Questions on Porphyry
Ed. Ottaviano, pp. 23-29;
Ed. Mazzarella, pp. 20-27.
Translated by John Longeway.
As the Philosopher says in Physics II, whoever does not distinguish between what is self-evident (manifestum) and what is not, is thus disposed to the cognition of beings as one blind from birth is disposed to the grasp of colors. Now those who are blind from birth are disposed in this way, that they can indeed syllogize concerning colors, but they cannot judge about them in accord with the truth. For those who lack a sense lack the knowledge which comes through that sense, as it is said in Posterior Analytics I. In the same way, whoever cannot distinguish the self-evident from what is not self-evident is indeed able to use words, but is lacking in reason and intellect., because of which the Commentator says, commenting on the passage in the Physics, that just as a blind person lacks vision, so such a person lacks the natural power of intellect. For they deny propositions that are primary without qualification and indemonstrable.
Now there are a number of causes why people cannot judge between what is self-evident and what is not. This happens to some from their natural construction, due to which their intellects can pick nothing among sensibles. Again, nothing can be impressed on the souls of such people from the cognition of sensibles, except with the greatest difficulty; for they have an intelligence blunted by nature, which neither have the principles of the arts and sciences in themselves, nor can receive them from others. Boethius says of these that we never see those with blunted intelligence drunk with philosophical nectar.
This happens to some others through their having become habituated to the opposites of principles, since, as the Philosopher says in Metaphsyics II, “as we are accustomed [to hear], so do we judge it must be said,” and having become accustomed to hearing what is false, many are drawn into error, as the Commentator says on the same passage, namely that there were many in his time who, because of a bad habit of denying what are held to be principles in philosophy, of whose number, he claims, was Avicenna. Just as, therefore, there are some who, due to habituation, are unable to distinguish between what is self-evident and what is not, and who regard what is most self-evidently true to be most false, the Commentator speaks of these, commenting on Physics II, remarking that it is impossible for this sort of person to philosophize.
Now it happens to some that they cannot judge between what is self-evident and what is not because they have too little instruction in logic. For they believe that everything can be demonstrated, and so wish to receive nothing that is said to them through mathematics. Now this can occur through a weakness of the mind, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics IV, that it is a weakness of mind to seek demonstration of those things of which there is no demonstration. Therefore this happens from an ignorance of logic., for it is explained in logic that one cannot proceed indefinitely in demonstration, and again, that one cannot demonstrate in a circle, from which it is immediately concluded that there cannot be demonstrations of everything. Since, then, such errors, and such great errors, happen in philosophy, because people do not know how to distinguish what is known through itself and what is known through something else, therefore the Philosopher concludes in Metaphysics II that a human being should be instructed in what one should proceed in the individual sciences, so that he does not seek the same certitude in all of them. He should be taught how much certitude is to be sought in each reality, that is, how much the nature of the reality admits. A science which thus instructs a person in the cognition of every reality is logic. This hands down the way in which one must, in each science, arrive at the cognition of something unknown from something known, in such a way that he does not seek the same certainty in all things, if it is not in accord with what the nature of the subject demands. And so logic, although it is a certain science in itself, is nonetheless a way of knowing other sciences.
Although there are many sciences, and every science has a special way of knowing, which differs from the way of knowing in other sciences as one science differs from another, still there is a way of knowing common to every science, since every science through a certain investigation of reason moves from what is cognized to the cognition of something not yet cognized; but this way in which reason runs from one to the other is treated in logic, and therefore logic a certain way of knowing common to all the sciences. If, then, it be absurd to seek at the same time both a science and its way of knowing, it is absurd to seek at the same time logic and the other sciences together with it. It is necessary to learn each way by which one arrives at a term. But logic is the way in every science, and therefore, if any wish to proceed in an orderly way in the sciences, they must first learn logic. So whoever passes on to the other sciences, leaving logic out, perverts the order of things and seeks to do what it is impossible to do. For they seek to teach others, but do not care to learn, which is to be derided, since, as Boethius says, it is an unfortunate thing to become a master, when one has not learned to be a student. They seek to come to a certain end, but they do not care to enter on the way, and such crude and beastly people are regarded as wholly useless for cognizing the true and the good. Against such people we can cite what the Commentator says, “Woe to you, who are reckoned among the number of the beasts.” And they are rightly called bestial, who pass on to the lucrative sciences and leave out logic, this is because they care more for the good of the body than the good of the soul. Since we agree with the beasts in the goods of the body, but act in the same way as the separate substances in the goods of the soul, therefore the Commentator says against such people, “Woe to you, who reckon yourselves in the number of the beasts, not perceiving the good that is in you, through which you rise to higher things, and are similar to the Intelligences.”
In the consideration of the truth of beings, then, logic is not to be set aside, but is to be approached before all the other sciences. Whoever is ignorant of logic, even if he knows something, does not know that he knows it, since whoever knows himself to have some knowledge must know how this knowledge can be discovered, and whoever is ignorant of logic does not know the way in which any knowledge can be discovered. For all the arts and sciences are discovered in accord with one of these ways, namely, by defining, dividing or syllogizing, but logic alone teaches all of these. Even though special sciences define their subjects and divide them, still they presuppose the way in which they are to be defined and divided as it is taken from logic. So logic is useful not merely to support some sciences, but for the support of all sciences, for those who do not know logic do not know how it is that one knows anything. Such people may know something, but they don’t know that they know it.
Albert says in the beginning of his Logic, “whoever does not know logic, cannot discern either his own or anyone else’s error. For he is not capable of judging whether what is known is known rightly or not.” Such people, then are like the uneducated even in those things they seem to know, since they do not know how to trace the causes of those things they know, and so the Philosopher says very often in his books that the cause of the error of past thinkers was that they did not have the science of logic. So logic is the first to be learned among the sciences, for otherwise coming to the cognition of beings is the same as pursuing a flying bird.
