Therefore it is a question about the passion. But a question about the passion is not simple, but concerns the subject. Therefore, etc.

            On the other hand, the Philosopher says that the question if it is is a question about a simple and not one assuming more than one.

            It must be understood that the question if it is is a question about a simple, and not a question assuming more than one. And that it is a question is explained thus: in every question it is necessary that something be assumed and something unknown, for everyone who raises a question doubts, and one who doubts is in the middle between one who knows and one who does not. He recognizes something about the reality and is ignorant of something else. So in every question something is known and something is unknown. But in the question if it is there is something assumed. For it is assumed that what is signified by the mark has being a subject and it is not known whether it is any essence or nature. And so the question if it is is a question.

            But, then, isn’t it a question presupposing more than one? This must be understood, that everything that can be asked about is knowable and every knowable can be expressed in an affirmation or denial (enuntiatio)—for every knowable is true or false—and so every question goes back to some manner of affirming or denying. But there are two ways to affirm or deny, one in which the word “is” is predicated as a second adjacent, the other in which the word “is” is a third adjacent. And everything which is referred to in that way of affirming or denying in which the word “is” is predicated as a third adjacent is a question assuming more than one, as long as what is asked and that about which it is asked differ in essence.

            But someone will say, “According to your view a question and an affirmation or denial are the same in their subject. So, if a question and affirmation or denial are the same in subject, since every affirmation or denial is composite, therefore every question is composite; which is false according to the Philosopher. It is false, then, to say that every question leads back to an affirmation or denial.”

            I reply that there is a composite formula in every question, since there is something known and something unknown in every question, but it is not necessary on this account that every question be a question assuming more than one. Proof: Since wherever there is a question assuming more than one, that which is asked there is different in essence from that about which it is asked, for instance, whether human being is able to laugh, although it is not said without qualification that each is different from the essence of the other, for the being of each is included in the essence of the other. And therefore, since just such an abstracted being is asked through the question if it is, the question if it is is not called a question assuming more than one. And that being is in the essence of each is clear from the Commentator on Metaphysics IV. For I maintain that a human being is a being, therefore he is either a being through his own being or else through something added. If through his own being, we have what was proposed. If through something added, it is necessary that the added something be a being, for through a non-being there is no being. Then I will ask about that being, whether it is a being per se or through something added, and so on indefinitely. And again, if a reality is a being through something added that added thing will either be of the genus of substance or the genus of accident. It is not from the genus of substance, for three are found there, namely matter, form and the composition. But none of these is something added to the substance of a reality. Nor is it of the genus of accident, for if it were, something would be the cause of its own being, since the being of every accident is caused from substance. If, then, you reply that a substance is a being through some accident, the substance will be the cause of that accident. But the being of that accident is caused from the substance, therefore something will be the cause of its own being, which is impossible.

            So it is obvious then that the question if it is is not a question assuming more than one. And I speak of being without qualification, for there is another argument concerning actual being (esse in effectu). If you ask about actual being, it is truly said that it is something added to actual (causatur) realities inasmuch as nothing actual is its own being. But nonetheless actual being is not a reality added to actual realities. Insofar, then, as actual being is something added the question if it is is a question assuming more than one; but insofar as actual being is not a reality added from caused <actual> realities the question if it is in actuality is not a question assuming more than one. But you will ask how this can be? You must know these two things, that actual being is added, and that it is not a reality that is added. similarity founded upon whiteness is not some added reality, as though something could be white alone, for something is not composite even if it is both white and similar. And yet whiteness is not similarity. In the same way, even though actual being is not a reality added to that of which it is, yet actual being is not that of which it is.

            As for the arguments, in reply to the first, when it is argued that a question in which there is inherence etc., I reply that this is false But a question in which there is inherence of one to another, and what is asked and that which it is asked about are different in essence, is a question assuming more than one. But when what is asked and that about which it is asked are different in essence, this is a question about a simple. And such is the question if it is.

            In response to the other, I deny the minor premise. It was proved that the being of each is its being in. But you will reply, “Can I not understand the reality while not understanding absolute being?” Well, aside from this, actual being can be understood, for the question if it is, if it asks about actual being, is in one way a question assuming more than one.

            In response to the <last> argument, I maintain that the question if it is is a question about the subject of the passion and the middle term. Hence you can understand the question if it is to ask if the subject is, and if the middle is, and if the passion is. And these are related in a certain order, for the being of a passion presupposes the being of the subject, the being of the subject presupposes the being of the middle, and the being of the middle presupposes being without qualification. And about each of these there is something to ask, and concerning which something here is assumed and something unknown. The question if it is asked of the passion presupposes the being of the subject and asks about the being of the passion. The question if it is asked of the subject presupposes the being of the middle and asks about the being of the subject. The question if it is asked about the middle presupposes being without qualification and asks about the being of the middle. And being without qualification cannot be asked about, for it is that which first occurs to the intellect. But there certainly can be a question about actual being or being in the soul. concerning being without qualification there is no question, but this is assumed in every question etc. It is said, “If it is is a cognition beforehand” etc. I reply that what is first a question can <later> be a cognition beforehand. Or first it is asked if it is, and afterwards it can be a cognition beforehand in respect of something else, etc. It is replied next that the being of a passion is not something simple, but contracted to a subject. I answer that the being of a passion can be taken in two ways, namely as the <being> of the essence, and the being of existence. The being of essence is certainly absolute in respect of the being of the subject, but the essence of the passion is not the essence of the subject, for what produces distinct and separate concepts produces distinct essences. Because of this, then, it is absolute, for the essence of the subject does not pertain to its essence, and, therefore, since a passion is not dependent in its being, there can be a question if it is assuming more than one concerning a passion in that way. But a question if it is that asks about the being of existence of the passion when the essence is added is a question assuming more than one.

Question 45

            Next let us ask about the question what it is, and let us ask whether the question what it is is a question.

            And it is argued that it is not, since what sort it is and how much it is are not questions, therefore what it is is not a question. The inference is obviously correct, and the antecedent is also obvious since what sort it is and how much it is are not found among the questions.

            Again, whatever is a cognition beforehand is not a question, but what it is is a cognition beforehand; therefore what it is is not a question.

            The opposed view is clear from the Philosopher.

            And it must be understood that the question what it is is a question, for a question arises concerning everything about which there is any doubt, but there is a doubt concerning the whatness of a reality, for there is a doubt about everything of which the formula is posterior to the formula of being. For being is that which is first cognized by our intellect, and it is obvious that doubt arises concerning everything which is posterior to what is first in the intellect; therefore, doubt can arise concerning everything that is posterior to being. But what it is is posterior to being. For this reason Avicenna said that realities are made definite through being, for if it is asked what a reality is it will be responded that it is a being. If, then, what it is is posterior to being, one can raise a question about it. And from this two things follow. One is that the question what it is is distinct from the question if it is. And the other is that the question what it is presupposes the question if it is. And for both of these I explain that it is because the question if it is asks about the absolute being of a reality, and the question what it is asks about the determinate whatness of a the reality. For when I ask what it is I ask in what genus the reality is, and since the being of such a reality depends on being without qualification, therefore the question what it is presupposes the question if it is, and the Philosopher says this afterwards because it is necessary for one who cognizes what it is to cognize if it is.

            But next someone will ask, “Given that the question what it is is a question, isn’t it a question assuming more than one?” I reply that it is not, for that is a question assuming more than one in which what is asked and that about which it is asked have distinct and separate essences, but in the question what it is what is asked and that about which it is asked do not have distinct essences, for what is sought is the definition of the reality and that about which it is asked is the being of the reality. Now the definition and the being are not distinct essences. But someone will reply that the principle is posited in the same number with that of which it is a principle. But that which it is is the principle of a reality, hence the Philosopher in Metaphysics IV says that that which it is is the principle of that of which it is that which it is. If, then, this is asked, the question what it is is a question assuming more than one.

            Again, the question what it is and because of what do not differ, but the question because of what is a question assuming more than one; therefore etc.

            what is said first, “The principle etc.,” that the principle considered as principle and the cause considered as cause constitutes more than one with that of which it is a principle. And when it is said that that which it is is a principle, I reply that in that which it is there are two things conveyed, namely matter and form. And what is principally conveyed is form. And therefore the parts of a definition are forms, for the formula of matter is no more human being than donkey. Hence, considering the form I reply that that which it is is a principle. In this way of taking it, it has the formula of a principle and assumes more than one with it <i.e. with what it is a principle of>. But when one takes that which it is not only as form, but as form and matter, it does not assume more than one, nor is it a principle of it but rather entirely identical with that of which it is that which it is, nor is it prior to or posterior to it.

            And when it is said that which and that because of which are the same, I reply that they are the same according to subject, but differ in formula. For that which of the subject related to the subject absolutely has the formula of that which, but related to the subject as it is the cause of inherence of the predicate to the subject, it merits the name “that because of which.”

            And therefore it is the same in subject and indicates the cause of the inherence of the passion to the subject. Hence it is that the question because of what is called a question assuming more than one, since it includes the inherence of the passion to the subject, which differs from it in essence. For passion and subject differ by nature, for they have essences differing in number. For the being of the subject is not the essence of the passion nor conversely. But the question what it is does not include such an inherence of two of which one differs from the other in essence. Therefore it is a question about a simple. Hence Albert says that that question of which the aim is to know something simple is a question about a simple, and that question of which the aim is to know something complex is a question assuming more than one. Now the question what it is and the question if it is aim to know something incomplex, that is the essence of the reality. The question because of what and the question what property it has aim at knowing the inherence of one thing to another, therefore they are called questions assuming more than one. Again, although the question what it is and the question if it is agree in this that both are questions about simples, still they differ since the question what it is presupposes the question if it is, and again what it is is related to if it is as the definition to the defined. But the defined is better known to us than the definition according to Aristotle in Physics I, for to the extent that something is more confused it is better known. And therefore whoever cognizes what it is necessarily cognizes if it is.