Since then logic is a science of the rational, since it is one concerning acts of reason as it proceeds in various ways, moving from some signs making a certain suspicion or presumption to others, thus it is one part of logic, called pure rhetoric, if it is argued thus: “whoever comes out of a brothel is unchaste, this one is coming out of a brothel, therefore etc.” But if reason proceeds from constructed things making an abomination or object of delight in its discourse, thus it is the part of logic called poetics, for instance if it is argued thus: “This drink is similar to poison, therefore it is to be avoided.” But if reason proceeds from the probable, thus it is the third part of logic, which is called dialectic, and this is treated in the Topics. Now if it proceeds from essential and proper causes, thus it is another part of logic, which is called demonstrative, and is treated in the Posterior Analytics. But if it proceeds from those that seem to be, yet are not so, thus it is sophistic, which is treated in the Sophistici Elenchi. And since, when something is common to several things, it is necessary to consider this common thing separately, lest the same should happen to be repeated several times, therefore, aside from these parts of logic, which are about the species of syllogism, there is another part about syllogism in general, and this is treated in the Prior Analytics. Now sometimes reason does not proceed by moving from one to another, but receives the simple whatness of a reality absolutely, by considering it as it can be ordered both above and below a genus, and the book of Categories concerns this sort of act of reason, the subject of which is sayable incomplex beings that can be ordered to genus. And sometimes reason relates simple things it has grasped to one another by composition or division, and the Peri Hermeneias (On Interpretation) concerns such an act of reason, the subject of which is affirmative or negative statement.
Thus, according to the tradition of Aristotle, there are seven parts of logic: the science of the categories, the science of Peri Hermeneias, the science of the Prior Analytics, the science of the Posterior Analytics, the science of the Rhetoric, the science of the Poetics, and the science of the Sophistical Refutations. And people ought to be taught the parts of logic in this order, as the Ancient expositors intend. Since a subject and predicate, from which a statement is composed, are prior to it, the book of Categories, which is about being as the intellect establishes its intention of subject and predicate upon it, must precede the sciences concerning statement, which is treated in the book of Peri Hermeneias.
Again, since a syllogism, taken without qualification, is composed from statements or propositions, which are the same considered as subject, the science of the Peri Hermeneias must precede the science of syllogism taken without qualification, which is treated in the Prior Analytics.
Next, since the shape and form of a syllogism is realized (salvatur) most of all in demonstrative syllogism, therefore the science of the Posterior Analytics, where matters concerning demonstrative syllogism are settled, follows immediately on that of the Prior Analytics.
Then, since the shape of a syllogism through which we demonstrate is more completely (immediatius salvatur) realized in dialectical syllogism, therefore the science of the Topics must follow on that of the Posterior Analytics.
Again, since after dialectic and demonstration the nature of syllogism is realized in rhetoric more completely (per prius salvetur) than in poetics, immediately after the science of the Topics there must follow the science of rhetoric.
And after that, since the shape of a syllogism is found in poetic syllogism, immediately after the science of rhetorical syllogisms, there must follow or be ordered beneath it the science of poetic syllogisms.
And last among the parts of logic in order must be the sophistical science, since in sophistical syllogism the shape and form of syllogism is entirely lacking.
Thus must we order the parts of logic among themselves. Nonetheless, because they are easy, the Topics and the Sophistici Elenchi come beforehand in teaching, and the Prior and Posterior Analytics come last.
Now these books are the ones necessary for the existence of logic, but aside from these there are others, which are for the sake of comfort, and assuring that it is done well, namely the Book of Porphyry on the Six Principles, the Divisions and Topics of Boëthius, and the books of Boëthius on the Categories and Hypothetical Syllogisms.
Now the book of Porphyry which we have before us to be exposited, is useful for the book of Categories, for in that book of Categories mention is made of Aristotle on genus and species, and concerning such he does not yet give an art for cognizing them. Therefore Porphyry composed his treatise on the five universals, in which he shows what each of them is. In the same way the book on the six principles is useful for the cognition of categories, since in this book the six principles, which are dealt with briefly in the Categories, are dealt with at length. But the book of Divisions is useful for the science of the Posterior Analytics, in which demonstration is dealt with, for the middle term of a demonstration is a definition, and definition is investigated by dividing the genus in which we predicate them per se. Hence, whoever does not have the art of dividing cannot know the art of demonstrating. Now the book of Topics corresponds to Aristotle’s Topics, for Aristotle in that book makes a great many remarks about topics, but then does not say what those topics are, and so Boëthius made a treatise about these dialectical topics, showing what the topic is and what the differences of them are.
Since, then, in every work three things are needed, namely what it is that it is about, why, and how, therefore Porphyry touches on these three in his proemium—why? Because of the teaching of the book of Categories, because of demonstration, and because of division—about what? The five universals—how? In a brief and practical way.
It must be known that science is only for removing ignorance. Since, then, ignorance is of two sorts, namely the ignorance of negation, which is removed through the proemium, and of disposition, which is removed through the treatise . . .
“Mox de generibus.” Since it does not seem that he was ignorant of those questions which he does not settle, he perhaps did this because his book concerned logic, therefore it is asked first concerning logic, whether logic is a practical science, or speculative or demonstrative.
And it is argued that it is practical, since that science which teaches a manner of functioning is a practical science, but logic teaches a manner of functioning in individual sciences, since it teaches the manner of defining, dividing and collecting; therefore etc.
Again, reason and will belong to the same capacity of the soul, but that science which regulates human beings in acts of the will, that is, the moral science, is called practical; therefore in the same way that science which regulates human beings in acts of reason, and it is because it does this that logic is called a science of the rational, therefore logic will be a practical science.
On the other hand, it is argued that a practical science discerns good from evil, but logic only teaches how to discern the true from the false; therefore etc.
It must be understood here that there is a difference between speculative and practical science, for speculative science is what perfects a human being in the speculative intellect, but a practical science is what perfects a human being in the practical intellect. Since the speculative intellect inclines toward the true as an end, but the practical toward the good, therefore the end of a speculative science is a view (speculatio) of the truth, but that of a practical science is a function directed to something good. And therefore the Philosopher says in Metaphysics I that the end theoretically considered is truth, but practically it is some work., so that in the practical sciences the science exists only because of some work, since in these knowing is sought for the sake of the work, rather than work for the sake of knowing.
In the second place, it must be understood that the true to which the speculative intellect tends is a true whatness and nature, since each capacity naturally tends to its per se object. Now the whatness of a reality is the per se object of intellect, therefore the speculative intellect tends to this per se. Therefore the end of the speculative intellect is cognition of beings in respect of their natures and whatnesses.
When it is asked, then, whether logic is a speculative or a practical science, it must be said that it is neither speculative nor practical.
That it is not purely speculative is clear, since, in order for some science to be purely speculative, it is necessary that some truth be sought after in it, which is the perfection of the speculative intellect; but such a truth is the true whatness of a reality, and therefore a purely speculative science considers that whatnesses of realities. But logic does not consider such whatnesses, and therefore it is not purely speculative. Logic considers intentions, which the intellect founds on realities and which are extraneous to realities, therefore from such logic is said to be extraneous to philosophy. Then it is argued thus from what has been said: A science which is purely speculative considers the natures and whatnesses of realities, but logic does not consider the natures and whatnesses of realities; therefore etc.
Again, neither is logic purely practical, since in purely practical sciences knowing is sought for the sake of functioning. But in logic knowing is not for the sake of functioning, but for the sake of knowing. The proof of this is that logic was discovered, in the end, so that things could be set right in the other sciences, for instance, so that a human being might know how to divide, how to define, and how to syllogize in the other sciences. But speculative sciences are for the sake of knowing, and not for the sake of any other utility. Therefore logic is, in the end, for the sake of knowing since its end is the speculative sciences the way of knowing of which is explained in logic. Thus it is clear that logic is not purely speculative, nor pure practical, speculative in one respect and practical in another. It is practical when it teaches, using syllogism, how to function, and so teaches syllogizing, defining and dividing and such. It si speculative, since it teaches these not because of some work, but for the sake of scientific knowledge, for logic teaches us to syllogize, so that through its teaching we can set things straight in the other sciences.
Then in response to the arguments, as to the first, when it is argued, “Every science that teaches a manner of functioning” etc., I reply that every science that teaches a manner of functioning which is in the end for the sake of functioning, is practical. And I reply to the minor premise that, even though logic teaches how to function, it does not teach functioning for the sake of the work, but for the sake of knowledge, and therefore it is not practical.
when it is argued “Reason and will” etc., I grant it. And when you say in the minor premise, “But that science which regulates a human being” etc., I reply that it is not the same, since that science which regulates a human being in acts of the will is practical, for the will immediately moves one to function. But when a human being judges through the practical intellect that something is good and to be pursued immediately, if the will determines him to pursue this immediately, the human being begins to function. But the speculative intellect does not immediately move one to function, since that which moves immediately to functioning considers particulars, but the speculative intellect does not consider particulars, but rather universals. For it does not consider the good and the bad, but rather the true and the false; therefore when logic sets human beings right in acts of the speculative intellect, this intellect is not the first mover in functioning, so that logic is called a speculative science more than a practical one, for it does not set a human being right in the functioning of the practical intellect, but rather in the functioning of the speculative intellect, as was said. Therefore etc.
Since it is Porphyry’s intention to discuss the five universals, therefore it is asked whether it is possible for there to be knowledge of universals.
And it is argued that it is not, for there cannot be knowledge about that which is not, but the universal is not; therefore there cannot be knowledge about the universal. The minor premise is proved through Boëthius, who says that everything that is is because it is one in number, but the universal is not one in number; therefore etc.
Again, every science is from what is prior and better known according to its form, but nothing is better known than universals according to form, for just as the singular is first known to the senses, so the universal is first known to the intellect; therefore etc.
On the other hand, it is argued that there can be knowledge of all that which is associated with the intellect, but a universal is associated with the intellect; therefore etc.
It must be held that “universal’” can name two things, the intention of universality and the reality subject to that intention. Speaking of the universal in respect of the reality subject to the intention of universality, in this way there can be knowledge of the universal. And the reason for this is that knowledge is a certain intellectual cognition, and therefore there can be knowledge, either through definition or through demonstration, of all that which is per se intelligible. Now a reality subject to the intention of universality is per se intelligible to the intellect, for otherwise the intellect would not found the intention of universality upon it. Therefore etc.
Again, speaking of the universal in respect of the intention of universality, in this way too there can be knowledge of the universal. And the reason is because the intellect is active through cognition, and os the intellect brings about none of those things which are, unless it cognizes it. Now the intellect functions to produce second intentions in these things, and because of this the Commentator, on On the Soul III, says that the intellect brings about universality in things. Therefore it is necessary that the intellect cognize the intention of universality. Therefore the intellect has knowledge and cognition of the universal in respect of the intention of universality. The intention of universality, however, is the intention of genus and species and the rest, and logic is said to be about these intentions. So it is because of this that logic is said to be the “rational science,” and it is not said to be the rational science because it proceeds through reason, for every science would be rational in this way, but that is called the rational science which is about those things that are caused by the intellect.
But since the intellect causes such intentions, and is moved by their appearing in the reality, and because of this the intellect attributes different logical intentions to things because of their different properties. So the logician would not say this is true, “man is a genus,” but this, “man is a species.” Therefore all logic is taken from the properties of things, since otherwise logic would be a figment of the intellect, something we do not hold. From this it follows that whoever discovered logic was not a logician, for he considered the natures of realities, and so was not a logician, for a logician, considered as such, does not consider the natures of realities, but only intentions, or, if he does consider realities, this is only because they fall under intentions.
So it appears in this way that there can be knowledge of the universal in both its meanings, both in respect of the reality subject to the intention, and in respect of the intention itself. Logic is about the universal in respect of the intention, and is wholly received from intentions.
In response to the arguments: In response to the first, when it is argued, “There cannot be knowledge of that which is not,” I reply that there cannot be knowledge of that which in no way is. In response to the minor premise, I reply that the universal is not a being to that extent, since it is not per se subsistent, but it is a being associated with the soul. And to the authority of Boëthius, I reply that everything outside the functioning of the intellect is because it is one in number, but the universal is not outside the functioning of the intellect; therefore it is not one in number.
In response to the other argument, “every science proceeds etc.,” I reply that this is true. And you claim that nothing is prior to the universal itself—I reply that there is something associated with the intellect prior to and better known than the universal itself, considered in respect of the form by which it is a universal, that is, considered in respect of the form of universality. This is because everything has something prior to and better known to the intellect than it is if its concept can be resolved into a prior concept, but the concept of the universal can be resolved into something prior, namely into “being predicable of more than one,“ and therefore there can be knowledge of the universal considered in respect of the form of universality. Surely this form is an intention belonging to every universal, according to which they all agree in this, that they are each predicable of more than one, and therefore all universals are defined through this, as is apparent from the way the author proceeds.
Next we ask whether a universal is a substance or an accident.
And it is argued that it is a substance, since principles and the things of which they are principles must be of the same genus, but genera and differentia are principles of substances; therefore genera and differences are substances. But genera and differences are universals, therefore universals are substances. The major premiss is obvious, and the minor is proved since genera and differences are principles of substance, and consequently are substances.
Again, as is clear from the Posterior Analytics, there is a difference between definition and demonstration, since definition is of substances, while demonstration is of accidents. From this I argue that definition is of substances only. But definition is also of universals only. Therefore only universals are substances.