            In response to the arguments. To the first I reply that what sort it is and how much it is are questions, and you will reply, “To what question do they reduce?” I reply that they reduce to the question what property it has1 for that is the question what property in which something is asked about something distinct in essence from it. But when it is asked what sort it is and how much it is that which is asked is distinct in being from that about which it is asked. Therefore when it is asked what sort it is and how much it is it is a question what property.

            In response to the other, I reply that that which is a cognition beforehand is not a question in the same way and in respect of the same, since that which is a question can afterward be a cognition beforehand in respect of something else, as what the subject is is first a question and then afterwards a cognition beforehand for proving the passion of the subject. And therefore it can be both a question and a cognition beforehand.

Question 46

            Next it is asked whether every question is a question about the middle.

            And it is argued that not every question is, for if every question were a question about the middle, and every question about the middle is a question because of what, therefore every question is a question because of what. The consequent is false, therefore, so is the antecedent. Now, there is a proof that every question about the middle and question because of what are the same, for the middle and that because of which are the same, therefore a question about the middle is a question because of what. Let us take the argument up again, then.

            Again, every question asks something about something and so a question is of something composite, but the middle is a simple what, that is, it is the what it is of the subject; therefore etc.

            The opposed view is clear from the Philosopher.

            And to present argument instead of authority, every question is a question about the middle which can be ended through the middle, but every question is settled through the middle, for once the middle is cognized every question ceases.

            It must be replied to this that every question is a question about the middle, for every question seeks the cause and the cause is the same as the middle; therefore etc. The major premise is obvious by induction on the sorts of questions, for the question what it is seeks the formal cause, and seeks the whatness; the question because of what seeks the cause of the inherence of the predicate to the subject and so the cause, and the question if it is seeks the cause since the question what it is and if it is seek the same thing in substance. But what the question what it is seeks more determinately the question if it is seeks less determinately. And again, the question whether the passion is seeks the cause, just as the question what it is seeks what the cause is, so the question if the passion is seeks if there is a cause.

            And all this is reasonable according to Albert, for everyone wishing to arrive at some end intends the means through which it can be attained. And therefore, since in every question some end is sought, it is obvious that in every question it is necessary to proceed through some middle <or means>. And so every question will be a question about the middle. But according to Albert the middle can be sought in two ways, for either that is sought which is <as it happens> the middle, or the middle is sought under the description of middle. The question what it is seeks what the middle is, and if it is likewise, but not under the description of middle. But the question because of what it is, and whether the passion is, seek the middle under the description of middle, and therefore it is a question about the middle and most of all a question about the middle since it seeks it under the description of middle. And it seeks the middle more than the question whether the passion is. It is not therefore to be understood that every question is a question because it seeks the middle under the description of middle, but some seek what the middle is absolutely, as we have seen.

            Again, there is another argument, for every question is that through which something is determined <or settled>. But every question is settled through the middle for the middle is the that which it is of the subject, and the that which it is of the subject being cognized, it is cognized what the subject is, and this being cognized, it is cognized if it is, for the question what it is presupposes if it is. Again, it being cognized what it is of the subject it is cognized whether anything is in it and if this is cognized it is cognized because of what it is in it, so that if the middle is cognized, every question is resolved.

            In response to the arguments opposed to this view, the resolution of them is obvious. To the first I reply that not every question about the middle is a question because of what, but only that which seeks the middle under the description of middle, for the other questions ask about the middle absolutely, as we have seen.

            In response to the other I reply that every question is a question about a composite inasmuch as no question arises unless it asks something about something, but it is not thus a question about a composite because it is settled through a composite, but the question is settled and resolved through a simple. For instance, if it is asked what a human being is, it will be responded that he is a rational animal. And this signifies that which consists in an indivisible, for instance the substance of a reality, which consists in an indivisible. And in the same way the question if it is is also resolved and settled thus through something simple. And therefore these are questions that are simple.

Question 47

            Next we inquire concerning the middle of demonstration, and in the first place, whether the definition of the passion is the middle in demonstration, in the second place, whether the definition of the subject is.

            And it appears that the definition of the passion is, for the middle in demonstration, as the Philosopher says, is the formula of the first term, but the first term in demonstration is the major extreme and the passion, therefore etc.

            Again, the middle in demonstration is the middle according to nature, and not merely <in respect of us>, therefore that will be the middle which is prior to the minor extreme, and posterior to the major extreme. But such is the definition of the passion, for it is posterior to the major extreme, namely the passion itself, and prior to the minor extreme, the subject, therefore etc.

            Again, the middle in demonstration must be of the same nature with that which is demonstrated, but what is demonstrated in a demonstration is the passion. Therefore the middle in demonstration must be of the same nature with the passion. But there can be none such except the definition of the passion. Therefore etc.

            Again, the middle in demonstration must indicate what it is and why, but such is the definition of the passion, for it indicates what it is of the prior passion, and why of the posterior passion; therefore etc. And almost all of these are arguments of Giles of Rome.

            On the other hand, it is argued that that which is demonstrated must be demonstrated through some other that is its cause, for the Philosopher says that demonstration is of that of which some other is the cause, but the passion is what is demonstrated, therefore it is demonstrated through some other that is its cause. But the definition of the passion is not a cause that is other than the passion essentially or in actual reality, therefore etc.

            Again, in demonstration of the highest sort the question must not be begged, but if the middle is the definition of the passion the question is begged, for the definition of the passion is predicated of the subject in the minor premise, and in the conclusion the passion is predicated of the subject, therefore the passion is demonstrated of the subject through this, that the definition of the passion is in the subject. On the contrary, it must be known that whenever the passion is in the subject, so is the definition of the passion, so the question is begged.

            To make the reply to this question evident, it must be understood what the terms are in a demonstration, namely that which is demonstrated, that through which it is demonstrated, and that of which the other is demonstrated. That of which the other is demonstrated is the subject, that through which it is demonstrated is the middle term, and that which is demonstrated is the accident or passion. But of accidents there are two genera, in accord with the two-fold nature of the subject, for the subject is <an aggregate> of matter and form.

            There are some accidents that follow on the whole aggregate through the form, and some through the matter. And since form is the principle of the species, and matter of individuation, therefore those that follow upon the whole through the form are called accidents following upon the species, but those that follow on the whole through matter are called accidents belonging to the individual. Again, since form is the principle of the species, and individual happen to the species as such, therefore accidents following upon the form or species are called accidents per se. But those that follow on the individual are called accidents per accidens, and they are not in their subjects necessarily, nor per se. And therefore accidents are two-fold, namely accidents per se and accidents per accidens. And everyone agrees on this, that accidents per accidens are not demonstrable of their subjects unless they are understood of their subjects per accidens. This is false, since every <demonstrable> accident is per se in its subject, for every demonstrable is demonstrated through a necessary cause in the subject, but such do not have a necessary cause in their subjects, therefore etc.

            Now necessary and per se accidents are demonstrable, and in these an order is found. For some are found to be first, some intermediate, and some last. And since there is such a diversity in accidents, the whatness of the subject is nothing but the cause of the one accident that is per se and first. But the whatness considered in different ways can very well be the cause of several accidents, as for instance the whatness of human being, inasmuch as it is animal is the cause of sensing, and according as it is rational is the cause of the ability to laugh. And therefore when the nature of a subject is one and determinate, from it there is no more than one immediate <accident>, per se and primary, and through that accident another, and so on until some final <accident> is found. And therefore it is well to assume and order, because some are primary, some intermediate, and some last.

            And this is what Giles of Rome says of this matter, that between passions having causality some are primary, which are the middle of demonstration, but none are demonstrated since they are immediate and there is no demonstration of immediates. But others are intermediate, which are concluded through prior passions and are middles for demonstrating others, so that they are demonstrated, and demonstrate. And yet others are possible which are only demonstrated through prior <passions> and do not demonstrate. And therefore, since there is an order among these passions, there is one passion that is first, and proceeds immediately from the subject. And this is the middle in demonstration, and it is indemonstrable, as he proves thus, since, if the first passion is demonstrable it is either demonstrated through itself or through a prior passion, or through a posterior passion, or through the subject. that is, through its whatness or its accidents per accidens. Not through a prior passion, since it is assumed it is itself the first, nor through itself since then there would be a begging of the question in a demonstration. Nor through a posterior passion, since that through which something is demonstrated in a demonstration of the highest sort must be the cause of what is demonstrated, but no posterior passion can be the cause of a prior passion, so that it is not demonstrated through it. Again, not through accidents per accidens, since a demonstration is not in respect of such accidents. Again, not through the subject itself, for then the question is begged in such a demonstration, that is, in the major premise. For if the subject is received as middle term, the passion is predicated of the subject in the major premise, and again in the conclusion, so that the question is begged. Again, not through the whatness or essence of the subject, for the Philosopher says that demonstrations are not augmented through the middle, indeed, the proportion must be such between the conclusion and the middle in demonstration of the highest sort that there is only one conclusion for one middle, and conversely. Now it is obvious that through the whatness of the subject another, posterior passion is demonstrated, and so the first passion is not demonstrated through that whatness. Again, neither through the actual being of the subject, for such being is in respect of accidents per accidens, and demonstration is not in respect of such, therefore etc. so this first passion is indemonstrable, and therefore it is the middle term in the highest sort of demonstration.

            Against this, some have argued that it is claimed first that the first passion is indemonstrable of the subject, and some have said that this is false. And the reason is this--it is obvious that every passion that is in the subject per se whether first, intermediate, or last, is distinct from the subject. Because it is per se in the subject, it has a cause in the subject. But whatever is distinct from the subject and has a cause in the subject can be demonstrated of the subject, and so every passion, whether first, intermediate, or last, is demonstrable of the subject. Nor can it be said that the first passion does not have a cause in its subject, since every passion, even the first, is caused from the essential principles of the subject, so that it has a cause in the subject through which it can be demonstrated. Again, in per se accidents of a reality, everything is demonstrable of which it can be asked why, since if it can be asked why, there is a cause, and if there is a cause, therefore it is demonstrable. But of every accident, even the first, it can be asked why it is in the subject. So, since the visible is not included in the concept of human being, and it is in human being per se, it can be asked why visibility is in human being, and so it will be demonstrable.