On the other hand, every predication of one substance of another is either necessary or impossible. And this is apparent from induction on all such predications. For example, the predication, "this man is an animal," is necessary, but the predication, "the man is a donkey," is impossible. Therefore, if a universal is a substance, the predication, "man is a universal," will either be necessary or impossible. It is clear that it is not necessary, since the predicate is not predicated of everything contained under its subject. Nor is it impossible, since we admit such predications. Therefore a universal is not a substance.
It must be understood here that the universal can name two things, the intention of universality or the reality subject to that intention. If it names the intention, I hold that universal is an accident, and the reason for this is that everything that the understanding brings about with respect to a reality after its being is complete is an accident. But the understanding brings about the intention of universality with respect to a reality after its being is complete, since it is only when the reality is already completely understood and completely cognized that the understanding brings about the intention of universality in it. And therefore when it names the intention, the universal is an accident.
But if we speak of the reality subject to the intention of universality, we must make a distinction, since the thing subject to the intention of universality can be considered either as it is in itself, or as something understood. If it is considered as something understood, it is not to be assumed that the reality is in this way a substance. The Philosopher explains this in the end of Metaphysics VII, where he speaks against Plato, for if it must be assumed that a reality that is actually understood is in this way a substance, then a third man must be assumed. For it is clear that the singular man is a substance, and if, therefore, you assume that the common man is a substance insofar as it is understood, and similarly of the singular man, then they will agree in a single essential form, which is the substance of man. This is a man common to the common man and to the singular man, and thus a third man, a substance common to both, must be assumed. This is opposed to what the Philosopher explains in the place cited, that the substance of each reality is proper to itself and not to anything else. But if a common man is assumed which is the substance of these particulars, then the substance of each is not proper to itself, since the common man which is the substance of Socrates is not proper to Socrates, but is in many others. Therefore a common man which is a substance is not to be assumed. In this way, then, it is obvious that a reality insofar as it is understood is not a substance.
But if a reality subject to the intention of universality is considered as it is in itself, it can in this way be either a substance or an accident, since if the thing subject to the intention of universality is in the genus of substance, it is in this way a substance, but if it is in the genus of accident, it is in this way an accident.
And then the reply to the arguments is obvious, for each proceeds on its own way. When, therefore, it is argued that “principles and the things of which they are principles must be of a single genus,” I grant it. To the minor premise I reply that genus and difference can be considered either as regards the intention of genus or difference, and in this case they are not the principles of species, or as regards the reality falling under the intention, and in this case genera and differences are principles of species and so can be substances.
In reply to the other argument, when it is said “definition is only of universals,” I hold that this proposition must be understood in this way: “definition is of universals, that is, definition is of things with which the concept of universality agrees,” and for that reason definition is of universals. And one must grant that things with which the concept of universality agrees and things with which definition agrees per se are substances, for strictly speaking accidents are not defined.
In reply to the other argument, when it is said that “every predication of one substance of another etc.,” I grant the major premise. And when you say, “therefore, the statement ‘this man is a universal’ is necessary etc.” it must be understood here in what way substance is predicated of substance and in what way it is not. For considering it with respect to the intention of universality this proposition, “man is a universal,” is not a predication of one substance of another, but of an accident of a substance, and in this way it is a contingent proposition. But if we consider it with regard to the reality subject to the intention of universality, in this way the proposition is necessary, and this is its sense: “man is universal, that is, man is a nature which is subject to the intention of universality.” And you can say, “Since in a necessary proposition the predicate ought to agree with everything contained under its subject, if this proposition, “man is a nature subject to the intention of universality” is necessary, then this proposition, “Socrates is a nature subject to the intention of universality” is also necessary. I hold that this proposition is true, “Socrates is a nature that is subject to the intention of universality,” and so is this one, “Socrates is a man, and man is universal,” but this is not true, “Socrates is universal,” nor is this, “Socrates is the universal, man.”
Next, questions are raised concerning the part “Now concerning genera and species,” in which Porphyry raises three difficult questions about the being and nature of the universal. The first is, whether universals are substances among natural things or are among naked and pure concepts alone. Therefore we inquire whether genera and species must be outside the soul.
And it is argued that they must, since an accident is in that to which it belongs, but genus and species are accidents of realities, therefore genera and species are in these same realities. But realities have being outside the soul. Therefore genera and species have being outside the soul.
Again, whatever is predicated of a reality is in it, but genera and species are predicated of realities, so that we say animal is a genus and man is a species; therefore genera and species are in realities. Therefore genera and species have being outside the soul.
Again, as the Philosopher says in Physics III, an action which is an act of an agent is not in the agent as something is in a subject, but it is in the patient in this way. For if Socrates strikes Plato, the striking is not in Socrates as something is in a subject, but in Plato in this way. But now it is the understanding which brings about the intention of genus and species with regard to realities, as the Commentator says on On the Soul III. Therefore the intentions of genus and species are not in the soul as something is in a subject, but are in realities in this way. But realities have being outside the soul, therefore etc.
On the other hand, if genera and species have being outside the soul, then genera and species do not depend on the soul for their being. But this is opposed to Avicenna, who says that if the soul were not, there would be neither genus nor species.
As regards this matter, it must be held that “genus” and “species” can name two things, namely the intentions of genus and species, or the reality subject to these concepts. If they name the realities subject to these concepts, I hold that in this way genera and species have being outside the soul. The reason for this is that that which is predicated of particulars concerning their substantial nature (in quid), and indicates the whole substance of these particulars, has true being outside the soul, since particulars truly are beings outside the soul. But a reality subject to the concept of universality is predicated concerning the substantial nature (in quid) of particulars, and indicates the whole substance, as, for instance, when we say “Socrates is a man.” Therefore etc.
Considering genera and species as regards the reality subject to them, then, they have being outside the soul; but if they are considered as regards the intention, in this way they have being only in the soul. The explanation of this is that the intention of a genus or species is nothing but a certain form applied to the reality by the understanding, according to which that reality is both one and a common predicable of many. For genus is nothing but a certain intention applicable to a reality, according which it is predicated of many differing in species, and so for the other cases as well, each in its own way. But nothing outside the soul is a common predicable of many, since everything predicable which is outside the soul is predicable only in the manner of a particular.
And therefore Boethius claims that everything that is is because it is one in number. The concetp of genus and species is only in the understanding. Nothing this, the Commentator says, on Metaphysics XII, that universals in Aristotle are collected in the soul from particulars through the understanding’s consideration of them, making them one intention. Also noting this, Themistius, commenting on On the Soul I, says that universals are certain concepts (conceptus) which the soul gathers up into itself and collects. Avicenna agrees with this, and says that there must be two ways of being in the same material realities, namely a way of being outside the soul and a way being within the soul. They are outside the soul as regards their essences and whatnesses, but are in the soul as regards their being known. Natural realities, however, as they are outside the soul, must have real accidents, for instance, being white and black; but things as they are within the would must have intentional accidents, such as being genus and being species, and so forth. And therefore if we circumscribe the intellect, we circumscribe all second intentions and we also mark out logic, which is about second intentions.
As to the arguments against this view:
In the first argument, when it is argued, “An accident is in that to which it belongs,” I grant this; and to the minor premise I reply that since realities have being in two ways, namely being in the soul and being outside the soul, I hold that genus and species and such, inasmuch as they are understood alone, and as such, are within the soul alone; but with respect to that other being, they are in realities outside the soul.
As to the second argument, when it is argued that “whatever is predicated of a thing is in it,” I grant this. And when you say that a universal is predicated of realities, I hold that man, and whatever else, is not species according to the being which it has outside the soul, since according to the being which it has outside the soul it is as a particular, but it is species according to the being it has in the soul. For since the understanding considers the nature of man as it is one which is in many, it establishes the concept of species in it. Therefore that nature in which the understanding establishes the concept of universality is actually understood, and the understanding establishes the intention of universality in it as it is understood.
As to the other argument, when it is argued, “an action which is the act of an agent etc.,” I hold that there are two sorts of action—a sort which crosses over into external matter, and another which does not. Therefore, I maintain that an action which crosses over into external matter is in the patient as in a subject, but that action which does not cross over into external matter remains in the agent as the a subject. But the universal is of this latter sort with respect to the understanding, and therefore the universal is in the understanding as in a subject.
Next a question is raised concerning the third doubt upon which Porphyry touches, namely, whether universals are separated from particulars with respect to being.
And it is shown that they are, for each thing acts according to what it is in act; therefore those things which have separate action have separate being; and thus, as is seen, universals will have being separated from singular things.
Again, those things of which there are definitions per se cannot come to be or be destroyed, but definitions are per se of the universals themselves; therefore universals cannot come to be or be destroyed. But whatever is in singular things can come to be or be destroyed; therefore the universal is not in singular things.
On the other hand, that which indicates the whole substance and whatness of singular things is in singular things, but universals indicate the whole whatness and substance of singular things; therefore etc.
<The opinion of the author> The opinion of Plato, which the Philosopher often reproves, was that universals are certain natures subsisting per se outside the intellect, and separately from singular things in their being. And these natures, he claims, are the whole substance of particulars, so that the source of knowledge of particulars, and also of their being, is of the same species as the particulars. So he posited a certain man separated from particular men, and he supposed this to be the substance of all particular men, and he supposed that the same thing is the source of both the being of singulars and of the knowledge of singulars. But there are many things wrong with this opinion.
The first is that he assumes a universal which exists per se, separated from singulars, and yet is the substance of singulars, for these cannot possibly both stand at the same time, since the substance each is in each and not separated from it with respect to being—for the substance of Socrates is in Socrates and the substance of Plato is in Plato. But the universal is the whole substance of particulars, and Plato supposes this, therefore it will not be separated from particulars. And the argument is confirmed from this—that that which is predicated of something, the predication saying “this is this,” and is predicated as concerns its substantial nature (in quid) cannot be separated from it, but universals are predicated of particulars, with the predication saying “this is this,” as is the case in saying “Socrates is a man” or “Plato is a man,” and they are predicated as concerns the substantial nature of these things; therefore etc.
Again, what he says afterwards, that the separated universal is of the same species as the particulars, cannot be true. For corporeal and incorporeal things are not of the same species. But this separated man is incorruptible per se and per accidens, and these particular men are corporeal. Therefore this separated man cannot be of the same species as these particular men.
Again, this opinion fails since he posits that separated thing to be the source of knowledge of particulars. For nothing is understood as it is formally through that which is separated from it in being, but this separated man which Plato posited is separated from particulars in being; therefore etc.
The argument which moved Plato is not convincing. He believed that that which is separated with respect to the understanding is separated with respect to being, and since universals are separated from singular thing with respect to the understanding, therefore he believed that they are separated with respect to being. This is not a good argument, since it is not necessary that that which is separated with respect to cognition be separated with respect to being; for as it is in sensitive cognition, so will it be proportionally in intellective cognition. But it is not necessary that that which is separated or distinct with respect to sensitive cognition be separated with respect to being. Proof: since in milk there are two things conjoined with respect to being—namely, whiteness and sweetness. But these are distinct with respect to sensitive cognition, for vision grasps whiteness and taste sweetness. Therefore they are not separated with respect to being. Therefore it will be similar in intellective cognition, i.e. not everything that es separated with respect to the intellect is separated with respect to being, and therefore, although universals are separated from singulars with respect to the intellect, it is not necessary that they be separate with respect to being. Thus it must be said that universals are not separated in being from particulars, for the universal indicates the whole substance of particulars and is predicated concerning their substantial nature, and therefore it is not separated from particulars with respect to being. So a universal man is not to be assumed because it exists universally, but it is universal because it is understood universally, leaving out every individuating condition. Therefore the Philosopher says that man and animal and whatever is said universally of singulars is not a being, but it is understood, for whatever is a being outside the soul is particular, so that universals are otherwise, since they are understood.
As to the arguments against this view:
As to the first, when it is argued that “each thing acts” etc., I grant the major premise. And when you say that, “therefore, whatever has separate actions” etc., I hold that they have separate being in the same way as they have separate action. And you say that universals act on the intellect, and so have separate actions. It must be understood here that universals, such as man, donkey, cow, and so on, are not understood in actuality, nor do they act on this very intellect, of themselves. It is the active intellect which, in the presence of sensory images, brings it about that they are understood in actuality. Therefore they have separate actions, but this is in virtue of the active intellect, and because of this they have separate being in virtue of the active intellect, but they do not have this through their own power.
As regards the other, when it is argued that “those things of which there are definitions per se” etc., I hold that it is true that such things cannot be brought into being or destroyed per se; but they can be brought into being or destroyed per accidens, in connection with the coming to be and destruction of particulars. And therefore, although there are definitions of the universals themselves, they can still be destroyed per accidens, and brought into being as well, in connection with the coming to be and destruction of the particulars in which they are.
Next it is asked concerning the sufficiency of [the classification of] universals [given in Porphyry].