            And again, in what was said there seems to be a contradiction conveyed, if we assume that being in actuality is a reality added to the reality itself, as he assumes. Given that it is an immediate passion etc., it will still follow on the subject. For matter with form is the cause of this being in the first place, and of all the rest in consequence, since every accident presupposes being in actuality. And yet he assumes that being in actuality can be demonstrated of its subject, as of a being, so a first passion can be demonstrated of its subject.

            In response to the argument just given opposed to this position—“If it is demonstrated, it is demonstrated through something prior, or etc.” I reply that it is demonstrated through none of these, but rather through the subject and the subject’s whatness. And you reply, “there will be one middle term only for one conclusion, and actual being is determined through the whatness of the subject; therefore etc.” It is true that there will be only one middle term for one conclusion equally primary, but it is not absurd that there be one middle term for several conclusions not equally primary. And therefore I have said that the first passion is demonstrated of the subject through the whatness of the subject. Again, actual being is demonstrated of the subject, but not primarily. Or it can be said that it has actual being as a passion following the subject, but there is no such passion that can be shown in the subject, for that passion is strictly demonstrated of the subject by a demonstration of the highest sort, and through the whatness of the subject, which is in the subject universally through the universality determined in this book. But actual being is in no subject universally except for the first. Being in is universally when it is only in that subject, and if it is in others, it will be in them through the nature of that subject. But actual being is in others than men, and again, although it is in others it is not in them through the nature of human being, and therefore actual being can not be demonstrated of human being. Nonetheless actual being can be demonstrated of the subject, as the Philosopher says later, but this is insofar as it is different according to formula from subject, not insofar as it is the same essentially with the subject.

            It must be replied to this response that the definition of a passion is not the middle term in demonstration of the highest sort, and the reason is apparent from what has gone before. Nothing that is demonstrable is the middle term in a demonstration of the highest sort, but universally, every passion, whether first, intermediate, or last, is demonstrable of the subject, and consequently, so is the definition of these, since the same formula belongs the passion and to its definition, for they are the same essentially, and therefore neither the passion nor the definition of the passion will be a middle term. To make this evident, one must consider that the definition of a passion is two-fold: on the one hand indicating what the name is, positing other names, and on the other indicating what the passion itself is, and this latter is two-fold, for one is that which receives the subject and the formal and essential principles of the passion in its genus, and the other that which receives the subject in its definition, and that is the most complete of them all. Now it is obvious that the definition indicating what the name signifies cannot be the middle term, since it is not a sufficient cause of the passion in relation to the subject. Indeed, if it were a sufficient cause, although that definition which posits other names of them are not definitions of beings, there could be a demonstration, which the Philosopher denies. Again, neither the definition receiving the essential principles of the passion, since this definition will be the same in essence with the passion. Now it has been shown that every passion is demonstrated of its subject or is demonstrable of it. Again, neither the definition receiving the principles of its subject, for that which is the whole demonstration with a difference in the position <of the parts> cannot be the middle term. But such a definition of the passion is the whole demonstration, for it receives the passion and the subject, and the that which it is of the subject and the that which it is of the passion. Hence it cannot be the middle term in a demonstration. Now although the definition of the passion is not the middle term in the highest sort of definition, still it is certainly the middle term in some demonstrations, since, as I suppose, the middle term in a demonstration is the definition of the subject or the first term. flow it is possible that one passion should be demonstrated of another, and therefore the definition of such a prior passion can be the middle term in such a demonstration. For that definition indicates the what of the first passion, and the why of the second passion. Hence one may very well find a demonstrable and demonstrating passion, and similarly, a passion that is demonstrated alone, but one cannot find a passion that demonstrates alone.

            In response to the first argument, when it is claimed that the first term is the passion, I reply that this is false, but the subject, or the subject’s what it is, is the first term, for the Philosopher says in Physics I that the subject is that which is predicated beforehand. But even if he had not said this, it would have been suitable to call it the first term. For that is said to be the first term which, according to causality, precedes all others in demonstration, and every such is a middle term indicating the what it is of the subject. For it says what the subject is, and what the passion is, and therefore the what it is of the subject, or the subject, is the formula of the first term.

            In response to the second argument, the middle in demonstration must be the middle in nature. For it is true that that ought rightly to be the middle through which cognition and scientific knowledge said without qualification is received. Certainly in those that are in accord with nature the middle must be received that is the middle according to nature. But in those that are according to reason and intellect it is necessary to receive the middle in cognizing and understanding. And therefore, since demonstration is an act of reason, it is clear that it must receive the middle that is prior in cognizing, and the middle that is correct in cognizing Now that would be whatever it is of which the passion is better known than it <the passion> is of the subject that is signified in the conclusion, and of which the subject is better known than the passion is of the subject. For in demonstration we proceed thus—through this, that the middle is in the subject we conclude that the passion is in the subject, because the middle will be such that it is better known of the subject than is the passion. And again, there is a <valid> process in demonstration because the passion is demonstrated of the subject through this, that the passion is first in the middle. And it is clear that the passion is better known of the middle than it is of the subject—most correctly, therefore, such a middle as the what it is of the subject is the middle in cognizing and understanding.

            In response to the third, when it is argued that the middle must be of the same nature with what is demonstrated, I reply that this is false, for the Philosopher says that what is demonstrated is demonstrated through some other that is the cause, but another that is cause is different in essence from the caused, and therefore the middle must be different from that which is demonstrated. And identity according to the reality is not required, but only the proportion that holds between cause and caused. And when it is said, “what is demonstrated is the passion,” this is true, and therefore the middle of this demonstration will be other than the passion, and not its definition, but rather the definition of the subject, which is the cause of such a passion and its inherence in the subject.

            In response to the fourth, it must be held that that which is called what and because of what is the definition of the subject. For it indicates the what of the subject, and because of what there is an inherence of the passion to subject, and therefore it is not better to conclude through this argument that the middle is the what it is of the passion than it is to conclude that it is the what it is of the subject.

Question 48

            Next we ask whether the definition of the subject is the middle term in demonstration.

            And it is argued that it is not, since the middle in demonstration must be of one genus with what is to be proved in the demonstration, but the what it is of the subject is not of one genus with what is to be proved in the demonstration; therefore etc.

            Again, in a demonstration the middle term must be better known than the subject, since the passion must be demonstrated of the subject through the middle term. But the what it is of the subject is not better known than the subject, since the subject is the same as the middle term; therefore etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued, since the definition of the subject is the middle term in a syllogism that proceeds from true and immediate principles, and such a syllogism is a demonstration, therefore the definition of the subject is the middle term in a demonstration. But still, since, if the definition of the subject is the middle in a demonstration, the demonstration does not proceed from what is proper; and since the demonstration does not proceed from what is immediate, and since this being given, the premisses are not confirmed through first

            The first they explain thus, since the whatness of the subject contains in itself virtually all passions and properties that appear from the essence of the subject. For just as in an art a certain common principle contains virtually everything that can be produced through the art, so that the art of demonstrating is common to everything that can be produced through the art, thus in the whatness of the subject are contained all the passions that can be produced from it, so that this subject is common to all the passions that appear from the essence of the subject. Therefore, if there is some demonstration proceeding from a middle term, whatever is the what it is of the subject proceeds from what is common.

            Again, they do not proceed from immediate propositions, since it is obvious that not all passions and properties of the subject appear from the whatness of the subject, but only one, and with it as the middle the others appear, up to the last. If, therefore, it happened through the whatness of the subject that all the passions are demonstrated, although not all appear immediately from this whatness, it would follow that demonstration does not proceed from immediate propositions.

            Again, it would follow that the premisses of the demonstration are not confirmed through a first principle, since in such a demonstration the what it is of the subject is predicated of the subject in the minor premise. Now the what it is of the subject is the same as the subject, so although it is immediate, it will not be prior to another, so that it is not confirmed through a first principle.

            Now these do not seem to have the truth, for what they say first is that if the definition of the subject is the middle term in a demonstration, then the demonstration would proceed from common terms, but in such a demonstration one proceeds from proper terms, since a demonstration of the highest sort proceeds from proper terms in which the middle term is most proper to that which is demonstrated, and to that of which it is demonstrated. But in a demonstration in which one takes the whatness of the subject as the middle term, the middle is proper to the passion, since the primary passion appears immediately from the essence and whatness of the subject, but this would not be unless the whatness of the subject were proper to it. And again, it is compared to each in a genus of cause, since it is compared to the passion in the genus of efficient cause, and to the subject as its formal cause, since the what it is of the subject is the cause of its accidents, and indicates the whole nature of the subject, neither more nor less.

            Again, it is obvious that these say what is false on the second count, that if the what it is of the subject were taken as the middle term, the demonstration would not proceed from immediates. For that demonstration proceeds from immediates which receives immediate premisses. But in a demonstration where the what it is of the subject is the middle term, in the major premise the passion is compared to the what it is of the subject as an immediate effect to its cause. And clearly, it is in it immediately, and thus it is the fourth way of saying per se. But in the minor premise the what it is of the subject is compared to the subject as what it is to that of which it is. It is obvious, then, that the premisses are immediate.

            And then to the form of the arguments, when these argue in the first place that the passions are virtually contained in the subject etc., I reply that this is according to the Philosopher. He holds in On coming-to-be and Passing-away that the same remaining the same is the cause of the same. It is per se and primarily true that the whatness of the subject considered according to its formula is one, and therefore per se and primarily it is the cause of one passion, hence even though the whatness is common to many operations and properties, still it is proper to one property. For instance, the whatness of human being is common, as these operations proceed from it, vegetating, sensing, and reasoning. Still, reasoning proceeds from it primarily and per se, and therefore the whatness of human being is proper to that which is reasoning.

            In the same way, they say next that demonstration does not proceed from immediates I reply that nothing is demonstrated through the whatness of the subject except one passion of the subject, primarily and per se, and such a demonstration is immediate since that passion is caused immediately from the principles of the subject. Hence, if such a passion is demonstrated from the whatness of the subject it is a demonstration from immediate premisses, but if some other mediated passion is demonstrated, it is obvious that such a demonstration proceeds from mediate premisses.

            And what these say in the third place, that the premisses of a demonstration are not confirmed through a first principle, is false, since arguments from such terms are made clear to us from common terms, such as “being” (entis), therefore it is reasonable that all propositions formed from special terms are made clear from a proposition which is taken or formed from common terms, such as “being,” for instance, from this, that being is being. And therefore however much the same is predicated of itself, or of whatever in some other way, in special terms, nevertheless they all have a unity from the first intelligible, which is formed in terms of being, since according to the Commentator being is that which first occurs to the intellect.

            It must be held, then, that it is another way, namely that the definition of the subject is the middle term in demonstration, and to make this evident it must be considered that in every subject of which passions are demonstrated we consider a two-fold nature, matter and form. And therefore, if there are forms existing per se <i.e., not in matter> through some cause, of these as such passions are not demonstrated, and so prior (?) sciences, to which demonstration belongs strictly, do not extend to such substances. Hence the metaphysician as such does not demonstrate, but only inquires. And therefore the Commentator says, on Metaphysics II, that mathematics is in the first degree of certainty, and natural beings follow. But metaphysical matters are less certain, as far as the way of demonstration is concerned, since of these there is not demonstrating <or> demonstration, but simple inquiry, because they have no passion. And because of this demonstrations are not found except in those things which have matter and form, and because of this they have two genera of accidents in accord with these two natures. For there are certain consequences collected through the form, and others through matter. And the explanation of this last is that that is the middle in demonstration of the highest sort which does not have any cause in the subject, and which is the cause of every other thing in the subject. But that is the what it is of the subject, or the definition of the subject, which the what it is of the subject does not have any other as cause in the subject. For it is foolish to ask why something is its what it is, for it is its what it is since it is itself--for instance, it is foolish to ask why a human being is a human being. And the what it is of the subject is the cause of all the properties of the subject since every property is posterior to this what it is. Now it happens that it is prior and the cause of what is posterior, and therefore the what it is of the subject is the cause of all its properties and passions, so that the what it is of the subject is truly to be taken as the middle term.

            Again, that is the middle term in demonstration of the highest sort by the having of which it does not happen that one asks in those terms why. But by having the what it is of the subject for the middle term it does not happen that next one asks why it is—one does not ask why this is in the subject.

            Again, the passion is in the what it is of the subject per se and one does not ask why it is in the subject. Still, the cause of the predicate is in the subject and this is by the demonstration of the Philosopher in De Anima I. He says there that the what it is of the subject is the principle of every demonstration, but the principle of demonstration is the middle of demonstration. Again, the Philosopher says in the second book of the Posterior Analytics that the middle in demonstration of the highest sort indicates what and why. The what it is of the subject is that which indicates the what it is of the subject and the why of the inherence of the passion in the subject. It is clear, then, as we have seen, that the what it is of the subject is the middle in demonstration of the highest sort.

            Again, the principle of demonstration is the middle term. I ask about that principle whether it is complex or incomplex. It cannot be complex, since that which is demonstrated and of which it is demonstrated is incomplex, and therefore the middle is incomplex. If this is so, either it will be the what it is of the passion or the what it is of the subject. It will not be the what it is of the passion, since this is demonstrable of the subject, therefore all that is left is that it be the what it is of the subject. And this is what the Philosopher says in Physics IV, in the chapter on motion, for he says that such a definition of motion must be sought as provides from itself the what it is of motion, and resolves the controversies, and which provides from itself the cause of all its passions and properties. And therefore the Commentator says that perfect definitions of realities are suited to provide the causes of all the accidents existing in those realities. Such, then, must be the middle in demonstration, from which the cause of all the passions can be drawn. Now this is the definition of the subject, since it is, through its formal principles, the cause of all the properties and passions inhering in it, and this is to be understood in demonstration of the highest sort. For it is still true that in demonstration not of the highest sort the definition of the passion can be the middle term, demonstrating one passion of another, and this again can be the middle term for demonstrating yet another, while yet another is only demonstrated and does not demonstrate.

            In response to the arguments. In response to the first, I reply that it is not necessary that the middle term be of one genus with the passion so that it is of the same nature, but only of one genus by that unity which exists between the cause and what is caused. But such unity exists between what it is of the subject and the passion.

            In response to the second argument, I deny the minor premise. For although the subject and its definition are the same according to the reality, since what the subject indicates indistinctly and confusedly the definition indicates distinctly, the Philosopher in Physics I says that definition divides into singulars, that is, it indicates distinctly every principle of the defined. And therefore each is better cognized when its principles are cognized definitely than when they are cognized confusedly, therefore every definition is better known than what it defines, and therefore Avicenna says that the definition is called the cause of becoming known.

Question 49

            Since the Philosopher says that it is impossible for one who cognizes what it is to be ignorant if it is, it is asked whether being (esse) is something added to essence.

            And it seems that it is, since the Philosopher says concerning the first that in everything other than the first what it is and that by which it is differ, but what it is is the essence, and that by which it is is being; therefore etc.

            Again, as <the act of> living is related to a living thing, so being to a being (ens), since living is in living things and being is in beings. But living is added to a living thing, since living is locomotion and sensing, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul, but sensing and locomotion are added to living thing. Therefore etc.

            Again, this is argued by the argument of Avicenna, since everything that has being through its essence is determined from itself to being, and because it is determined from itself to being, its being is determined in such a way that it is necessary, and that it is its own being, and only one thing is like that, namely the first cause. Therefore in all other realities than the first cause being will be other than essence.

            Again, Thomas argues in this way in his treatise, Of Being and Essence. Being is not multiplied except through something added to it, for one being (esse) of this sort is not of itself multiplied, and since the being of the First is not itself added, therefore it is not multiplied. If, therefore, being in these is multiplied, this will be something added.

            Again, this is argued by the argument of Albert in his commentary on the Book of Causes. Every effect of the First Cause recedes from the simplicity of the First Cause, and therefore in every effect of the First there is found some formula of composition. But substances separated from matter are effects of the first cause, therefore there is composition in them. But there is no composition there of matter with form, nor of subject with accident, therefore in these there is necessarily found a composition of being with essence, therefore all the more in those inferior to them.

            On the other hand, it is clear from the Philosopher, Metaphysics IV, for he says that the substance of each is one without qualification and a being without qualification, and a being (ens) includes being (esse) and having being, therefore the substance of each is essentially something that has being, and therefore being will be of the essence of each thing, and so it is not something added.

            Again, the Commentator on Metaphysics IV says that if one says “a human being is,” the “is” can predicate a diminished being in the soul, or actual being (esse in effectu). If it indicates diminished being in the soul, then it is a problem of accident, if actual being, then it is a problem of genus. But in such a problem the predicate and subject belong to the same essence. Therefore etc. This is an axiom concerning which many have some doubt, as the Commentator reports on Metaphysics IV when discussing the opinion of Avicenna. He says that Avicenna held that each thing that is caused <i.e. actual being> is a being through some added essence.

            But there were two things that moved him to this view. First, because he assumed a being to be of the genus of denominators. But such being (esse) indicates the intention of the subject and of the accident, hence when the Philosopher says a being is, he assumes a being as subject, and being as an accident of the subject. Again, he said that a being and a reality are imagined in the soul as two intentions, and not one. And these two signify different things in all tongues, but they would not signify different things unless the one <i.e. being> added something different in signifying a reality. But, as he assumed, it signifies the essence of a reality, and therefore he assumed being as added to it and an accident of essence. But Avicenna assumed that being is a reality added to essence. It seems that he assumed this falsely, because if he said that being is a real accident added, then he would have been assuming ten genera of accidents, but this is impossible; therefore etc. Proof of the consequence, because if being is an accident it will either be in the genus of quality or quantity, and so on in order. And it can be in none of these, because all nine genera of accidents presuppose being. But nothing presupposes itself, therefore there are ten genera of accidents. Now some have said that being is in the genus of action. And this is false since there is a contrary to action, but actual being is not one of a pair of contraries, therefore etc. Again, action presupposes some accidental quality, but actual being presupposes nothing, but every accidental quality presupposes actual being. It is false, then, to say that it is in the genus of action. But Avicenna did not draw his conclusion from those things that move, for it is because he says that a being is of the genus of denominators etc., that he says that reality and being (ens) signify different things. The Commentator responds by holding that Avicenna was deceived because he did not distinguish between marks signifying different intentions, and the same intention but in a different way. Hence, for instance, he says there are three <sorts of> names that convert with one another in supposita. Some signify different intentions, for instance, human being and what is able to laugh, and still convert with one another in supposita. Some signify different intentions, but in the same way, as tunic and dress. But some signify the same intention, but in different ways, as one and being (ens). And therefore there is no tongue calling being one, and because of this one is verified through the other, as being (ens) through one.

            Father Thomas reproves Avicenna in this, that he says that being is something added as an accident. For he grants that it is something added, but not as an accident. But he understands that it is something constituted through the essential principles of the reality of which it is being, just as Avicenna understood that it is something real added. He understands badly, for being is a certain actuality (actus), and so either primary or secondary actuality. Not primary actuality, since primary actuality does not differ from the essence of the reality, and it follows then that being is not added to the reality. Not secondary actuality, since such an actuality is an operation not proceeding from a form, but every such secondary actuality presupposes actual being, and it is obvious that nothing presupposes itself, therefore that actual being is not a secondary actuality. If, then, it is said that actual being is something real added above these two actualities, it is necessary to assume a third actuality in beings, which is contrary to the Philosopher.

            Again, in a reality having an essence only three things are found, namely essence and the principles of essence, and accidents. If, therefore, Thomas assumes that actual being is none of these, then actual being will be nothing. Albert, in his commentary on the Book of Causes, assumes that actual being is added to essence on the basis of this argument, that every caused being has being from the first principle, but no caused being has its essence from another, but from itself. It is obvious, then, that in every caused being there will be another than its essence, which is its being. This argument does not seem to conclude <validly>. For it is necessary that everything that is posterior to the first go back to the first as to its cause. Since, therefore, being and essence of every caused being are caused by the first principles, they go back to the first cause as to their cause. By this same argument, then, things that are caused receive being from the first, and also essence.