And it seems that they are infinite, since in however many ways one opposite is said, the other is said in the same number of ways. But singulars and universals are opposites, and singulars are infinite. Therefore etc.
The sufficiency of [Porphyry’s classification of] universals is accepted for this reason: Every universal is predicable, and it is predicated either as regards the essence (in quid), or some characteristic (in quale); and if regarding the essence, then it either indicates the whole essence or some part of it. If it indicates the whole essence, thus it is species, but if it indicates some part of it, thus it is genus. And here one might misunderstand what it is for the genus to indicate a part of the essence. For if it is understood that the genus indicates a part in such a way that it does not indicate the whole essence of that of which it is predicated, this is a misunderstanding. Rather, it is said to indicate a part of the essence because it indicates the [whole] essence of the reality after the manner of matter, and consequently after the manner of a part, just as a difference indicates the whole essence after the manner of form. Thus do those explain the matter who deny any degree in forms. If it is predicated regarding some characteristic, either it is a substantial characteristic, and thus it is a difference, or some accidental characteristic--and this happens in two ways, either convertibly, and thus if it is a property, or no convertibly, and thus it is a [common] accident.
As regards the argument, “in however many ways” etc., that is however many meanings one opposite has, the other has as well, etc. I grant that however many meanings one of these opposites has, namely “the universal,” “the singular” has the same number, and vice versa. But it is not necessary [on this account] that there be as many universals as there are singulars. Or it can be understood strictly concerning these that they are strictly and really opposed, but universals and singulars are not opposed in this way, since the universal is predicated of the singular insofar as it is the reality made subject; therefore, even though there are infinite singulars, it is not necessary that there be so many [kinds of] universals, but they will be as many as has been said.
We ask about the remark that genus and species seem to be said in several ways.
And it seems that genus and species ought not to be defined, since if genus and species are said in several ways they are equivocal, but nothing equivocal is defined; therefore genus and species are not defined.
I reply that genus and species can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, they can be considered as they are equivocal, and thus they ought not to be defined, nor does Porphyry define them taken in this way, for he gives no definition that is common to every signification of genus. In the other way genus can be taken for just one of the things it signifies, and thus genus is not equivocal, and Porphyry defines genus taken in this way when he says that genus is what is predicated etc.
And from this it is obvious how to reply to the argument, for the argument does not lead to any conclusion except that genus as it is equivocal is not defined, and I grant this.
We ask about the remark that a father is a principle for something’s coming-to-be—why is it not said that the mother is a principle in the same way, since the mother contributes to the coming-to-be just as the father does.
I reply that this is the cause, because the mother is materially the principle of coming-to-be, but the father is the principle as the efficient cause and formally. Since the name is taken from what is more formal, therefore the offspring is said to take its origin more from the father than the mother, and so the father is said to be the principle of its coming-to-be more so than the mother.
We ask about the remark that species supposits for the genus.
And it seems that according to this the difference is the genus, because if the species supposits for the genus, and the species supposits for the difference; therefore the difference is the genus.
I reply that species supposits for the difference and the genus in different ways, since species supposits for the genus directly and in the line of categories, but the species supposits for the difference collaterally, and therefore the difference is not the genus.
We ask about the second definition of genus, when it is said that genus is what is predicated of several things different in species.
And it seems, according to this, that species is a genus, since if genus is what is predicated of several things differing in species, species is also what is predicated of several things different in species. When we speak thus: “Man is a species,” Cow is a species,” and so on, these differ in species, and so species is predicated of several things differing in species in this way. Therefore, it seems that species is genus.
I reply that genus is predicated in a different way of several things differing in species in their essence. Species is predicated of several things differing in species, but it is predicated of them accidentally and not in their essence, because this predication, “Man is a species,” is an accidental predication; and therefore species is not genus. Indeed, it can be proved in a similar way that an individual is a species, since it is predicated of several things differing in number; and one ought to respond in the same way to this.
Next it is asked whether place is a principle of coming to exist.
And it is argued that it is not, since place and time are both accidents which come to a thing from without, but time is not a cause of coming to exist; therefore neither is place. That time is not a cause of coming to exist is clear, for the Philosopher says in Physics IV, that everything is made hot, and is destroyed, in time, and nothing new nor good is done in time. Time, therefore is not a cause of coming to exist, and so neither is place.
Again, if place were a cause of coming to exist, it would be either a material cause, a formal cause, a final cause, or an efficient cause. Now it is not a cause in the way form or matter is, since form and matter are in the reality and of its essence, but place is outside the reality; therefore etc. Again, neither is it a final cause, since the end and the form coincide, but it is not the formal cause; therefore neither is it a final cause. Again, neither is it an efficient cause, for place is a quantity, as is apparent from the Categories, and a quantity is not an efficient cause of anything, since it is something mathematical and mathematicals neither act nor suffer action; therefore place is not an efficient cause.
On the other hand, it is argued that coming to exist comes to an end at being; therefore place is a principle preserving the reality in being, since it pertains to the form of place to contain and preserve; therefore place is a principle of a reality’s coming-to-be.
It must be noted that, as the Philosopher says in Physics II, a human being and the Sun bring a human being into existence differently, for the Sun is the principal agent for this bringing to exist, whereas human being is an instrumental agent. The Sun is the principal agent since it is what brings to exist but cannot be brought to exist, whereas the human being is the instrumental agent, or what brings it to exist, since it is what brings to exist and is itself brought to exist. And therefore just as an instrumental agent does not act except in virtue of the principal agent, so neither does a human being act to bring something to exist except in virtue of a superior agencu, that of the Sun and the rest. And therefore the bringing to exist of a human being and of other superior things cannot be, unless it is by a power that has flowed in from superior bodies, but the power that has flowed in from superior bodies is not received in these inferior bodies unless it is by containing a mediating power. Therefore these inferior bodies do not act in bringing a human being or other animal into existence unless it is in virtue of some power they contain, and therefore the place contributes a great deal to the production of animals and other inferior bodies. And this is a sign that it is true that place is a principle of coming to exist, that lions in the second and third climate cannot bring other lions to exist, but in the others they can. Another sign is that certain plants bear fruit in one part of the Earth, but if they are planted in another they do not bear fruit. Therefore the power and disposition of the place contributes much to the coming to exist of animals and other inferior bodies.
From all this two arguments can be formed to show that metaphysically place the principle of coming to exist, by which the power of the principle agent that brings things to exist is received in every secondary agent, because the secondary agent does not bring anything to exist unless it is in virtue of the first. But place is what mediates, by which the power of the principle agent that brings things to exist is received in the secondary agent, by the mediation of which it flows into these inferior things, therefore etc.