            Leaving aside these opinions, then, it seems we must respond otherwise, the evidence for which are three things to be considered. The first is that it is true of no caused being that it is itself its own being. The second is that being is something added to caused beings. The third is that being is not a reality added to caused beings, so it is added and is not a reality added.

            The proof of the first is that in caused beings being is not other than a certain order or respect to what produces or generates it. A caused being, for instance, a human being, can very well be said to be a being, since it has a relation to what generates it, through which it is introduced into beings, therefore in caused beings being is nothing except a certain order to what generates. But it is obvious that no caused being is itself an order. <Being> is an order or respect. Therefore none of these is its own being.

            Proof of the second point is that everything over and above anything of which there can be held a complete and essential concept of a reality is something added to a reality. But being is over and above something of which there can be a complete and essential concept, and hence Algazali says in the beginning of his logic that we can understand quadruple without understanding if there is a quadruple. Being therefore is something added to a reality. And the argument is confirmed since I understand the reality through the same essential principles, whether it is an existing reality or not existing. When a variation is introduced in the existence of a reality it is not necessary to introduce a variation in the essential concept of the reality, so that being and non-being are added to the essence of a reality.

            Proof of the third point. And this can be explained by the argument of the Commentator on Metaphysics IV, for we argue thus: A human being is a being, therefore either a being through its substance or through something added to its substance. If it is a being through its substance, we have what was proposed. If through something added, we ask about that added thing. Since it is necessary that it be a being, it is either a being through its substance or through something added. If through its substance, by the same argument there was a stand in the first; if through something added, there will be a process indefinitely, or it will be granted that being is of the essence of a reality. Now some, considering the matter superficially, use this argument of community to destroy. Since then it is asked whether it is a being through its substance or though some added reality, they say that it is through some added reality, for instance, through being. And when it is asked about that, will it be a being, they reply that this is false. But it is that by which some other is a being, for instance, they posit an example, human being is white through whiteness, and still, whiteness is not white, but whiteness is that by which a human being is white. In the same way, they say that being is not a being, but is that by which some other is a being. But this does not work. I receive a being that is first of every caused thing, and also of the first cause, by which a being is nothing, speaking more widely of such a being. I ask whether being is a being. If so, we have what was proposed. If not, since everything that is over and above that being is nothing, since a human being is formally a being through such being, therefore a human being, and whatever else, will formally be a being through nothing, which is impossible. And again, someone would not say that being is not a being unless this is because it is not a composite from being and something having being. But not withstanding this composition it can be said that it is one being. Therefore, even more, being will be a being over and above this which is not composite.

            Again, this is shown by another argument. If human being is a being through some added reality, what is added will either be of the genus of substance or accident. It cannot be said that it is of the genus of substance, since there are only three in this genus, namely matter and form and the aggregate, and none of them is this being, and since this is so, one of them will not be a being through some being.

            Again, it cannot be said that there is a being through some added reality which is of the genus of accident, since every accident presupposes actual being, and beyond these realities there is no other reality. Therefore human being is not a being through something added to the reality itself, or to the essence in caused realities. It is apparent, therefore, that being is something added, and is not an added reality, from which it follows that it is an added formula. Human being, therefore, and everything caused will be a being not through any added reality, but through an added formula. But this added formula will either be absolute or relative. It cannot be said that human being is a being through an absolute formula, since as such human being would have being in the soul more than in external reality, since <being in external reality> is in respect of proper accidents, and therefore it follows that it is not a being through some absolute formula. Therefore it will be so through some formula in respect of an accident, or through some agents. Not through a formula in respect of some accident, since no accident precedes actual being, but every accident necessarily presupposes actual being. Therefore it follows necessarily that human being is a being formally in respect to an agent. For that alone precedes it in nature, hence if it is asked by me through what human being is formally a being, I reply that it is through this, that it is the end result of this coming-to-be. Now separated substances are beings through this that they are the end results of this making, but these are beings through these that they are the end results of this making by this agent and from this matter. But this respect is something real, since it can have being over and above the concept. But still it is not such a reality as is of the genus of accident, but is in the same genus with the reality in which it is, of which it is a reality.

            And this is how brother Giles of Rome explains it, so that being is added, but not as some real accident, but as an accident of formula, and it is the same <really> as each of these of which it is. And if someone asks , since some relations are founded immediately on a substance, is it then false in every case that all relations are founded on accident, I reply that it is possible for some relations to be of the genus of substance. For it is obvious that matter has a relation to its form, therefore this relation is either in matter through the substance of the matter or through something added to its substance. If the first, we have what was proposed, that some relation is immediately founded on a substance; if not, then matter will have a relation and be ordered to something added, either, therefore, through its substance, and thus we have what was proposed, <or else through something added>. And the same argument was established before, if through something added, matter then has a relation and order to it. And now we either proceed indefinitely or there will be some respect and relation (respectum et relationem) immediately founded on a substance. But although actual being is not a reality added to the substance of a reality, still it will be some accident of formula, since it does not coincide with the essence of a human being as such, for human being as such neither is nor is not, as Avicenna proves.

            In response to the arguments it must be replied that they each takes the question in its own way, and does not prove that it is something added, but rather prove that it is not something added, as was said.

            But we must reply to them in order. In response to Boëthius it must be replied that what he said. understood by this was that what it is and that by which it is are not the same according to the formula of understanding, and this is true, but if he understands that they differ in the reality, he understands this falsely, as has been shown.

            In response to the second argument, it must be replied that it is true. Either it indicates the principle of life or the operation consequent on being a living thing. But if it is understood concerning the principle of life, thus it is related to a living thing as being is to a being, for just as living is not distinct from a living thing, in the same way neither is being from a being. But it that living is understood which is the operation of something living, I reply that it is not related to a living thing in the same way as being is related to a being.

            In response to the third, it must be replied that “from” either indicates some circumstance of efficient cause, and thus the major premise is false, for everything that has being formally from itself is determined to being of itself as from an efficient cause. But if it indicates the circumstance of a formal cause, thus the proposition it true, for everything that is has being formally from itself. And taking “from” in the first way . . .

            In response to the fourth, “being is not multiplied except through something added,” I reply that this argument assumes that being as it is in itself is of one formula in all beings, which is false, indeed, there is a different formula of being according as it is said of substance and as it is said of accidents. Now, if this were true, it would not be multiplied except through something added. But as it is, it is not of the same formula, and therefore it can be multiplied, but not through anything added, so, for instance, the substance of human being from itself, and not through anything added, is different from the substance of a donkey. In the same way, the being of a human being from itself and not through anything added is different from the being of a donkey.

            In response to the fifth argument, it must be replied that all things aside from the first cause recede from the simplicity of the first, and are removed from act, and approach to potency, and if, through this approach to and recession from potency is understood composition, it is to be replied that in everything other than the first cause there is a certain composition. And the argument is resolved through this, and it is true that in these separated substances there is some composition in this, that they recede from the simplicity of the first cause. And when it is said, “if in this there is no composition of matter with form, nor of accident with subject, therefore there is a composition of essence with being,” I reply that it is a fallacy of the consequent. Indeed, in place of that composition, I give another, for instance, of potency with act, or the composition of the formula or the act of understanding. For they understand through a formula of understanding other than their substance, for none of them is its own action of understanding. Now the first cause does not understand through a formula of understanding other than its substance, and therefore in these separate substances other than the First, there is such a composition, but it is not a composition of essence with being.

Question 5O

            Next it is asked whether there is ever both definition and demonstration of the same thing.

            And it seems that there is, since there is demonstration of a passion, but there is also definition of a passion, therefore there is definition and demonstration of the same thing.

            Again, there is a principle of demonstration for whatever has a demonstration. Therefore, of whatever has a demonstration, there is a definition.

            The Philosopher takes the opposite view, and it is argued that demonstration is per se of what is an accidental being, for the demonstration is of a conclusion in which the accident is demonstrated to inhere in the subject, and so demonstration is of the complex. But definition is not of a being according to accident, nor of any complex, but only of a per se and incomplex being; therefore etc.

            It must be replied to this that of nothing of which there is demonstration per se and primarily is there also definition per se. And this is apparent since definition is primarily of this, what it is, and demonstration is per se of this, that it is. But what it is and that it is are different, so of nothing is there both definition and demonstration primarily.

            Again, demonstration per se and primarily is of the conclusion, in which a passion is predicated of the subject, but there is no definition of such according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VII; therefore etc.

            From these it is apparent that of nothing is there both definition and demonstration. And this is convertible, since it is a negative universal, so the demonstration of Aristotle is plain enough. For although of nothing is there both demonstration and definition primarily, still, there can be definition and demonstration accidentally, for demonstration is of a complex per se, and definition is of the parts of the conclusion, therefore of the same, accidentally, there is both definition and demonstration.

            In response to the first argument, it must be held that demonstration is not only of the passion primarily, but it indicates the cause of the inherence of the predicate or passion in the subject. consequently there is <accidental> demonstration of the passion, of which there is a definition per se.

            In reply to the second argument, it must be held that definition certainly is a principle, and it differs as it is a principle and as it is a principle of the inherence of the passion in the subject, just as what it is and because of what it is differ. And when the definition is taken thus in different ways, one can assign the fallacy of accident to the argument, for the middle term varies in the respect in which it is considered.

Question 51

            Next it is asked whether definition is of substance alone.

            And it seems it is, or so Aristotle intends in Metaphysics VII. And he argues there that definition is only of per se beings, but a substance alone is a being per se, therefore etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued that everything that has whatness, genus, and difference can be defined, but accidents are such, and are not substances, therefore etc.

            It must be replied to this that definition is primarily of a substance, and of accidents in consequence, as the Philosopher intends in Metaphysics VII. And his argument is that definition indicates the what it is of a thing, but substance has what it is primarily, and so definition is primarily of substances.