Again, that is a principle of coming to exist of which the change provides the first capacity to bring into existence, but change of place provides the capacity to bring into existence, as is clear from what has been said; therefore etc.
And that place contributes much to coming to exist is clear from what Albert said, that everything born in the same place strives, as it were, to follow one law and one custom. Now this would not be unless place contributed to it. Therefore place is the principle of coming to exist and of conservation in existence.
But it must also be noted that place has a two-fold nature, namely qualitative and quantitative. Though its qualitative nature it brings into existence and conserves, and through its quantitative nature if contains, so that place is the principle of coming to exist not insofar as it is quantity, but insofar the a power flowing from a celestial body is received in place, which virtue is suited by nature to contribute to the coming to exist and conservation of a body in that place. And therefore this place in the middle where we are is the principle of human beings and the other animals, not as it contains them abstractly, but as there flows into it a power from a celestial body, which is suited by nature to contribute to the coming to exist of men and other inferior bodies.
As for the arguments to the contrary, as for the first, when it is argued, “time and place etc.,” I reply that time is not a per se principle of coming to exist, but rather it is per se a principle of destruction, since time is the number of motion, and in number is the successive destruction of the parts, and therefore time is more the cause of destruction than of coming to exist, since it separates a reality from the condition in which it once was. Now place is not the measure or number of motion, but is the measure of a reality having in itself a certain power, and through this it is the measure of a reality, and there is received in it from a celestial body another power to bring into existence and to conserve in existence, and through this power flowing into it it is a principle of coming to exist, even though time is not a cause of coming to exist.
As for the other, when it is argued, “if place were a cause etc.,” I reply that place conveys two things, namely containment and conservation. Hence I hold that speaking of place in the first way, it is not a material cause, nor is it a formal cause, nor efficient, as a single argument proves, since, as such, it is quantity. Nor is it a final cause, and this since it is not a formal cause. But speaking of place as it has a power to conserve that has flowed into it from a celestial body, thus it can be called, in a way, an efficient cause.
Next it is asked about the part, “Genus is said in a three-fold way,” in which the author gives a definition of logical genus, saying, “Genus is what is predicated etc.” And it is asked whether that which is defined is a reality or an intention.
And it is argued that it is not an intention, since that is defined which is predicated of many differing in species. But intention is not predicated of many differing in species, for we do not say that a human being is a genus, or a donkey is a genus, by predicating an intention of a reality. Therefore etc.
Again, animal is defined here, but animal is not an intention, therefore an intention is not defined here. The major premise is clear, since the author says in the text that genus is what is predicated of many, etc., for instance, animal, and therefore animal is what is defined.
On the other hand, it is argued, only that is defined here which falls under the consideration of the logician, but only intention falls under the consideration of the logician; therefore only intention is defined here.
It must be understood here that a reality is not defined here absolutely, since it is said that genus is what is predicated etc. And the reason for this is that what is defined here is genus, but “genus” does not name a reality absolutely, but it names a reality as it has a relation and order to supposita. Therefore Albert says that the name “genus” is a relative name, or one concerning the order of superior to inferior. Then it is argued thus: that which is defined here is genus, but genus does not name a reality absolutely, but a reality as it has a relation to supposita; therefore etc. And this is explained thus: with whatever the defined agrees the definition also agrees, since definition and defined are convertible. But a reality taken absolutely, for instance, animal, agrees with its supposita. Therefore its definition also agrees with its supposita. If, therefore, that which is defined here were an absolute reality, then it would be obvious that this definition would agree with all its supposita, and so every suppositum would be predicable of many differing in species; but this is not true; therefore a reality taken absolutely is not what is defined here.
Again, neither is a reality as it is under an intention defined. The proof is because a reality as it is under the intention of genus only has being in the soul, but what has being only in the soul is separated from particulars. From this it is argued that a reality as it is under an intention is not that which is predicable of many supposita, because it is separated from them. But a reality as it is under an intention is separated from supposita or from singulars, and has being in the soul. Therefore etc. Therefore a reality as it is under an intention is not defined here.
It must be held, then, that only the intention is what is principally defined here, although this is not what is usually said. To make this evident if must be considered that there is a difference between the definition of substances and the definition of accidents, since the definition of substances is not given through something added, but the definition of an accident is given through something added, because it is given through the subject, that is, a reality in another category. And the reason why the definition of accidents is given through something added is that it is a definition of true being outside the soul, and therefore whatever it is on which something depends in its true being outside the soul, it depends on that in its definition, but an accident depends on its subject in its true being outside the soul, hence accedents are not beings unless they are beings of a being, and therefore it depends on its subject in its definition. Now the intention of genus is something founded on a reality only through the operation of the intellect, since it is only the intellect that makes second intentions, so that the intention of genus is in two things as subject, namely in the reality understood, and in the intellect, and therefore it is defined through both.
Since then it is sad that genus is what is predicated of several different species as regards what it is, definition must be exposited thus: Genus is a certain intention caused by the intellect and applicable to a reality, which is predicated of several things differing in species as regards what it is. Now Porphyry, to be brief, does not set out all of these conditions, that is, that the genus is an intention applicable to animal, that animal indeed is predicated of several things differing in species etc. The intention of genus, as is is of each accident, is defined through something formal and something material, through something formal, as it is an intention caused by the intellect, and through something material, as it is a reality predicable of several etc., so that what is placed first in its definition is more formal, and what comes after is more material, in contrast with the definition of substance.
But perhaps someone will ask, “this reality which is predicated of several etc., either it itself is predicated of several, according to the being it has in the soul, or according to the being it has in supposita; but not according to the being it has in the soul, as is apparent since it is separated from its supposita according to that being, and nothing separated from something is predicate of it; nor is it predicated according to the being that it has in supposita, as is apparent since then every suppositum would be predicable of several things.
Again, to be predicated is a certain act of reason, therefore it does not agree with a reality according to the being it has in supposita. I reply to this that animal, which is predicated of several etc., has being both in the supposita, and in the soul. It has being in the supposita because otherwise it would not be predicated of them by a predication saying “this is this.” Another that this predicated thus of something is not separated from it. Again, animal, which is predicated of several etc., has being in the soul. The proof is that animal is not predicated of many differing etc., unless it is as it is one in many, but every unity is in the soul, therefore animal which is predicated is in the soul.