            Again, the what it is of a substance does not depend on another, but every accident depends on substance. And so definition is of substances alone primarily, and of others only in consequence, and through the relation to substance. For accidents depend on substances, and so they receive substance into their definitions. Hence I maintain that there is definition of accidents in consequence, for accidents have what it is with a distinction and in a certain respect, through their relation to substances. For accidents are beings only because they are of a being, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics VII, therefore etc. And Aristotle understands this, saying that definition is primarily of substance, of which there is no demonstration.

            And the response to the arguments is clear from this, for each takes the question in its own way.

Question 52

            Next it is asked whether what it is can be demonstrated.

            And it is argued that it can, for demonstration is of the conclusion of a demonstration, but what it is is sometimes concluded in demonstration according to the philosopher here, and in Posterior Analytics I; therefore etc.

            In reply to this, it must be understood that what it is is two-fold, for there is the what it is of the subject and of the passion. The what it is of the passion can be demonstrated. But the what it is of the subject is two-fold, speaking logically, for there is the what it is that is the same as the essence of the subject, and it is this that is intended here, and such a what it is cannot be demonstrated, but the other is the what it is that is given through an extrinsic cause as through an agent or end, and such a what it is is incomplex since it does not indicate the essence of a thing perfectly. And such a what it is can be demonstrated, so that the what it is given through a final cause can be demonstrated through the agent cause, and conversely. And Aristotle settles it in this way in the text. Hence the first argument proves well enough that some what it is can be demonstrated, and this is true of the what it is of a passion.

            In reply to the second, when someone argues thus, “Everything that can laugh is a rational animal, etc.,” it is a good syllogism, nor is it either sophistical or demonstrative. For there are many kinds of syllogism <other than these two>, for instance, convertible and circular syllogism, and so on. And if any one argues that the destruction of the genus does not follow on the destruction of one species, it must be replied that syllogism is not related to the sophistical syllogism and dialectical and demonstrative syllogism as genus to species, for the species adds a new form over and above the genus, but a dialectical syllogism, or a demonstrative or sophistical syllogism, does not add a new way of arguing to the formula of syllogism, but matter alone. Hence syllogism without qualification is related to those particular syllogisms as one form or species to different sorts of matter, just as circle is related to a bronze circle or copper circle. And if anyone argues that since the formula of syllogism is not preserved except in dialectical or sophistical or necessary natter, and if in sophistical natter it is a sophistical syllogism, and if in probable matter it is a dialectical syllogism, and if in necessary matter it is a demonstrative syllogism, and yet this syllogism, “Everything that can laugh is a rational animal, every human being is something that can laugh, therefore every human being is a rational mortal animal,” thus in necessary matter, it follows that this syllogism is demonstrative—to this it must be replied that it does not follow unless all the conditions for a completed demonstration are satisfied. So since it does not satisfy all the conditions, since it does not proceed from the causes of the conclusion, it is not a demonstration, but is rather a begging of the question, since the premisses don’t prove the conclusion.

%%Question 53

            Next it is asked whether what it is can in any way be proved through syllogism, and I do not say “demonstrated.”

            And it is argued that it can from Aristotle, who gives consideration to the construction of the what it is and the definition of a thing, which is clear from Topics VI. Therefore etc.

            On the other hand, Aristotle says here that it must be replied that the what it is without qualification is not proved through any syllogism, for where there is a begging of the question there is no proof, but in every syllogism through which the what it is is concluded the question is begged. Therefore etc. The major premise is obvious from Aristotle here. It is possible to prove the what it is of something in respect of someone through probable premisses, and this is what Aristotle does in the Topics. Whence nothing prevents an argument that begs the question without qualification from being a proof in respect of someone.

            And through this the reply to the argument is obvious.

Question 54

            Next it is asked whether, in a syllogism concluding what it is under this reduplication, “in its what it is,” it is necessary to receive this reduplication in the major and minor premisses.

            And it seems that it is not, since as the what it is in the premisses is related to concluding the what it is in the conclusion, thus is necessity in premisses related to concluding necessity in the conclusion. But, to conclude a conclusion concerning something necessary it is not necessary for both premisses to be statements asserting necessity, but is suffices that the major assert necessity; therefore etc.

            Aristotle takes the opposite view, claiming it must be said that what it is is a predicate convertible with the subject, and the middle through which it is concluded that the what it is of that of which the what it is is substantial, and proportional to the extremes, and therefore it is necessary that the middle receive under reduplication what it is, so as to mark out the essential relation of the middle to the extremes. Hence, if the what it is were added to one extreme and not the other, then it would signify that the relation of the middle to one extreme is essential, and to the other not. And so it is if it is argued thus: “Every B is A in its what it is, every C is B,” it is not held therefore that every C is A in its what it is because, <in a syllogism regarding necessity>,the minor is not marked out as being necessary even though it happens to be necessary.

            In response to the argument opposed to this, it must be replied that, to conclude a conclusion asserting necessity it is sufficient for one premise to assert necessity, but to conclude something concerning the what it is of something, it is not enough to take one premise with this reduplication, “in its what it is,” but one must take both thus. And the reason is that more is needed to conclude <a conclusion in respect of> the what it is of something than to conclude the conclusion <taken by itself>. For it is enough <for the second purpose> that the conclusion be true, and that it cannot be false. But to conclude <a conclusion in respect of> the what it is of something this much is required, and also more, namely that it is essential to the subject and convertible with it.

Question 55

            Next it is asked whether the what it is can be shown by the way of division.

            And it is argued that it can, since every way shows what it is which receives every essential predicate, but the way of division is such; therefore etc. And this is what Aristotle seems to want in Metaphysics VII, where he teaches how to investigate what it is by the way of division. Therefore etc.

            The opposite view is explained by Aristotle here.

            It must be said that even though what it is can be concluded through the way of division, but it cannot be concluded of something under this intention, “what it is,” whence it is argued thus, “Every animal is rational or irrational, and human being is not irrational,” and from these it follows that human being is rational, supposing that the whole nature is exhausted by the way of division in the first proposition. But this “rational” is <also> proved of human being, even though the whole nature of animal is exhausted by the rational and the irrational, when it is said that human being is rational. But the question is begged, for it is just as well known through one contrary that it inheres in something as by the removal of the other contrary; and so the way of division does not prove anything. But if it did prove this, it would not be sufficient to show what it is under the formula of its what it is through the predicate, therefore, it is shown that human being is rational through division, but still, that human being is rational essentially is not shown, therefore such a way does not show what it is under its proper formula.

            In response to the argument to the contrary, it must be said that the way of division receives every essential predicate, and so can well enough show the what it is of something to belong to it, through the removal of the other, different, essential predicates. But the way does not show what it is in the being of that of which it is under its proper formula of what it is, and this is what Aristotle intends in Metaphysics VII. But Aristotle shows here that what it is cannot be demonstrated of anything under its proper formula, teaching how to receive what it is with reduplication in both premisses. Or it can be held that the what it is without qualification is shown, even though it cannot be shown to belong to something, as was said before.

Question 56

            It is asked whether what it is can be shown through definition.

            And it is argued that it can, since nothing is a stronger showing than that which is through definition. Since, then, one concludes the what it is to be what it is of something through its definition, it seems obvious that such a showing is a good one.

            Again, everything that is predicated of something in its essence and convertibly is in it through its what it is. But rational animal is predicated of human being in its essence and convertibly, therefore the predicate of this proposition is in the subject through its what it is; therefore etc.

            It must be replied that what it is cannot be demonstrated through definition, for a proof seems to beg the question if the definition and the defined are convertible. And so the defined cannot be proved through definition, and this demonstratively. Now what it is can be shown dialectically through its definition, as appears from Topics II, but such a showing is not demonstration without qualification, but only in a certain respect.

            And from this it is obvious what to say to the arguments when such a showing begs the question. But it begs it without qualification and according to reality, even though such a showing serves as a demonstration for some.

            And from this the reply to the other is obvious.

Question 57

            It is asked whether what it is of one contrary can be shown through the definition of the other contrary.

            And it is argued that it can, for if one speaks thus, contraries signify that by which they differ, and so one contrary can be shown through the other.

            Again, the what it is of contraries are contrary, the reason for which is that contrariety is the reception of a property according to its form, and so if one contrary is defined, the opposed definition shows the what it is of the other contrary; therefore etc.

            Aristotle states the opposed view.

            It must be replied that one contrary cannot be shown through another without qualification, indeed, without qualification it begs the question, for one contrary is not better known in any subject matter than the other. And therefore one cannot be shown without qualification through the other, but one contrary is shown through the other in a certain respect.

            And from this it is clear how to reply to the arguments, for each takes the question in its own way.

Question 58

            It is asked whether one who cognizes what it is necessarily cognizes if it is.

            And it is argued that he does, since what is not one cannot know (scire), therefore what one can know is; therefore etc.

            Again, just as why it is so is related to that it is so, so what it is is related to if it is, according to Aristotle in Posterior Analytics II. But if one does not know that it is so, one does not know why it is so; therefore etc.

            On the other hand, Aristotle says that it one can know what a triangle is and still can doubt if it is, therefore etc.

            In response to this, it must be understood that the question if it is can ask two things, for it can ask if something is absolutely or if it is actually. If the question is put in the first way, then the question what it is presupposes the question if it is, since what is first posited in the what it is of something is the nature of being, and therefore the formula of being occurs first in the concept of each thing. But if the question if it is is put in the second way, then actual being is not in the formula of caused beings according to Aristotle here, who says next that if it is, or being, can be demonstrated of caused beings, and that nothing belonging to a substance <as such> can be demonstrated; therefore etc. And this, since Avicenna and Algazali say it in their logics, and it is also obvious of itself and was clear beforehand. Therefore actual being does not belong to any substance <as such>, but is consequent upon whatever is aggregated from matter and form by reason of form, just as a proper passion follows on its proper subject, and is common to the same things as its subject is. And it must be understood that knowing what it is absolutely occurs, and not by understanding if it is in reality, just as knowing beforehand occurs, but not by knowing afterwards. Or one can know the what it is of something under the relation to actual being, of which there is a cause, and then in understanding what it is one must cognize the cause, since one does not cognize the cause under the formula of cause unless one understands the effect.

            Hence it is clear what to say to the argument, for when it is argued that what it is is related to if it is as why it is so is related to that it is so, as Aristotle says in Book II, I reply that why it is so is prior to that it is so, just as a cause is prior to its effect, and understanding the prior does not occur by understanding the posterior. Therefore understanding and knowing why it is so in <the same> relation to that it is so. I reply in the same way concerning what it is in respect of that it is so; therefore etc. And it is clear how to reply to the argument, for each takes the question in its own way. Hence Aristotle in this book, when he says that understanding what it is does not occur unless it is understood if it is, and when he says the opposite, understands these in different ways, as we have explained.

            In reply to the first argument, it must be understood that it is not the case without qualification that knowing does not occur, for there does occur knowing such a being as a figment in the soul. But concerning knowing without qualification what it is, this does not occur, and so concerning these knowing what is signified by the name does occur.

            As to the second, that “knowing why it is so does not occur unless it is known that it is so,” one must reply by utter rejection, even though knowing why it is so does not occur under the formula of cause unless the cause is known, for knowing why in itself does occur without knowing anything about whether it actually is. I reply that what it is in respect of its what it is is similar, and this is apparent since of whatever there is definition, of these there is what it is, for this can be known. But definition is of universals, and it is possible for something to be universal without this being because it exists in reality, for instance, a seven-sided house does not exist in reality, but exists in its parts, because, although they are not put together, yet they are compossible. Again, neither is it prevented from being, and such a being suffices for the formula of a universal, and so for cognizing what it is. It isn’t necessary to know whether it is at present, for if it were, knowing a thing from its impression would not occur, and the knowledge of meteors <i.e. atmospheric effects and conditions> would perish. But it is necessary that one cognizing what it is should cognize if it is absolutely, that is, it is necessary to know if a natural thing has arisen through its principles and causes alone, and also if it is not prevented from being, and thus eclipse is known when it does not exist. Therefore etc.

Question 59

            It is asked whether it is possible to know what a goat-stag is.

            And it is argued that it is, since if not, this is because it is not a being at all, and this is not true since it is not possible to say anything concerning what is not, according to Avicenna in his Metaphysics. Or else, if the intellect says something (aliquid enuntiat intellectus) concerning a chimera or goat-stag, this is because it is a hidden being, but this is not so according to the Commentator on Metaphysics II, who says that no being is hidden from the intellect; therefore etc.

            Again, what is not does not move the intellect, but a chimera moves the intellect; therefore etc.

            On the other hand, Aristotle says that it is not possible to understand anything about a goat-stag; therefore etc.

            It must be replied as Avicenna says, it is not possible to understand anything about what is not, or to say or signify anything about it. If, then, a goat-stag has some being cognized or signified, it has a formula of being, even if it is a weak one. Whence privations, according to Aristotle in the beginning of Metaphysics IV, have a formula of being, at least through attribution to a habits <of which they are privations>. But the being of a chimera is the being of its parts outside the soul. The name of chimera, however, does not signify those parts, but a composition of parts which cannot be parts of one thing in the nature of realities. Aristotle says the same thing, that this can’t be understood, but if a donkey is not, then it is possible to understand about it what it is, since it is not itself prevented from being. It is not possible to understand about a chimera, then, what it is, but it is possible to understand what it is that is signified through the name of “chimera.” And it is also in this way possible to understand about a negation, privation,^, and an infinite term.

            In response to the first argument, it must be replied that it is not. It is not possible to understand what it is concerning a goat-stag, because it is prohibited from being. But it is possible to understand concerning it what it is that is signified by the name, and so it can have a definition.

            In response to the second argument, it must be replied that that which in no way is does not move the intellect, but a chimera, although it is not a being in the nature of things, is still a being in the soul; therefore etc.

Question 60

            It is asked whether a definition signifies the being of that of which it is a definition.

            And it seems that it does, for what signifies the posterior signifies the prior, but what it is is posterior is being, for the question what it is is posterior to the question if it is; therefore, since the definition signifies what it is, it signifies being; therefore etc.

            Again, whenever two things are received by one cognition, whatever one signifies the other does too. But what it and that it is are cognized by the same cognition, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VI; therefore etc.

            The philosopher says the opposite in the text at hand, claiming that a definition does not signify that it is nor that it is possible for it to be. For if a definition were to signify being, then one who knows the definition of something could not ask if the thing defined is. But, now, the Philosopher says one can ask if there is a circle.

            It must be replied that a definition can be taken in relation to the defined of which it is pronounced, and thus it signifies that the defined is. And in this way Aristotle says in the second book that a definition pronounced of some defined thing indicates being affirmatively and universally. Or a definition can be taken in respect of itself, and thus it signifies neither actual being nor actual non-being. Aristotle understands it in this way in the first book, since definition is not a supposition indicating being or non-being, but a definition does not signify being or non-being.

            Again, a definition only indicates the what it is of a reality, but actual being is not anything concerning what it is, but it follows on this; therefore etc.

            Again, capacity and act are of the same genus, if, then, definition does not signify the act of being of the defined, then neither does it signify the capacity for being. And in this way Aristotle says, that a definition does not signify being, nor the possibility of being of the defined; therefore etc.

            In reply to the first argument, it must be held that actual being is not prior to what it is, although being without qualification is prior, as it can be beforehand; therefore etc.

            In reply to the second argument, it must be held that that which it is and if it is are not received into cognition by the same reception, for that which it is is the cause of this that it is, if it is, and cause and effect are not cognized by the same cognition. Or, it can be held that the dictum of Aristotle is to be understood concerning that it is without qualification, when he says that which it is and that it is are cognized by the same cognition, but not concerning actual being.

Question 61

            It is asked whether what is signified by an expression (dictio) can be demonstrated or shown.

            And it seems that it can, for there is demonstration of those of which there is a cause, but that this name should signify has a cause, since this is not a per se being, therefore it will be demonstrable through its cause.

            Again, there is a demonstration of whatever has a middle, but that this signifies has a middle, since the predicate does not fall under the definition of the subject; therefore etc.

            Aristotle takes the other side.

            And it is argued that what is presupposed in a science as primary is not demonstrated in it. But what it is that is signified through the name is presupposed, and is presupposed as primary in every science. Therefore etc. And this must be considered because of this argument: Now this will be so, since that which is presupposed is not shown, but the significations of words (vocabulorum) are presupposed in every science; therefore etc. Whence, if anyone denies the principles of a science, always he must run to the significations of the words. And through these the artisan shows the first principles. And if anyone denies the significations of the words, one must not carry on further discussion with him, any more than with a plant, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics IV. Therefore etc.

            It must be replied, then, that it is necessary for that which we are to demonstrate to have a cause known to us, and that it not be indeterminate, but definite (certam). But that this name signifies that, there is some cause of this, though it is an indeterminate one, namely the will of the impositor or the custom of authors. And since the will can be moved by an indefinite number of things, and it is kept from such an imposition when it pleases, therefore we don’t have a determinate cause. Therefore no science can demonstrate the significations of words, and this by a demonstration from prior things. Nor can they be shown from posterior things, for instance, through the usage of authors, but it is apparent that there is no demonstration of anything having any other cause, but only of what has a definite and determinate cause. Similarly, not of everything with a middle is there demonstration, but only of those that have a definite cause.

            And from this it is obvious how to reply to the arguments.

Question 62

            We ask about the chapter, “We must inquire again,” and first whether any cause is the same as that of which it is the cause.

            And it seems that some cause is, for that which is assumed in the definition of something is the same as it, but some causes are assumed in the definition of those things of which they are causes, so that Aristotle in Metaphysics IV commends Archistas <i.e. Archytas> because he accepts all causes in his definition; therefore etc.

            Again, the same thing is argued concerning the causes of particulars, that is, material and formal causes which seem to be the same as that of which they are causes, since they enter into definitions and the substance of the reality. And Aristotle says this here. He says some are causes the same as the reality, and some are not, for intrinsic causes are the same, but extrinsic causes are not. Therefore etc.

            On the other hand, it is argued, that is not the same as anything that follows upon it, but a cause precedes that of which it is the cause, as is clear from the definition of cause, which is “that upon the being of which another follows,” that is, the thing caused. Therefore cause and caused are not the same.

            It must be replied that no cause is without qualification the same as that of which it is the cause, for the cause precedes that of which it is the cause, but nothing precedes itself; therefore etc. But it must be understood that “the same” is said in two ways, namely the same in subject and in formula. And in the same way, “different” is said is two ways, namely different in subject, as, for instance, Socrates and Plato are different, and the same in subject, as, for instance, whiteness and sweetness in milk. Hence in some the cause and effect are the same in subject, for instance, matter and form are the same in subject, since they are in those things of which they are causes. Hence, although a human being is composed from matter and form, still, the formula of human being is other than the formula of matter and the formula of form. And this is apparent if we consider the properties (propria) of these. But if we consider the agent cause and its effect, then sometimes they differ in subject and agree in formula, as when the form bringing something to be and the form coming to be are the same, for instance, when a human being comes to be from a human being and heat from heat. And sometimes the agent cause and the effect do not agree in form, but agree in the subject. But concerning the remote final cause, which I call the operation of the reality, it is obvious that it differs in form from the reality of which it is the cause. But the proximate final cause, which I call the form of the reality, is related to the reality as form is related to that of which it is the form. Hence certain causes are, according to Aristotle, the same as the reality, for instance, the formal and material causes, which are not demonstrated through any intrinsic cause. Hence Aristotle says that a definition given through the remote form cannot be demonstrated, but the material cause can, perhaps, be demonstrated through the form. But extrinsic causes, for instance the agent and the end, are not the same as that of which they are causes.