But you will ask next, whether animal, according to the being it has in the soul, is predicated of several things differing etc. I reply to this that animal is not predicated of several etc. according to the being it has in the soul, and this absolutely, but as it has being in the soul and the soul related the nature of animal to supposita. Hence when the intellect considers actually the nature of animal, as this has being in supposita, and it considers the nature of animal as this being is one, and not made diverse in the supposita it actually exists in, the formula is assigned to it of predication of several differing in species, and it founds the intention of the genus on these, and he says that such a nature is predicable of several differing in species as regards what it is. Thus, the nature of animal is that which is predicated of several etc., and the intention of genus is founded on that nature. And so we will hold as Porphyry does that a genus is an intention caused by intellect and applicable to a reality, which is predicated of several things differing in species, as regards what they are.
As to the arguments on the other hand, to the first, when it is argued, “that is defined which is predicated of many etc.,” I reply that this is not true. Indeed, that which is defined here is an intention caused by the intellect, etc. And you will say that the intention of the genus is not predicated. It is true that it is not predicated, but it is applicable to a reality which is predicated in this way. So if we take it for the reality it is not defined here, as was said before.
As to the other, when it is argued, “animal is that which is defined here, etc.,” I reply that when Porphyry says that “genus is that which is predicated etc.,” it is said that the definition must be exposited, thus, “that genus is the intention caused etc.,” and such a reality is an animal. Therefore the intention of genus belongs to it.
Next it is asked whether the genus is the principle of its species, as the author says in the text.
And it is argued that it is not, for the principle and that of which it is the principle differ through their essence in species, therefore etc. The major is clear since a cause is that upon which another follows, and therefore the effect is essentially different from its cause. The minor is also clear, since then the genus would not be predicated of its species per se, therefore etc.
Again, a principle is not predicated of that of which it is the principle, but genus is predicated of species; therefore etc.
On the other hand, it is argued, everything is defined through its principles; but a species is defined through its genus and difference; therefore genus and difference are the principles of species, and thus genus will be a principle of its species.
The Philosopher distinguishes different senses of principle in Metaphysics II. Principle is two-fold, namely the principle of a reality and the principle of a cognition. Speaking of the principle of a reality we can say that matter and form are the principles of a species, and in this way substance is in a different manner the principle of accident, so that . . . the principle of a cognition is that upon which it depends as far as its cognition is concerned, and in this way accidents are in a way principles of substances, for accidents contribute a great deal to cognizing what it is. Speaking of principle in the first way genus is not a principle of its species, since when something is constituted from real principles it is different in essence from each of them. But it is not other in essence from its genus, for the same essence is conveyed by both. Therefore one cannot say truly that genus is a principle of species speaking of a real principle.
Again, this is explained thus: If a genus were a real principle, it would be either matter or form, or an end, or an efficient cause. It is not an end or efficient cause, since these are extrinsic to the reality, but a genus is not something extrinsic to its species, since the essence of a genus is not included in the essence of its species. Therefore it is not a principle as an end or efficient cause. Again, it is not a principle of its species as form or matter, since matter is not predicated of that of which it is matter by a predication indicating “this is this,” nor as form, but genus is predicated of species; therefore it is neither matter nor form. Since genus is none of these, genus will not be a real principle of its species.
But speaking of a principle of cognition, in this way the genus is a principle of its species. That it is is clear, since those things which are prior according to intellect are principles for cognizing the posterior. Now the more universal are prior according to intellect to the less universal, and this is what the Philosopher says in Physics I, “The way from the more universal to the less universal is innate to us,” therefore the more universal are the principles for cognizing the less universal. But genus is related to species as the more universal to the less universal, therefore etc.
From this it is clear that a species is not constituted from genus and difference as from
Next it is asked whether this is true: Socrates and Plato are one human being.
And first it is argued that it is not, for one human being and more than one human being are opposites. From this I argue, opposites are not made true of the same thing, but one human being and more than one human being are opposites, and this is true, “Socrates and Plato are more than one human being,“; therefore this is not true, “Socrates and Plato are one human being.”
On the other hand, it is argued that those which are undivided in the nature of a human being are one human being, but Socrates and Plato are undivided in respect of human being; therefore etc.
As regards this, it must be understood that to be one is to be undivided in respect of some nature; for “one” indicates non-division. But non-division is a privation, and a privation requires a nature subject to it, and therefore being one is being undivided in some nature subject to it. Since, then, it is asked whether this is true, “Socrates and Plato are one human being,” the word “one” can indicate non-division in the nature of human being absolutely considered, or in the nature of human being as determined to an instance. If it indicates non-division in the nature of human being absolutely considered, in this way it is true. Socrates and Plato are one human being, for Socrates and Plato are undivided in the nature of human being. But if “one” indicates non-division not in the nature of human being absolutely considered, but as it is limited to an instance, in this way it is false, for those which are one in one nature as it is limited to an instance are one in number, because the instance limits the nature. If, then, Socrates and Plato were one in human nature as it is limited to an instance, Socrates and Plato would be one in some instance; but this is false, therefore the proposition is in one way true, in another way false.
But I believe if we consider the truth of the sentence, this proposition is false. For the Philosopher says in Metaphysics V that “one” is said in three ways, one in genus, one in species, and one number, but “one” in its primary use is said of what is one in number, and in a secondary use it is said of what is one in genus or species. Now this is the nature of an analogous term, which, when it is used alone, stands for that with which it primarily agrees. If, then, “one” is said through its primary use of what is one in number, and through a secondary use of the others, since it is said that “Socrates and Plato are one human being,” the sense is “Socrates and Plato are one human being in number.” And it is clear that this is false.
Therefore, I maintain that speaking without qualification this is false. And that an analogous term which occurs alone stands for that with which it agrees primarily is apparent, for the Philosopher holds in the Physics I that ‘a being’ is said of substance and accident, but when we say “a being” absolutely it stands for substance. In the same way, although we say “it is expedient” of what is expedient for the good and what is expedient for the evil, when it is said “This is expedient,” it stands for the expedient for the good. But it is true that if you add something pertinent to wht is signified secondarily, it stands for what is signified secondarily, so if it were said “Socrates and Plato are one human being in species,” then the “one” stands for one in species, and the sentence is true.
In response to the arguments, in response to the first, when it is argued “those which are undivided in some nature” etc., I reply that they are one in the way in which they are undivided. And you say that Socrates and Plato are undivided, etc.—I reply that this is true, they are undivided in the nature of the species. And you claim therefore, that Socrates and Plato are one human being—I reply that they are one human being by participation in the species.