            In reply to the first argument, it must be said that not everything that is assumed in a definition of a thing is the same as it in essence, since some definitions are given through something added (additamenta). For instance, the definitions of accidents, and some through accidents, like those of accidents, and in these what is assumed is not true. It is only true in a definition by nature,

            I reply to the other just as before. It was cleared up in saying that some causes are the same as that of which they are causes, and some are not. And I say this in respect of the reality, for it is obvious that causes under the formula of cause differ from effects, at least according to formula.

Question 63

            It is asked if any cause can be demonstrated, as Aristotle says.

            And it seems not, since there is no demonstration of immediates, but a per se cause is the immediate cause of that of which it is the cause; therefore etc.

            Again, if there is demonstration of per se causes, then there will be demonstration of every cause, and so demonstrations will proceed indefinitely, since every demonstration is made through a cause, and this is absurd; therefore etc.

            On the other hand, Aristotle says that middle causes are demonstrable.

            It must be noted that there is demonstration in two ways, namely demonstration why (propter quid), which proceeds from a proximate cause, and demonstration that (quia) it is the case, which proceeds from a remote cause to one nearer, or from effects to causes. Hence, in some things the effects are better known than their causes, and such causes can be demonstrated through their effects. Similarly, some causes can be demonstrated by demonstration why it is the case, since causes are causes of causes according to Aristotle, Physics II. Hence, the formal cause is prior in formula to the material cause, for matter is because of form, and so the material cause and its definition can be demonstrated through the formal cause and its definition. Since the end is the cause of causes, all other causes can be demonstrated through the final cause.

            In response to the arguments, to the first it must be replied that not every immediate cause is in the reality, unless the cause happens to be in the genus of the subject, but there are some causes of the being of a reality through something other than the reality caused, and therefore some can be demonstrated through others.

            In response to the second argument, it must be said that of causes considered as causes, there is no demonstration, but of causes considered as having a middle, there is demonstration through a prior cause, and therefore the argument is no good.

Question 64

            It is asked whether one can know through a cause.

            And it seems one cannot, since in this way nothing is known unless it is known through the first cause, but it is impossible to know the first cause perfectly; therefore etc.

            Aristotle takes the opposed view, and it is apparent through the definition of what it is to know, which is cognizing the cause, etc.

            I reply to the question that one can know through a cause, since as something is related to being, in a similar way it is related to cognition. But a reality has being through its cause, therefore it is cognized through this. But it must be understood that although the principles of being and cognition are the same, still they are not under the same formula. Note concerning this proposition that the principles of being and cognizing are the same, for the principles of cognition are universals and the principles of being are particulars. And thus everything has a principle of being from the first principle, and of cognizing, but they differ in a way, since the first cause insofar as it is a principle of cognizing for all things ought to be taken universally under the formula of being. And so it is obvious that the first cause, insofar as it is taken as particular, is not cognizable by us, but insofar as it is taken universally, it is most cognizable, and everything is cognizable in virtue of it. But then someone will ask how the first cause can be taken as a particular as it is a principle of being, but when it is taken universally, as a principle of cognizing, when it is the cause of the being of all things just as much as it is of the cognition of all things. It must be replied that the first cause is universal under causality, but particular under being, but it is not universal by predication except as it is taken under the formula of being

Question 65

            It is asked whether a cognition of all its causes is needed for the complete cognition of a reality.

            And it seems that it is, for Aristotle in Physics I says that we do not consider ourselves to know until we know al the causes, both proximate and remote, and the principles right down to the elements. And the Commentator says in that place that teaching ought not cease concerning any being until a cognition of all the causes is had in every case, and this in each genus; therefore etc.

            Again, if knowing is cognizing the cause of the reality, then each one lacks cognition of the reality to the extent that he lacks cognition of its causes. Therefore, if anyone happens to know the reality without qualification it is necessary that he cognize every one of its causes.

            The contrary is argued thus: demonstration why it is the case produces knowing without qualification, and still does not receive all the causes of the conclusion the knowledge of which it produces, but only the efficient cause; therefore etc.

            Again, a definition is a sufficient principle for cognizing the reality, and still it does not receive every being, but only intrinsic being; therefore etc.

            Again, in the Ethics I, a doctor is a sufficient cause of health, and yet a doctor does not produce health by cognizing right up to the first cause, but only by cognizing particular causes, for cognizing the first cause furnishes but little of help in performing his function.

            It must be understood that just as what is known to us is not the same as what is know by nature, so neither are the causes of our cognition the same as the causes of the nature of the reality. For in nature each one is known from that from which it has being, and since it has being from all its causes, therefore etc. And since sometimes the effects are better known to us than their causes, just as these things below are better known than things above, for they are more accessible to the senses and nearer, therefore we sometimes cognize causes through effects, and not always are the principles of a reality the same as the principles of our instruction.

            And through this it is clear how to reply to the arguments. For the first one shows that cognition of every cause is needed for cognition without qualification of something, but such a cognition is not possible to the human intellect. But according to what the Commentator says we have cognition of something through demonstration in the way that the cognition is possible to the human intellect, and not according to the nature of the reality and not without qualification. And in the same way, a definition makes us know the reality in respect of its extrinsic principles, but such knowledge is not a complete cognition of a reality. And so demonstration and definition produce knowing in some genus of cause without qualification, but not absolutely without qualification.

Question 66

            It is asked whether it is necessary to know all its causes in order to know something perfectly without qualification.

            And it seems that it is not, for demonstration produces knowing without qualification, but demonstration does not produce knowing through all causes taken together, but separately, according to Aristotle here, therefore etc.

            Again, if demonstration produced knowing through every cause, then nothing could be demonstrated unless the first cause were cognized, which is absurd. Therefore etc.

            Aristotle maintains the opposite, as well as the Commentator at Physics I.

            Some hold in response to this that for something to be known perfectly every cause in the genus must be cognized, but it is not necessary to cognize every one of its extrinsic causes outside the genus. So, for instance, when the mathematician wishes to know something in the genus of quantity it is necessary for him to cognize all of its causes in that genus, and this suffices. But this is not true, for nothing is cognized perfectly until all of its causes are cognized. Hence, if any being in the genus has causes outside the genus it is necessary to cognize them, for just as each one is related to being, so also to being true. But being true is being cognized, wherefore just as each is related to being, so also to correct cognition. If, then, there are some extrinsic causes of a thing in being, then also in cognizing. And just as arriving at the first cause happens without qualification in being, so also in cognizing, and so, as all things are in virtue of the first cause, so also all things are cognized in virtue of the first cause. But causes in being are particulars, and in cognizing, universals, whence the first cause is the principle of human cognition under the formula of a universal, but the first principle under particular being is the goal of our cognition.

            In response to the arguments. In reply to the first, it must be maintained that demonstration produces knowing without qualification, but in a demonstration it is necessary to presuppose many things, for instance, the material cause, of which we presuppose its being. Hence, although demonstration does not take every cause as a middle term, still we have cognition of every cause through demonstration.

            In reply to the second argument, as before, the first cause can be cognized beforehand in a way, since it is cognized under universal being, and in a way it is not, since it is not cognized under particular being.

Question 67

            It is asked if matter is cognizable.

            And it seems that it is, for all that which is assumed in the definition of something is cognizable; but matter is assumed in the definition of something; therefore etc.

            Again, everything that has a formula of being is knowable according to the formula of being it has, but prime matter has a formula of being; therefore etc.

            Aristotle holds the opposite view in Physics I, where he says that matter is cognizable by analogy to form; and Aristotle says in Metaphysics V that matter is cognized through privation; therefore etc.

            It must replied that prime matter is cognizable, since sometimes the effect is demonstrated through the material cause, and the principle of demonstration is knowable, and therefore also the conclusion. But it must be understood, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics IX, that nothing is cognized per se except being in act, namely, through form. Matter, then, is not cognizable in itself, but through form.

            And the response to the arguments is obvious from this.

Question 68

            It is asked whether anything can be demonstrated through a material cause.

            And it seems not, for the thing to be demonstrated follows on that through which it must be demonstrated, but no being follows on matter except possible being; therefore etc.

            Again, the cause must be better known than its effect, but the material cause is not known in itself therefore etc.

            Aristotle maintains the opposing view.

            It must be held that the material cause is said of matter that is only in potency, and also of parts which have the formula of matter in respect of the whole. According to Aristotle, Physics, II and Metaphysics V, we can consider prime matter in two ways; in one way, in itself alone, and in another way, as it is to the highest degree disposed to form. Through material cause primary without qualification, and not disposed to form, nothing can be demonstrated, as the first two arguments prove. But through material cause taken in the second way; that is, as it falls under the aforesaid disposition to form, thus demonstration does occur through it. Nevertheless, the Philosopher understands it in neither way here, but through “material cause” he understands parts that have the formula of matter in respect of the whole. And that Aristotle understands it thus here is clear from his example. Hence such parts, taken thus one by one, are better known than the whole, and the whole follows on those parts; therefore etc.

            And through this it is obvious how to answer the arguments.

Question 69

            It is asked whether anything can be demonstrated through its formal cause.

            And it seems not, for that which is demonstrated and that through which it is demonstrated are different, but the form does not differ from that of which it is the form; therefore etc.

            Aristotle takes the other view. And it is argued by the following argument: those that are demonstrated are demonstrated through what falls within their formula, since the middle term must be of the same genus as the extremes. But that which falls within the formula of another has the formula of form. Therefore etc.

            It must be replied to this that in a demonstration without qualification demonstration through the formal cause, and this of the passion, does not occur, for the formal cause and the passion of which it is the formal cause are the same, and nothing can be demonstrated without qualification through itself. Now it is true that a passion can be demonstrated through the formal cause of its subject, but through the formal cause of the passion the passion cannot be demonstrated. But it must be understood sometimes a formal part of human being <e.g. rationality> is called a form, and sometimes that which is placed in the formula of something is called the form, so, for instance, rational mortal animal is the form of human being. And so it happens that the aforesaid passion is demonstrated through a formal cause taken in the second way, for such a formal cause is better known than that of which it is the cause.

            And through this the reply to the arguments is obvious.